What might interest rate liberalization do to intermediation and the cost of capital in China? China’s most binding interest rate control is a ceiling on the deposit rate, although lending rates are also regulated. Through case studies and model-based simulations, we find that liberalization will likely result in higher interest rates, discourage marginal investment, improve the effectiveness of intermediation and monetary transmission, and enhance the financial access of underserved sectors. This can occur without any major disruption. International experience suggests, however, that achieving these benefits without unnecessary instability, requires vigilant supervision, governance, and monetary policy, and a flexible policy toolkit.

Early-stage ?rms usually have a single large Research and Development (R&D) project that requires multi-stage investment. Firms? volatility can dramatically change due to the evolvement of R&D e¤orts and stage clearing. First, the success (failure) of R&D e¤orts within each stage (jump risk) decreases (increases) the un- certainty (i.e. volatility) level of the ?rms?future returns ?"jump e¤ect". Second, at the end of each stage, ?rms decide whether to continue next stage investment upon re-evaluating the project prospect conditional on the resolution of technical uncertainty and other information; as ?rms survive each investment stage and are becoming mature, the uncertainty level of their future returns should eventually decrease in later investment stages that lead to maturity ?"stage-clearing e¤ect". Ignoring these e¤ects results in incorrect estimation of ?rms?future volatility, an important element for early-stage ?rm valuation. In this paper, I develop a gener- alized Markov-Switching EARCH methodology for early-stage ?rms with discrete stage-clearing and jumps. My methodology can identify structural changes in the idiosyncratic volatility and also explore the relation between price changes and future volatility. Using a hand-collected dataset of early-stage biotech ?rms, I con?rmed the existence of the "stage-clearing e¤ect" and the "jump e¤ect". In the second part of my paper, I model early-stage ?rms as sequences of nested call options with jumps that lead to mature ?rms. "Jump e¤ect" arises because the early-stage ?rms are modeled as compound call options with jumps on the underly- ing cash ?ows, the volatility of the early-stage ?rms at each stage is determined by the compound call option elasticity to the underlying cash ?ows. If the downside (upside) jump happens, the value of the underlying cash ?ows decreases (increases), which makes the compound call option elasticity go up (down). As a result, the compound call option becomes riskier (less risky). "Stage-clearing e¤ect" arises because as ?rms exercise their option to continue investment, the new options that ?rms enter into will eventually become a less risky option.

Theoretical models predict that the value of a real option should be increasing in the volatility of the underlying asset. Thus, if real options are economically important, then firm values should be positively related to volatility. Consistent with this prediction, we find evidence that stock returns are contemporaneously positively correlated with changes in volatility. Moreover, this positive relation is stronger for firms that are more likely to have more real options and for firms with more irreversible investment opportunities. Most importantly, we find that the sensitivity of firm values to changes in volatility declines significantly after firms exercise their real options. These results indicate that real options constitute an economically meaningful component of firm values.

We find that firms that timed their external financing more in the past (i.e., that issued more capital when market conditions were good) have a lower expected cost of equity than those that timed their issuance less. This result is economically significant, and holds for numerous specifications. The benefits of market-timing activity are more pronounced for equity than for debt. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the gains from future market-timing activity are priced by current investors, and suggest that investors in the secondary market believe in the ability of firms to successfully time the market. We also find that the benefits of timing activity are enhanced for firms with a higher fraction of shares held by dedicated long-term investors, and are reduced for firms with shareholders that are more likely to time their own trades.

In this paper we use the new developed Markov Switching Unit Root test to examine the status of real and financial integration of China, Japan, the European Union, and the United States based on the empirical validity of real interest parity, uncovered interest parity, and relative purchasing power parity. We found strong evidence in favour of those parity conditions and hence concluded that real and financial integration between China and other four countries was well established.

Abstract This paper deals with constructing Finite Dimensional Realization (FDR) of HJM with time-invariant hump shape volatility by applying Linear Realization Theory. Two realization algorithms, Standard Observable Canonical Realization and Jordan Canonical Realization, are introduced. The equivalence between Jordan Canonical Realization algorithm and commonly adopted method of constructing FDR is shown by concrete example. At the same time, simulation results indicate that Standard Observable Canonical Realization is better choice for constructing FDR than Jordan Canonical Realization in terms of more precisely capturing the state variables.

Dynamic allocation of control rights between managers and investors affects policy of the dividend and value of enterprise. The paper studied the relevant factors that affect optimal debt ratio and allocation of control right. We suggest that the enterprise decrease the debt ratio with the increase of moral hazard, liquidity risk and investors’ absolute risk aversion. With the increase of shareholder’s control right, the relationship between shareholder’s control right and managers’ moral hazard is reversed from positive to negative. The implication of the paper is moderate debt ratio may achieve the tough constraint on the managers’ decision.

Using a sample of listed subsidiaries and their parent companies in China, I study top executive compensation and turnover and their relationship to firm performance in business groups in China. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation (CEO turnover) in a listed firm is positively (negatively) related to the accounting performance of its parent company. Using related party transactions to proxy for the correlation between the two firms, I find that management compensation in a listed firm is related to the performance of its parent company if related party transactions exist between them. In addition, I find a stronger relationship between the compensation (turnover) in a listed subsidiary and the performance of its parent company when the percentage of common directors and managers are less than median level. This result indicates that the incentive system can be used to align the interests of managers in the listed firm with that of its parent company when the information asymmetry is high and the parent company can not effectively monitor. Using brand name as a proxy for reputation, I find that management compensation and CEO turnover in group firms are more likely to be sensitive to the performance measures in their parent companies if both use the same brand name.

This study proposes an incentive alignment hypothesis of corporate spin-off activities, in which executive compensation contracts tie the interests of CEOs with those of shareholders and the reduction of agency problems enhances firm value through corporate spin-offs. Consistent with this hypothesis, CEOs with a high level of equitybased compensation are more likely to initiate a spin-off. The announcements of such corporate restructurings are reacted positively by the market. Firms engaging in spin-offs provide greater operating growth in the years following the restructurings compared with their size- and industry-matched control firms. Also consistent with this hypothesis, high incentive CEOs yield more personal gains by selling shares and exercising options following spin-offs.

Lin, Cai, and Li (1998) argue that under information asymmetry, SOE managers can use state-imposed policy burdens as excuses of poor performance and make the State accountable for it. The argument implies that turnover-performance sensitivity of SOEs decreases as policy burdens increase and that such impact depends on the extent of information asymmetry. Accordingly, this paper empirically explores how policy burdens affect top management turnover of Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2005. We find that high surplus labor significantly reduces the sensitivity of chairman turnover to performance for state-controlled firms, while private firms do not exhibit such a pattern. Furthermore, our results show that high surplus labor reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity more for firms with greater information asymmetry. Overall, we find strong evidence supporting the implications of Lin, Cai, and Li (1998). In addition, we find that chairman turnover of Chinese firms is sensitive to different performance measures for state-controlled firms and private firms.