目前世界经济和中国经济正面临一个深刻的调整周期。对于中国经济来讲，如何在解决当前危机所需要的短期手段以及改变中国经济依赖外需的畸形结构间寻求平衡，越来越受到政府部门和中外学者的密切关注。为了从数量上把握短期扩张的公共支出政策对实物部门和金融部门影响，本文基于一个实物部门与金融部门相统合的中国金融可计算性一般均衡（Computable General Equilibrium，CGE）模型，从动态的角度定量分析了在中国结构调整过程中公共支出政策对经济效率和收入分配的影响，并提出模拟结果的相关政策含义。

本文利用成都市房地产交易的微观数据（2004-2006），实证检验了中央宏观金融调控（首付款比例和利率）对地方房地产市场的影响效果。我们发现，由于实质的约束力较弱，首付款比例政策没有起到有效调控的作用；相反，地方购房者的贷款决策对中央利率调控有明显反应。我们的检验结果显示：当长期贷款利率升幅较短期贷款利率升幅高0.1百分点时，贷款者选择短期贷款的概率增加8.4个百分点。而且利用商业住房贷款利率和公积金贷款利率变动差异的“自然实验”（Natural Experiment），我们有效控制了可能由宏观政策内生性产生的计量问题，从微观角度为长、短期利率政策的有效性提供了更可靠的实证检验。

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) form a new class of institutional investors with significant influence on the global financial market. Assets under management (AUM) of global SWFs totaled around US$3.0 trillion at the end of 2007, and are still rising. Three developments are behind the current cause of SWFs: First, reform of international monetary system is the core reason for the rise in SWFs; Secondly, the phenomenal raise of energy price is an important reason contributing in the expansion of SWFs; finally, the economic globalization facilitates SWFs’ operation. According to the model of "National Economic Man" model, the foreign reserve of a nation will increase sharply and gradually this nation will invest surplus wealth during the economic stage of early expansion or fast-growing stage. Whereas, with the decreasing of the production factors, accumulated wealth of a nation will gradually attain to peak. When the economy enters into wealth-oriented stage or the stage of sustainable low growth, the nation will increasingly rely on wealth accumulated by consumption, and incline to invest in risk-free assets. At present, the aims of SWFs are mainly focused on the following five aspects, including stabilization the national balance sheet for different periods, diversification of the central bank's reserves, smoothening inter-generation revenue of country, prevention of national socio-economic crisis and assistance of the government’s overall development strategy.

This paper firstly discusses alignment of SWFs with macroeconomic policy. We believe that SWFs can become an effective tool for fiscal policy; SWF investments should be made in alignment with the monetary authority, and help stabilize the exchange rate. SWFs also contribute to stability of the national balance sheet. Asset allocation of SWFs has significant impacts on the current and capital accounts of both domestic and international balance sheets. Secondly, this paper explores the impacts of SWFs on the global financial market and its stability, including those on asset bubbles, equity risk premium and financial market stability. We argue that the potential negative impact of SWFs on the global financial market is very limited, and that they are important stabilizing forces in the global financial market. We believe that SWFs contribute to the coordination of macroeconomic policy from a domestic point of view and to the stability of global financial market from an international point of view.

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) form a new class of institutional investors with significant influence on the global financial market. Assets under management (AUM) of global SWFs totaled around US$3.0 trillion at the end of 2007, and are still rising. Three developments are behind the current cause of SWFs: First, reform of international monetary system is the core reason for the rise in SWFs; Secondly, the phenomenal raise of energy price is an important reason contributing in the expansion of SWFs; finally, the economic globalization facilitates SWFs’ operation. According to the model of "National Economic Man" model, the foreign reserve of a nation will increase sharply and gradually this nation will invest surplus wealth during the economic stage of early expansion or fast-growing stage. Whereas, with the decreasing of the production factors, accumulated wealth of a nation will gradually attain to peak. When the economy enters into wealth-oriented stage or the stage of sustainable low growth, the nation will increasingly rely on wealth accumulated by consumption, and incline to invest in risk-free assets. At present, the aims of SWFs are mainly focused on the following five aspects, including stabilization the national balance sheet for different periods, diversification of the central bank's reserves, smoothening inter-generation revenue of country, prevention of national socio-economic crisis and assistance of the government’s overall development strategy.

