This research explores the effects of adding bitcoin to an optimal portfolio (naïve, long-only, unconstrained and semi-constrained) of by relying on mean-CVaR approach in Chinese market. Then backtesting to compare the performance of portfolios with and without bitcoin for each scenario is performed. Results show significant but weak correlations between various asset classes and bitcoin, implying a more mature financial profile of bitcoin in China compared to that in the west. Backtesting results show that the effect of adding bitcoin to optimal portfolios is not consistent over the entire out-of-sample period. The naïve and the long-only strategy improved the risk reward ratio up until the late 2013 price-crash with no significant advantages thereafter. Shorting strategies on the other hand, with or without leverage, fail to produce more efficient portfolios when bitcoin is added, and this is consistent over the entire out-of-sample period. The results also show that semi-annual rebalancing amplifies the advantages of adding bitcoin to most portfolios except for the semi-constrained portfolio, although the weights analysis show significant shifts in weights which might not represent a feasible strategy in realistic scenarios.

Open banking facilitates data sharing consented by customers who generate the data, with a regulatory goal of promoting competition between traditional banks and challenger fintech entrants. We study lending market competition when sharing banks’ customer data enables better borrower screening or targeting by fintech lenders. Open banking could make the entire financial industry better off yet leave all borrowers worse off, even if borrowers could choose whether to share their data. We highlight the importance of equilibrium credit quality inference from borrowers’ endogenous sign-up decisions. When data sharing triggers privacy concerns by facilitating exploitative targeted loans, the equilibrium sign-up population can grow with the degree of privacy concerns.

影响决策之变量有个人特征、社会影响及情境因素等等，其中个人特征部分又分为：个人资源、动机涉入、知识、态度、人格、价值观与生活型态(Engel 和 Black wall，1990)。而态度，是指人由经验而组织起来的对人、事、物以及周围世界所做的评价，既反映出个人对某些事情的感觉，也是一种相当持久且一致的行为倾向（荣泰生，1999）。而金钱意义除了表面上的购买能力外，还对不同人所代表的意涵也是有所不同的（Keller, C., & Siegrist, M.，2005）。故投资人对金钱的态度会影响投资者决策行为；而投资者不同的风险承担程度会对投资动机产生影响(陈丽梅，2010)。 　　因此，本研究将以(Farley,2000)之风险承担程量表包括风险规避、风险接受及风险偏好三个构面； Yamauchi and Templer(1982)的金态度量表包括权?/名望、保?/时间、诱惑以及焦虑四个构面；及江佳宇(2006)之投资决策量表包括投资信息、产品熟悉度、商业消息、投资者信心及投资意图五个构面对三个变量作为衡量之基础。以观察风险承担程和金钱态度对投资决策的影响程度；同时以金钱态度作为中介变项解释投资决策，以探讨潜在依变项金钱态度是否能增加风险承担对投资决策的解释力。 　　研究结果显示：在人口统计变量分析发现：性别对各变数皆无显著差异；而年龄、教育程度、月收入、投资经验对各变量皆有显著性差异；婚姻状况则只对风险承担形成显著差异；而投资时间之长短则不会显著影响风险承担程度，但显著影响其他变量。各变量以结构方程模式（structural equation model, SEM）作研究工具分析发现：(1)风险承担会影响投资决策部分成立。(2)金钱态度影响投资决策部分成立。(3)当金钱态度作为完全中介变量以增加风险承担对投资决策的解释力部分成立 ,即投资者金钱态度能作为风险承担对投资决策之中介作用。

企业总资产的系统风险可以分解为在位资产系统风险和增长期权系统风险两部分。借鉴Bernardo et al.（2007）的方法，利用1993-2011年间中国A股市场20个行业的数据，实证发现：整体而言，我国市场呈现增长期权贝塔高于在位资产贝塔的现象，而且这一现象在资产账面市值较低和总资产贝塔较高的行业表现得更为明显；此外，即便控制经营杠杆，增长期权贝塔高于在位资产贝塔的结论依然成立。论文的现实指导意义在于，根据与待估企业或项目处于同行业且增长期权占总资产比例较为接近的上市企业的股票收益率，能够较好地确定待估企业或项目的资本成本。

