Corporate misconduct poses significant risks to financial markets, undermining investor confidence and economic stability. This study investigates the influence of World Heritage culture, with its social, historical, and symbolic values, on reducing corporate misconduct. Using firm-level data from China, with its rich cultural heritage and ancient civilization, we find a significant negative association between the number of World Heritage sites near a company and corporate misconduct. This suggests that a richer World Heritage culture fosters an informal institutional environment that mitigates corporate misconduct. This effect is robust across 100 km, 200 km, and 300 km thresholds and remains significant when using a binary misconduct indicator. The results also show that World Heritage culture enhances corporate social responsibility (CSR) and social capital, which in turn reduces corporate misconduct. Additionally, the impact of World Heritage culture is more pronounced in firms located in high social trust areas, those with high institutional investor supervision, and those farther from regulatory authorities. These findings advance academic knowledge and offer practical implications for policymakers and investors.

Analyzing data from 3,616 Chinese listed firms, we find a strong positive relationship between policy uncertainty and firms’ exchange rate exposure. This result remains robust after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and addressing endogeneity issues. Notably, policy uncertainty’s impact is significantly stronger for firms with a higher degree of international involvement and for poorly-governed firms. Interestingly, firms use financial hedging more intensively and reduce their operational hedging in high-uncertainty periods. Our results suggest that policy uncertainty exacerbates the impact of currency movements on firms’ financial performance, as firms become increasingly involved in international operations. Consequently, firms should strengthen their corporate governance and make effective use of hedging tools.

Investors' previous experiences with a stock affect their willingness to repurchase it. Using Chinese investor-level brokerage data, we find that investors are less likely to repurchase stocks that have increased in value since they were sold. We then construct a novel measure of Regret to capture investors' repurchase regret and investigate its asset pricing implications. Stocks with higher Regret experience lower buying pressure from retail investors in the future, leading to lower future returns. In terms of economic magnitude, portfolios with low Regret generate 12% more annualized abnormal returns. Further analyses show that the pricing effect of Regret is more pronounced among lottery-like stocks and those in which investors have previously gained profit. The results are robust to alternative estimations.

This paper proposes a conditional factor model embedded with heterogeneous group structure, called grouped Instrumented Principal Component Analysis (Grouped IPCA) model, to study the enhancement of industry classifcations on the pricing power of frm characteristics. We derive an inferential theory on the alternating least square (ALS) estimators of the grouped IPCA model under an unbalanced panel data. Based on this, we use two BIC-type information criteria to determine the number of latent factors. We further examine the group heterogeneity with a bootstrap test statistics. Simulations are conducted to evaluate both our asymptotic theory and test statistics. In the empirical study, we show that the in-sample performance of Grouped IPCA model excels the IPCA model, and fnd a strong evidence on the incremental pricing power of industries.

This paper explores the widespread perception of insurers as bad payers, often accused of unjustly rejecting legitimate claims. We explore the mechanisms leading to this negative image by examining the strategic “nitpicking” behaviour of insurers. Such behaviour involves an insurer’s effort to find evidence that can help it cut the indemnities of honest claims. Our findings reveal that this nitpicking behaviour only arises in markets with asymmetric information, where policyholders are unable to observe insurers’ nitpicking strategies. Conversely, in markets with symmetric information, insurers lose the incentive to engage in nitpicking. Moreover, our study highlights that nitpicky behaviour leads to a reduction in welfare and Pareto-inefficiency. This is because nitpicking is essentially an overpriced gam- ble that charges lower premiums from policyholders at a no-loss state, but cuts actual indemnities received by policyholders at a loss state.

Using text data from Reddit, we construct inter-firm linkages based on shared discussions and common authors on social media. We find that firms linked on social media have similar fundamentals characteristics. The positive predictability of the returns of their Reddit peer stocks on focal stocks’ future returns suggests a sluggish dissemination of information. Our findings show that social media activities capture the collective cognition of the public, effectively reflecting the financial network in an implicit way.

Corporate site visits provide investors with opportunities to obtain non-standard, tailored "soft" information about the firm. In this study, we investigate the impact of information disclosed from corporate site visits on stock market stability from the perspective of stock return volatility. Our findings suggest that it is the information disclosed rather than the visits themselves that significantly reduce stock return volatility, primarily by mitigating information asymmetry. Moreover, we observe that the volatility-mitigating effect of site visits is more pronounced when the visit information better aligns with investors' concerns and when it is more effectively disseminated. Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the timely disclosure of site visit details serves as a stabilizing mechanism for stock prices through effective information mining and dissemination.

We propose a novel measure, DOT, to capture belief divergence on extreme tail events in stock returns. Defined as the standard deviation of expected probability forecasts generated by distinct information processing functions and neural network models, DOT exhibits significant predictive power for future stock returns. A value-weighted (equal-weighted) long-short portfolio based on DOT yields an average return of -1.07% (-0.98%) per month. Furthermore, we document novel evidence supporting a risk-sharing channel underlying the negative relation between DOT and the equity premium following extreme negative shocks. Finally, our findings are also in line with a mispricing channel in normal periods.

This paper examines the effect of financial shared service centers (FSSCs) on corporate misconduct. Using a sample of Chinese public companies with hand-collected FSSC data, we find that the adoption of FSSCs is negatively associated with the likelihood and frequency of corporate misconduct. The results hold to a battery of robustness tests. Moreover, we show that the negative association between FSSCs and corporate misconduct is more pronounced in firms that have no management equity ownership, disclose internal control weaknesses, and have more subsidiaries. Additional analyses indicate that FSSCs can help mitigate both disclosure-related and nondisclosure-related misconduct.

We develop a signaling game model of investment to explore the effects of ambiguity aversion on corporate equilibrium strategies, investment dynamics, and financing decisions in incomplete markets with asymmetric information. Our analysis shows that volatility ambiguity aversion has a similar but more pronounced effect than asymmetric information, leading to higher financing costs, lower investment probabilities, and a greater likelihood of non-participation in investment. Importantly, volatility ambiguity aversion exhibits an amplifier effect, magnifying financing costs, adverse selection costs, and distortion in investment choices under asymmetric information. This increased ambiguity aversion raises the chances of inefficient separating and pooling equilibria, resulting in notable welfare losses. These findings highlight the significant impact of ambiguity aversion on strategic decision-making and equilibrium outcomes in investment, particularly in settings marked by information asymmetry and incomplete markets.