The deviation of control right and cash flow right is a common problem of corporate governance in East Asian companies.With Taiwan's listed companies as samples, this paper discusses whether the degree of deviation of control right and cash flow right will affect the company’s earnings distribution policy. The results reveal that, regardless of using stock right or the number of directors to measure the control right, companies of higher degree of deviation of control right and cash flow right have higher proportions of employee bonuses against the shareholder dividends, In this case, the company is more biased in the care of the employees at the expense of the minority shareholders. The company is especially likely to exploit the minority shareholders by controlling the board of directors and paying cash dividends to employees. As investors believe that the controlling shareholders of companies with high degree deviation of control right and cash flow right, and high proportion of employee bonuses are intended to exploit the minority shareholders, such companies have significantly lower declared earnings distribution remuneration compared with companies with low degree of deviation and low employee bonuses.

本文针对商业银行流动性风险国际监管框架的演变，探讨监管重点与流动性风险变化的互动关系，从而梳理出国际流动性风险监管的目的、手段和发展趋势，进而研究其对我国流动性风险监管实践的影响。 本文从分析商业银行流动性风险的成因入手，指出其根源是银行存款和贷款业务所形成的期限错配，因此这种风险是银行在经营活动中难以避免的。流动性风险区别于银行面临的其他风险的主要表现是其低频率、高损失的特点，这使得银行一旦面临流动性危机的打击就很难在短时间内恢复过来，所以必须引起银行管理层和监管机构的重视。从20世纪90年代起单一的流动性指标监管方法已经逐渐被综合的流动性风险管理体系所取代，但各国之间尚存在较大差异。 本文对次贷危机前美国、英国和东亚各国的流动性风险监管框架作了横向比较。经过比较后发现，在流动性风险监管体系中，存在两种不同的方法，即定性方法和定量方法。前者偏重在制度层面对银行进行指导以提高其流动性风险管理能力，而后者则偏重以硬性指标客观计量和评估流动性风险，两者互有优劣，不可偏废。相对来说，英美国家因为金融制度比较完善、人才水平较高，其监管机构以使用定性方法为主；而东亚各国由于金融发展水平较低，产品结构简单，从业人员水平参差不齐，所以更偏好使用定量方法。 当各国金融监管机构还在为如何在定性方法和定量方法之间进行取舍的时候，美国次贷危机和之后席卷全球的金融危机不期而至，这大大加快了流动性风险管理理念和监管实践的发展速度。作为次贷危机的受害者，本文深入分析了英国北岩银行（Northern Rock plc）的挤兑危机案例，对危机背景、银行的经营特点、事件经过和后续影响都作了较为细致的论述，并指出银行自身流动性风险管理不善是形成危机的主要原因，这表现在不合理的资产负债结构、期限错配、利率缺口以及内部控制的缺失。尽管北岩银行管理层对于流动性危机的发生负有不可推卸的责任，但是监管失败的教训同样发人深省，这间接促成了巴塞尔银行监管委员会（Basel Committee on Banking Supervision，以下简称巴塞尔委员会）制定后危机时代的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文回顾了历年巴塞尔委员会制定的流动性风险监管文件，将其大致分为次贷危机前和次贷危机后两大类。本文指出，巴塞尔委员会早期制定的流动性监管框架已经很难适应飞速发展的国际金融形势，面临诸多迫切需要解决的问题，包括融资渠道的变化、资产证券化、复杂金融工具的泛滥、抵押品的广泛应用、支付结算系统和日内流动性需求以及跨境资金流。在这些问题中，很大部分也同样存在于危机前的北岩银行，因此危机的爆发带有某种必然性。巴塞尔委员会在次贷危机后发布的《流动性风险管理和监督稳健原则》和《第三版巴塞尔协议：流动性风险计量、标准和监测的国际框架》奠定了第三版巴塞尔协议下国际流动性风险监管新框架的基石。前者制定的17项流动性风险监管新原则和后者引入的流动性覆盖率（Liquidity Coverage Ratio，简称LCR）和净稳定资金比例（Net Stable Funding Ratio，简称NSFR）两大指标分别从定性方法和定量方法两方面完善了现有的流动性风险监管框架，这也反映了未来国际流动性风险监管的趋势。 正如在本文开篇提到的，流动性风险是银行不可避免的风险，对于中国银行业来说，也不能置身事外。经过分析我国银行业的流动性风险现状，笔者认为我国银行的资产负债结构仍属传统，偏重以存款作为融资来源、以贷款作为盈利来源，因此长期流动性风险不容忽视而短期流动性风险尚属可控。同时，不同类型商业银行的流动性风险来源也有所不同。此外，国内银行的流动性风险管理水平也有待提高。与巴塞尔协议类似，在次贷危机前后，我国的流动性风险监管框架也有了质的飞跃，这主要归功于中国银监会颁布的《中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见》、《商业银行流动性风险管理指引》和《商业银行流动性风险管理办法（试行）》（征求意见稿）。这些法规系统性地借鉴巴塞尔委员会的先进经验，辅以本地化的监测工具，从而形成了兼顾定性方法和定量方法的有中国特色的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文最后指出，无论是定性方法还是定量方法，在流动性风险监管中都起着举足轻重的作用，两者不可偏废。监管机构在设计流动性风险监管框架并实施现场或非现场监管时，应灵活运用定性方法和定量方法并结合压力情景评估银行的流动性风险，这样才能全面有效地实施流动性风险监管，避免系统性的流动性危机。另外，本文还建议我国监管机构在本地化国际流动性风险监管框架方面做更多尝试。 With respect to the evolution of the international supervision framework for commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article aims to discuss the interaction between the regulatory focuses and the diversification of liquidity risk, in order to sort out the purposes, approaches and development trends of the international supervision on liquidity risk and their impacts on China’s supervision practice of liquidity risk. In regard to the causes of commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article points out that the mismatch of maturity between the bank’s deposits and loans is the fundamental reason. Such risk is inevitable when conducting banking business. The features of liquidity risk (i.e. low frequency but extremely severe) distinguish itself from other risks that the bank faces, which hinders the bank from a quick recovery after being stricken by a liquidity crisis. Therefore, both the bank management and the regulators must draw their attentions to it. From 1990s, the monitoring method of single indicator has been gradually replaced with the comprehensive liquidity risk management system. However, there are still big variances between different countries. This article compares the framework for liquidity risk supervision between the United States, the United Kingdom and the East Asian countries prior to the subprime mortgage crisis. It is noted after comparison that there are two different approaches in the liquidity risk supervision system, namely the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. The former emphasizes improving the bank’s liquidity risk management skill by guiding the bank from governance perspective, while the latter prefers measuring and evaluating the liquidity risk by means of objective indicators. Each of these two approaches has its pros and cons that neither should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. Relatively speaking, the Anglo-American countries prefer qualitative approaches due to their mature