In this article, we analyse investment preferences of domestic and foreign institutional investors to the management quality of Chinese listed firms. We find that foreign institutional investors hold higher shareholding in firms with greater numbers of executive officers with MBA degrees, having served as vice president or higher prior to joining the firm and sitting on multiple boards. Foreign institutional investors in China also show preference over investee firms with larger board size. However, they pay no attention to whether directors are independent from the firm management and meet often. Domestic institutional investors show preference to all management quality indicators that are associated with foreign institutional ownership. In addition, domestic institutional investors invest more in firms where the executive officers are certified public accountants (CPA) and are longer tenured in their current position. Furthermore, domestic institutional investors pay more attention to corporate governance of investee firms than foreign institutional investors. Finally, we find that domestic institutional investors show a strong preference to firms that have been invested by at least one Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII), even after controlling for QFII’s preference for management quality. This indicates that the QFIIs’ international reputation has been used by domestic institutional investors as a positive signal for investment opportunities.

This paper surveys how and why the share spilt reform enhance the corporate governance using agency cost as proxy from the perspective of stockholders’ conflict and liquidity increase in the process of share spilt reform respectively. We find that share spilt reform brings significant governance improvement. Besides, we use some governance effect and liquidity theory proposed by Edmans et al. (2011) to testify by which means the share split reform enhance the corporate governance. What is more, we find that the corporations with great difficulty, which represented for severe shareholders’ conflict, in carrying forward the reform tend to have severe governance problems while it was this kind of corporation that benefited most from the reform and formed the main driving force of the realization of the goal of reform. It has some implication on China’s current reform; that is, only when toughest problems have been overcome will the goal of reform be achieved.

The deviation of control right and cash flow right is a common problem of corporate governance in East Asian companies.With Taiwan's listed companies as samples, this paper discusses whether the degree of deviation of control right and cash flow right will affect the company’s earnings distribution policy. The results reveal that, regardless of using stock right or the number of directors to measure the control right, companies of higher degree of deviation of control right and cash flow right have higher proportions of employee bonuses against the shareholder dividends, In this case, the company is more biased in the care of the employees at the expense of the minority shareholders. The company is especially likely to exploit the minority shareholders by controlling the board of directors and paying cash dividends to employees. As investors believe that the controlling shareholders of companies with high degree deviation of control right and cash flow right, and high proportion of employee bonuses are intended to exploit the minority shareholders, such companies have significantly lower declared earnings distribution remuneration compared with companies with low degree of deviation and low employee bonuses.

This study investigates the impact of ultimate government ownership or control on the cost of debt of Chinese listed corporations. We first examine the relative level of cost of debt of corporations under government control compared to corporations under individual or family control. We then explore circumstances under which government control is likely to reduce a corporation’s cost of financing. Our results suggest that the benefits of government control are conditional on firm-specific financial circumstances and internal- and external-corporate governance environment. We find that, on average, government controlled corporations have lower cost of debt but the effect is not homogeneous. Government controlled corporations have lower cost of debt when they are highly financially constrained and have higher risk of being expropriated by controlling shareholders and in provinces where the local government is less effective, but not otherwise.

This study examines relation between financial development and the cost of equity capital and finds the following main results: (1) stock market development in general reduces cost of equity, consistent with its role in liquidity provision, information asymmetry reduction, and risk diversification helping to reduce systemic risk; (2) banking development only weakly decreases the cost of equity, consistent with the pervasive state-ownership in large banks constraining their efficiency. Further analysis reveals that the relation between stock market development and cost of equity is more pronounced in large firms and in firms with lower growth potentials, suggesting that stock market development fails to support small and/or growth firms. Moreover, the relation is more pronounced in region with low accounting quality, weak law enforcement, or lower market integration, and in period prior to split share structure reform. The evidence suggests that stock market developments and other institutional arrangements substitute each other in reducing cost of equity. This study contributes to literatures on financial development and cost of equity, and also holds immediate policy implications.

This study examines the effects of acquirer characteristics, information asymmetry on method of payment of Chinese acquirers based on a sample of 1370 mergers and acquisitions that occur between 1998 -2008. Using both Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) and Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (CTAR) approaches, we find that Chinese acquirers experience pre-acquisition abnormal returns ranging from 14.29%-121% over the period 12-36 months prior to the acquisition relative to 3 different portfolio benchmarks. In the pre-bid period, acquisitions financed by shares outperform acquisitions financed by cash. However, in the post-acquisition period, we document no significant difference between cash- and equity-financed acquisitions. We document a number of factors that determine the method of payment by Chinese acquirers: acquirer market value, Tobin’s Q, state ownership and leverage have significant effects on the method of payment.