本文采用EGARCH与TARCH模型，以2003年6月30日至2008年6月27日的上证综指和深证综指日收益率为研究样本，对中国股票市场价格波动的非对称效应进行了检验，证实了中国股票市场存在对信息反应的不平衡，即：“利空消息”对股票价格的冲击大于“利多消息”对股票价格的冲击。

Based on the background of the banking industry in China, this paper establishes Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg mixed oligopoly competition models with deposit and interest rates as strategic variables between a representative state-owned bank and a representative foreign bank. We discuss and compare the equilibrium deposits, interest rates and profits in different market structures. More importantly, considering the endogenous timing setup and taking the extended game with observable delay as the basic model, we analyze the competition results of the mixed duopoly at different market structures and make numerical simulations in order to get the outcomes of the extended game. It is found that, in the deposit competition with endogenous timing, if two banks have the same deposit return rate, the simultaneous move could become the final result; If the deposit return of the foreign bank is more than twice that of the state-owned bank, all SPNEs of the extended game are sequential, i.e one bank will lead, the other will follow. If the state-owned bank’s profit in Cournot is larger than that of the state-owned bank as the Stackelberg follower, the only SPNE will be (E, L), i.e. the state-owned bank will lead and the foreign bank will follow. Additionally, in the interest rate competition with endogenous timing, if the degree of nationalization is no larger than 75% as well as two banks have the same deposit return rate, the final SPNEs of the extended game are sequential and the simultaneous move can not become the SPNE.

We examine whether the Chinese exchange rate is misaligned and how Chinese trade flows respond to the exchange rate and to economic activity. We find, first, that the Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB), is substantially below the value predicted by estimates based upon a cross-country sample, when using the 2006 vintage of the World Development Indicators. The economic magnitude of the mis-alignment is substantial -- on the order of 50 percent in log terms. However, the misalignment is typically not statistically significant, in the sense of being more than two standard errors away from the conditional mean. Moreover, this finding disappears completely when using the most recent 2008 vintage of data; then the estimated undervaluation is on the order of 10 percent. Second, we find that Chinese multilateral trade flows respond to relative prices -- as represented by a trade weighted exchange rate -- but the relationship is not always precisely estimated. In addition, the direction of the effects is sometimes different from what is expected a priori. For instance, Chinese ordinary imports actually rise in response to a RMB depreciation; however, Chinese exports appear to respond to RMB depreciation in the expected manner, as long as a supply variable is included. In that sense, Chinese trade is not exceptional. Furthermore, Chinese trade with the United States appears to behave in a standard manner -- especially after the expansion in the Chinese manufacturing capital stock is accounted for. Thus, the China-US trade balance should respond to real exchange rate and relative income movements in the anticipated manner. However, in neither the case of multilateral nor bilateral trade flows should one expect quantitatively large effects arising from exchange rate changes. And, of course, these results are not informative with regard to the question of how a change in the RMB/USD exchange rate would affect the overall US trade deficit.

Chinese outbound investment can overall be explained by traditional theories on FDI and MNEs. However, in some aspects Chinese outward FDI is unique and differs from known investment in the “Western” context. Most importantly, it is largely executed by Chinese SOEs. This paper aspires to deepen understanding on the phenomemon by focusing on the policy dimension of Chinese outbound investment. It provides an understanding of the potential and actual government influence, comparing motivations for internationalization by Chinese enterprises and the Chinese government, and pointing out where Chinese companies own a comparative advantage in their internationalisaton activities compared to its mostly Western competitors due to the particular Chinese policy support. Apart from typical motivations for internationalization that apply for Chinese MNEs (market-seeking, resource-seeking, strategic asset seeking and efficiency-seeking motivations), a number of additional motivations exist, which are directly linked to the particular institutional and societal context of China.

Chinese commercial banks have experienced tremendous growth over the past decade but have received limited academic attention due to data collection difficulty. We’ve successfully compiled a hand-collected panel dataset of Chinese commercial banks governance characteristics from 1998 to 2007. We empirically examine the relation between board governance and the profitability of Chinese commercial banks. We find that board governance has significant impact on Chinese banks’ performance. Specifically, higher board ownership, lower percentage of insiders on board, and lower block ownership are associated with better bank performance. In addition, to improve bank performance, Chinese bank managers should also focus on effectively control of bank’s operating cost, increasing net interest margin, and closely monitoring loan productivity. This is the first study conducted on the efficacy of Chinese banks’ governance system and its relation with banks’ profitability. Empirical evidence from this study has important policy implications in reforming China’s banking system into a more transparent and more efficient market driven system.