financial system as well as professional practitioners. By contrast, East Asian countries rely on quantitative approach because of their under-developing financial system, simple product structure and less experienced practitioners. When the financial regulators in various countries were still wondering whether to adopt the qualitative approach or the quantitative approach, the subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States and thereafter became a global financial crisis. This crisis accelerated the development of the management theory and the supervision practice of liquidity risk. This article analyzes the bank run on Northern Rock plc (the Bank) in the United Kingdom, a victim of the subprime mortgage crisis, by elaborating the crisis background, the business features of the Bank, the incident course as well as the subsequent impacts. The major cause of the bank run was the Bank’s own mismanagement of its liquidity risk, which included unbalanced structure of assets and liabilities, maturity mismatch, interest rate gap and ineffective internal control as well. Although the management of the Bank bore the ultimate responsibility for this liquidity crisis, the lesson of the supervision failure was thought-provoking. It also indirectly led to the renewed framework for the post-crisis liquidity risk management and supervision by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee). This article reviews the historical documents of liquidity risk supervision that were formulated by the Basel Committee and divides them into two categories, i.e. before and after the subprime mortgage crisis. This article points out that the framework for liquidity risk supervision which was established by the Basel Committee at the early stage could no longer meet the rapid development of the international financial environment and faced many problems which need be solved urgently. These problems included the change of financing channels, asset securitization, misapplication of complex financial instruments, extensive use of collaterals, payment-settlement system, demand for intraday liquidity and cross-border cash flow. Northern Rock plc had most of these problems prior to its bank run crisis. Therefore, the crisis was with certain inevitability. After the subprime mortgage crisis, the Basel Committee issued “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision” and “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” which laid the foundation of the renewed international framework for the liquidity risk supervision under Basel III. The former defines 17 new principles of liquidity risk supervision whilst the latter introduces two key indicators, i.e. the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Both of the two foundational documents improve the existing framework for liquidity risk supervision from qualitative and quantitative aspects respectively. They also reflect the trends of international liquidity risk supervision. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the liquidity risk is inevitable to all banks including the China’s banks. Based on the analysis of the status quo of the Chinese banks’ liquidity risk, the author draws the conclusion that the structures of assets and liabilities of the China’s banks are traditional, i.e. the deposits are the source of financing while the loans are the source of profit. Hence, their long-term liquidity risk cannot be ignored whilst their short-term liquidity risk is still under control. In addition, the liquidity risk management skills of the China’s banks need further improvement. Similar to the Basel Accord, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (the CBRC) promulgated “Guidance Opinions on the Implementation of the New Supervisory Standards of Basel III in China Banking Sector”, “Guidelines on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks” and “Administrative Measures on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks (Trial) (Draft for Consultation)” right after the subprime mortgage crisis, which made great improvement in the framework for liquidity risk supervision in China. By referring to the advanced experiences of the Basel Committee, together with the help of the localized monitoring tools, these regulations forms a new framework for liquidity risk management and supervision with Chinese characteristics which takes into account both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Finally, this article reminds that both the qualitative and quantitative approaches play equally important roles in the field of liquidity risk supervision that neither of them is dispensable. When designing the framework for liquidity risk supervision and conducting the on-site or off-site inspections, the regulators should apply flexibility in the use of qualitative and quantitative approaches and attach importance to the stress scenarios to assess the bank’s liquidity risk. By this means, comprehensive and effective supervision on liquidity risk can be achieved to prevent systemic liquidity crisis. Furthermore, it is suggested that the domestic regulators should make more efforts to localize the international framework for liquidity risk supervision.

