We axiomatize a new class of multi-prior preferences for decision-making under uncertainty. The unique feature of this class of preferences is that it allows for the role of a reference probability measure. The class of preferences has a tractable representation. It takes the form of minimization, over a set of priors, of an expected utility plus a penalty function that penalizes deviation from the reference probability measure. The preference reduces to the standard expected utility when there is no uncertainty. The paper also discusses some potential applications of the axiomatized preferences.

We study stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) optimal control problems over an infinite time horizon, allowing the cost matrices to be indefinite. We develop a systematic approach based on semidefinite programming (SDP). A central issue is the stability of the feedback control; and we show this can be effectively examined through the complementary duality of the SDP. Furthermore, we establish several implication relations among the SDP complementary duality, the (generalized) Riccati equation, and the optimality of the LQ control problem. Based on these relations, we propose a numerical procedure that provides a thorough treatment of the LQ control problem via primaldual SDP: it identifies a stabilizing feedback control that is optimal or determines that the problem possesses no optimal solution. For the latter case, we develop an
-approximation scheme that is asymptotically optimal.

We find that short-horizon institutions possess private information on long-term earnings that will be reflected in near term stock prices but do not have private information on long-term earnings that will be reflected in stock prices beyond the near term. In contrast, we find no evidence that long-horizon institutions have private information on long-term earnings, regardless of whether the private information will be reflected in near term stock prices or not. Our results question the notion that long-horizon institutions have a stronger incentive than short-horizon institutions to acquire private information on long-term firm value.

In this paper, we have examined the long memory property of Indian stock market by analyzing the trading volume series. Given the absence of trading volume index data, we have constructed trading volume series for the Indian stock market. We used maximum likelihood method to analyze the constructed trading volume index. The estimation of ARFIMA model, obtained a signicant parameter for the order of fractional integration, and this could be consistent with the long autocorrelations observed in the trading volume series. The ndings that stock trading volume is a long memory process is robust, given dierent estimating methods, different subsamples, temporal aggregation and tests on individual stocks. Because of the conditional heteroscedasticity in the series, we have also carried out ARFIMAGARCH procedures to check whether long persistence were robust in the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity.

The purposes of this research are to examine bank risk taking behavior and its relationship with bank charter value, particularly whether the responses of risk measures to charter value are different for banks with high and low level of charter value for the five European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) during the period 1993-2002. By employing Galloway et al’s (1997) empirical model, the findings are partially consistent with their results. The consistency is the acceptance of the ‘moral hazard’ hypothesis that banks with low charter value are more apt to engage in high risk taking strategies. Further analyses found this behavior was constrained in the early 2000s. Moreover, it is interesting that the results also illustrate that risk taking increased with bank charter value over the period, which rejects the ‘bankruptcy cost’ hypothesis that when banks charters are valuable, they are more likely to be risk aversion due to the fear of potential losses of their valuable charters. Overall, the pooled data indicate that there is a non-linear relationship between risk taking behavior and bank charter value.

In a real options and game-theoretic framework, this paper examines the optimal R&D investment timing of an incumbent under uncertainty, which faces the threat of preemption by a potential entrant. We incorporate incomplete information into the model by assuming that the incumbent does not know the entrant’s investment timing but know its distribution. We find that incomplete information reduces the erosion of waiting option value by the competition, and therefore waiting is still valuable even in the presence of preemption and competition. The entrant's hazard rate has the impact on the incumbent's optimal investment timing: the more the hazard rate is, the earlier the incumbent invests.

Based on the research of foreign capital flows and financial risks, this note puts forward the conceptual model─“Foreign Capital Reliance”(FCR), and analyses its interior development mechanism and the possibility & inevitability of its result in Financial Crisis from the perspective of monetary capital. The author believes that financial risks also exist in foreign capital flows, and foreign capital inflows are entirely possible to result in a more fragile economic system. The author also regards Asian Financial Crisis as Crisis typical of FCR. The empirical analyses of sampling five Asian countries: Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines support the arguments.

摘　要: 银行卡在信息时代发挥着重要的作用，但由于存在信息保护和业务处理方面的漏洞，已被犯罪分子充分利用，给银行和持卡人带来了巨大的经济损失。用变形字符表示卡的特征值、结合卡号和密码检验能实现银行卡的多维防伪，杜绝他人成功伪造银行卡，对国家、银行和持卡人来说都具有十分重要的意义。 Abstract:：The Bank card produces a marked effect in information age. It easy be used by lawless person that message saveing and deal processing has defects. So Banks and holders of card suffers a great economics loss. To express eigenvalue of card by changed chars, combining card No and password check can achieves card preventing to forge in many ways. This can prevent man to successfully forge Bank card . This is very important for country, Bank and holder of card. Key words: Bank card; preventing to forge ; preventing to forge in many ways

利率期限结构是资产定价、金融产品设计、保值和风险管理、套利以及投机资等的基础。因此，对利率期限结构的估计是金融工程领域一个十分基础的工作。本文则是在这方面进行的一个尝试性研究工作。对利率期限结构的估计，可以有许多方法，其中包括息票剥离法（bootstrap method）和样条估计法（spline approximation）。本文则同时利用这两种方法对中国2001-2002的利率期限结构进行一个静态的估计，比较两种估计方法的静态估计结果并在此基础上分析中国利率期限结构的变化特征。 The term structure of interest rate is the foundation of Asset pricing, financial products design, hedging and risk management, arbitraging and Investment. For this reason, the estimation of term structure of interest rate is a fundamental research work in the field of financial engineering. This paper is a trial on this subject. There exist many methods to estimate to term structure, which include the bootstrap method and spline approximation. This paper uses both methods to make a static approximation of term structure of interest rate in China from 2001 to 2002, compares the static estimation results of two approximation methods, and then analyzes the dynamic change of term structure of interest rate in China.

We explore whether compensation policies in bidding firms counter or exacerbate agency conflicts by examining CEO pay and incentives around corporate takeovers. We find that even in mergers where bidding shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of the time. In the years following mergers, CEOs of poorly performing firms receive substantial increases in option and stock grants that offset any effect of long-term underperformance on their wealth. As a result, the CEO’s pay and his overall wealth become insensitive to negative stock performance, but his wealth rises in step with positive stock performance. Corporate governance matters; bidding firms with stronger boards retain the sensitivity of their CEOs’ compensation to poor performance following the acquisition. In comparison, we find that CEOs are not rewarded for undertaking major capital expenditures, and that they receive only minor downside protection. Our results highlight that acquisitions are treated differently from other capital investments by the board in setting CEO compensation and our evidence is consistent with the self-serving management hypothesis in corporate acquisitions.