The rise of automated trading systems has made stock trading more accessible and convenient, reducing the link between traditional illiquidity measures and stock returns. However, empirical data in China’s stock market shows conflicting results. We find a significantly positive correlation between intraday illiquidity and future returns in China’s stock market. We offer that the pricing ability of this intraday illiquidity originates from the correlation between trading activity and intraday return. This finding provides compelling out-of-sample evidence for the debate regarding the pricing of the Amihud (2002) measure in the U.S. market. Additionally, we create an intradayreturn illiquidity factor that outperforms Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan (2019) sentiment factors in China’s stock market.

Emissions data collection and management are crucial to operationalizing an emissions trading scheme (ETS). Regulators need high-quality data to allocate emissions allowances and monitor compliance. However, collecting such data can be costly, challenging various actors. Emitters may misreport data, weighing the cost against their interest, while governments may struggle with limited resources in managing compliance. Third-party verification is a solution but tends to be ineffectual and causes new problems unless with sufficient oversight and support. This quality-cost dilemma becomes even more complex in multi-level ETSs, as in China’s national ETS (NETS). Despite increased regulatory efforts to address data challenges, there remains a lack of in-depth legal analysis on the relationship between data quality and cost. This Article establishes a three-element analytical framework—data quality, cost concerns, and intergovernmental relations in data management—to shed light on the nuances of data regulation. Using China’s NETS as a case study, we gain a deeper understanding of the three elements in a specific jurisdiction and the legal institutions, practices, and challenges involved. Governments, emitters, and third-party verifiers each have unique roles and limitations in this process. We suggest legal and regulatory strategies for finding solutions. Our actor-centered analytical model and practical recommendations for the NETS can serve as a valuable guide for jurisdictions facing similar data challenges.

Empowered by comprehensive data on smartphone fund investors’ trading and browsing histories from a Chinese financial company, we explore the role of investors’ financial attention in influencing the relationship between unrealized profits and investors’ selling decisions. Against a backdrop in which retail investors are not attentive to their portfolio information, we find supportive evidence suggesting that investors exhibit realization preference when we condition on days when investors pay financial attention. Further, we show that failing to account for investors’ financial inattention may induce observers to reject the realization-preference hypothesis. This paper also offers insights into the determinants of financial attention and the influence of financial attention on investor disposition effect.

Based on the expected utility under uncertain probability distribution, we explore whether the ambiguity of individual stocks is priced in China’s A-share market and the mechanism behind the ambiguity premium phenomenon. Theoretically, when the asset price is in a specific price range, investors with ambiguity aversion do not participate in the transaction of the asset. As the ambiguity of assets increases, investors with high ambiguity aversion withdraw from the market, and investors with low ambiguity aversion remain in the market (the limited market participation phenomenon); investors who remain in the market due to lower ambiguity aversion are also willing to accept a low ambiguity premium. Empirically, we use "the volatility of the distributions of daily stock returns within a month" to measure monthly ambiguity; and find that (1) the equal-weighted average returns of the most ambiguous portfolios (top 20%) are significantly lower 1.38% than those of the least ambiguous portfolios (bottom 20%); (2) ambiguity still significantly negatively affects the cross-sectional stock return after controlling for common firm characteristics; (3) the higher the ambiguity, the lower the future trading activity, the empirical results are consistent to the theoretical predictions. Those findings reveal the mechanism of the negative ambiguity premium in the A-share market, provide new ideas for further building a factor pricing model suitable for the A-share market, and provide a fresh perspective for preventing systemic financial risk.

Using a proprietary granular database of a major Chinese stock exchange, we examine heterogenous investors’ trading dynamics around one of the most important macro announcements of the Chinese central bank, the monthly release of monetary aggregates data. Exploiting the trading heterogeneity across assets and across investor types, we find that before announcements, institutional investors reduce their aggregate stock exposure while over-weighing riskier stocks of smaller caps, whereas retail investors provide liquidity by increasing their aggregate stock exposure and avoiding the riskier stocks. Large retail and institutional investors become more informed before announcements and trade in correct directions consistent with the news surprises after announcements, while smaller retail investors trade in opposite directions. While the institutional investors accumulate positive returns with risk compensated, the market realizes sizable pre-announcement equity premium.

While it is generally believed that pressure from peers induces employees to improve their efficiency and performance, little is known about whether employees' improved performance is detrimental to the interests of others. Based on a granular dataset at the individual-month level of investment advisors' and customers’ accounts from a large retail bank in China, we find that peer pressure, as measured by the performance of advisors relative to their colleagues in the previous month, can induce the advisors to sell more financial products, but can also exacerbate misselling, resulting in a significant increase in sales of poor-quality financial products ("high-risk-low-return" products). The causal link is identified with an exogenous change of peer size. The peer pressure effects are pronounced among poor performance advisors, and client complaints play a monitoring role in curbing misselling. By exploring the correspondence between advisors and clients, we find that misselling occurs mainly between female advisors and male clients, and between advisors who lack work experience and clients who lack investment experience.

This paper uses the China Household Income Project 2018 dataset to estimate returns to education for various Hukou-migration subgroups. We overcome the endogeneity problem of years of schooling using an instrument based on the Great Expansion of Higher Education policy. Our results indicate that the highest returns are for urban native workers (27.4%), followed by urban Hukou-converted (25.0%) and rural native workers (14.7%). In contrast, the returns to education for rural-urban migrant workers are insignificant. Further analyses suggest that Hukou conversion significantly increased the returns to education for rural-origin people by enabling them access to better job opportunities.

As China’s population ages, more older workers are participating in the labor market, including a significant number of older migrant workers moving to urban areas. However, surprisingly little research has been done on their destination city and employment patterns. This paper addresses this gap by investigating the impact of city-level and industry specialization on the employment prospects of older migrant workers. Using both individual- and city-level data, we find that unlike prime-age migrant workers, older migrant workers have higher employment probabilities in relatively less-developed lower-tier Chinese cities than in better-developed high-tier cities like Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, or Guangzhou. This phenomenon is driven by industry specialization, particularly in the construction sector, which fosters a dense labor market and facilitates higher job-finding rates. Additionally, construction firms and real estate developers in lower-tier cities are more willing to offer better wages than those in high-tier cities, which aligns with older migrant workers’ relatively moderate education profile and wage preferences over housing costs.

With China being a large developing economy, the trading in China’s stock market is dominated by retail investors, and its government actively participates in this market. These features are quite different from those of typical developed markets, and This review focuses on two important questions: how do retail and institutional investors trade in China and why? We have three main findings after reviewing 100+ previous studies. First, small retail investors have low financial literacy, exhibit behavioral biases, and not surprisingly, negatively predict future returns; whereas large retail investors and institutions are capable of process information, and they positively predict future returns. Second, the macro- and firm-level information environment in China is slowly but gradually improving. Finally, the Chinese government actively adjusts their regulations of the stock market to serve the dual goals of growth and stability, with many of them being effective, while some may not generate intended consequences.

Recent sociological research suggests that culturally tight environments enforce strong social penalties for mistakes. I find that such culturally tight environments incentivize managers to suppress negative information, increasing stock price crash risk. Opaque financial disclosure is a channel through which cultural tightness affects managerial bad news hoarding. Labor and capital market pressures strengthen the positive effect of cultural tightness on crash risk. The instrumental regressions using labor-intensive agriculture and ethnic homogeneity as instruments confirm a positive tightness-crash relationship. Finally, changes in environments because of headquarters relocations affect managerial tendencies to withhold bad news, resulting in changes in crash risk levels.