This paper develops a model of private debt financing under inefficient financial intermediation. It suggests a mechanism that can generate the following sequence of events observed in the recent Asian crisis: A period of relatively low capital flow despite a steady improvement in economic fundamentals (capital inflow inertia), followed by a fast buildup of capital inflow, and ended with a large capital outflow and domestic credit crunch. Unlike other models requiring large movements in fundamentals or asset prices to explain a financial crisis, this model can exhibit large credit/capital flow swings with moderate changes in the economic and market environment.

Despite the considerable media attention given to the collapse of the market for complex structured assets that contain subprime mortgages, there has been too little discussion of why this crisis occurred. The Subprime Crisis: Cause, Effect and Consequences argues that three basic issues are at the root of the problem, the first of which is an odious public policy partnership, spawned in Washington and comprising hundreds of companies, associations and government agencies, to enhance the availability of affordable housing via the use of creative financing techniques. Second, federal regulators have actively encouraged the rapid growth of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and securities by all types of financial institutions. And third, also bearing blame for the subprime crisis is the related embrace by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board of fair value accounting. After reviewing the Bush administration's proposed solutions as flawed, this article recommends a strategy for subprime crisis resolution. Job one is to rebuild market confidence in structured assets by going back to first principles on issues such as market transparency, standardization of contracts, and accounting treatment. By reducing complexity on the trade of structured assets through simple deal structures and providing investors with the information they need to analyze collateral, for example by requiring SEC registration and public pricing of assets, much of the current liquidity problem is ameliorated.

Using loan-level data, we analyze the quality of subprime mortgage loans by adjusting their performance for differences in borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and house price appreciation since origination. We find that the quality of loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the crisis and that securitizers were, to some extent, aware of it. We provide evidence that the rise and fall of the subprime mortgage market follows a classic lending boom-bust scenario, in which unsustainable growth leads to the collapse of the market. Problems could have been detected long before the crisis, but they were masked by high house price appreciation between 2003 and 2005.

We conduct a within-county analysis using detailed zip code level data to document new findings regarding the origins of the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. The recent sharp increase in mortgage defaults is significantly amplified in subprime zip codes that experience an unprecedented relative growth in mortgage credit from 2002 to 2005. This expansion in mortgage credit to subprime zip codes occurs despite sharply declining relative (and in some cases absolute) income growth in these neighborhoods. In fact, 2002 to 2005 is the only period in the last 18 years when income and mortgage credit growth are negatively correlated. We show that the expansion in mortgage credit to subprime zip codes and its dissociation from income growth is closely correlated with the increase in securitization of subprime mortgages. Finally, we show that all of our key findings hold in markets with very elastic housing supply that have low house price growth during the credit expansion years. Overall, our findings favor a supply-based explanation for credit expansion over income-based or house price expectations-based hypotheses.

This study investigates the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance in China's listed firms. The study examines how the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is moderated by the private control of firms, the presence of a majority shareholder and the presence of independent directors on the board. Using a panel of about 1200 Chinese firms per year from 1999 to 2006 we find significant changes in the ownership and control of firms. The private control of firms and the fraction of independent directors on the board have increased considerably over time. The study finds a significant negative association between CEO turnover and firm performance consistent with the agency model. There is evidence that the CEO turnover sensitivity for poor performance is greater in firms that are privately controlled, or have a majority shareholder, or have a greater fraction of independent directors on the board.

This paper estimates switching autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (SWARCH) time series models for weekly returns of nine Asian forward exchange rates. We find two regimes with different volatility levels, whereby each regime displays considerable persistence. Our analysis provides evidence that the knock-on effects from China’s currency forwards markets upon other Asian countries have been modest, in that little evidence exists for co-dependence of volatility regimes.

We examine the wealth effects of three regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm's related-party transactions as an inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, we find that firms with weaker governance experienced significantly larger abnormal returns around announcements of the new regulations than did firms with stronger governance. This evidence indicates that securities-market regulation can be effective in protecting minority shareholders from expropriation in a country with weak judicial enforcement. We also find that firms with strong ties to the government did not benefit from the new regulations, suggesting that minority shareholders did not expect regulators to enforce the new rules on firms where block holders have strong political connections.

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of return and volatility spillover effects between developed and emerging futures markets with investment obstacles. It mainly focuses on analysis of the effects on equilibrium futures price, investors’ trading strategies and their wealth distributions in the emerging market. Three hypotheses are proposed. The first two assume that there is either return or volatility spillover between the two markets. The last one combines the first two together by assuming that there are both return and volatility spillovers between the markets. Our analysis results show that the equilibrium futures price, investors’ trading strategies and their wealth distributions in the emerging futures market are affected by (1) the scale of informed traders in the emerging market who form their expectations of delivery price by using the spillovers from the developed market, (2) the spillovers degree that the informed in the emerging market expect, and (3) whether there is return spillover or volatility spillover, or both. Overall, the findings suggest that if there are both return and volatility spillovers, then ignoring the volatility spillover, investors will make improper investment decisions so that the futures contracts could be overpriced and the traders’ wealth could be harmed. The theoretical analysis provide an important implication for empirical examination on the spillover effects between markets, that is, both return and volatility spillover effects should be considered jointly, otherwise the return spillover effects can be overestimated. Empirical examination in copper futures markets generally supports the conclusions drawn from our theoretical analysis.

We investigate considerations (compensations) paid in on-going Division Reform, a process of releasing trading constraint, in China Stock Market, and link this event with existing literature of restricted asset by inferring implied illiquidity discount of restricted shares from consideration. We also propose a new measure of restriction capturing multiple dimensions of restriction finding it together with the scale of restriction well explain the ratio of considerations and the implied illiquidity discount. We also use theoretical models to justify the 20% implied illiquidity discount and find it is below the 48.67% upper bound suggested by Longstaff (1995) and it falls within the range between 12.18% and 23.82% suggested by Lonstaff (2001) concluding the considerations paid in Division Reform is adequate and relative wealth of two classes of shareholders remains after the trading constraint released.

It is documented that technical analysis is a highly pervasive activity among stock traders and security analysts in China. This paper uses eight years’ data on daily stock prices and trading volume of thirty-nine companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to examine the usefulness of technical analysis. Very weak evidence in support of return predictability is generated either by considering returns alone or by the use of volume in conjunction with returns. The results not only cast doubt on the ability of technical analysis to predict future price movements in China’s stock markets, but also challenge the views of market inefficiency for China that are based on aggregate market data rather than individual company data.