Various studies have been done on wealth effects and financial performance of firms in different countries but have yielded mixed results. Data on completed deals of Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (CBMAs) comprising public listed firms with more than ten percent of share acquisition in five East Asian countries were analysed using event study and key financial ratios. Although the results for average abnormal returns in Indonesia and Korea were inconclusive, the results for Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines suggest that the market had reacted positively adding value to the target firms at merger announcements. There was a significant improvement in targets’ free cash flow after CBMAs when compared to both before CBMAs and also control firms after CBMAs. The results also reveal that that these five East Asian countries have moved towards more efficient markets.

This study examines the effects of different dimensions of financing constraints (financial market development, governance environments, ownership control and other firm-specific characteristics) on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for all takeover bids announced in nine East Asian economies from 1998 to 2005. The results of logistic regressions verify that the extent of stock market and governance developments encourages cross-border M&As in this region. The results also indicate that firm-specific financing constraints, except the ownership control variables, reduce the occurrence of cross-border M&As related to domestic M&As. Although family- and state-controlled firms have better access to external financing, they are reluctant to risk diluting their management control and thus prefers less cross-border M&As to domestic M&As. This study enhances the empirical studies of the financing constraint-investment relation based on the market imperfection theory in corporate finance theories. Information asymmetry is the main reason causing the market imperfection and leading to financing constraints to corporate investments. This study, by examining the relation over nine East Asian firms, thus provides an understanding of how such a relation fits in the firms in countries where information asymmetry is high.

A model of the domestic financial intermediation of foreign capital inflows based on agency costs is developed for studying financial crises in emerging markets. In equilibrium, the banking system becomes progressively more fragile under imperfect prudential regulation and public sector loan guarantees until a crisis occurs with a sudden reversal of capital flows. The crisis evolves endogenously as the banking system becomes increasingly vulnerable through the renegotiation of loans after idiosyncratic firm-specific revenue shocks. The model generates dynamic relationships between foreign capital inflows, domestic investment, corporate debt and equity values in an endogenous growth model The model's assumptions and implications for the behavior of the economy before and after crisis are compared to the experience of five East Asian economies. The case studies compare three that suffered a crisis or near-crisis, Thailand and Malaysia, to two that did not, Taiwan Province of China and Singapore, and lend support to the model.

Vertical fragmentation of product value chain across borders is the driving force of growing economic interdependency in East Asia. A common currency, not flexible exchange rates between national currencies, would reduce flexibility in relative prices within East Asia. Its impact would be far greater for exports that have stronger production network linkage. In order to test the hypothesis, the paper estimates the effect of a common currency on China's processing and ordinary exports separately. The distinction is necessary because the processing exports, unlike the ordinary exports, are produced along the regional production networks, with final stages of assembly and exporting being increasingly concentrated in China. The short-run dynamics indicate that the effect on China's processing exports is more than double the corresponding effect on China's ordinary exports. The long-run effect on the processing exports of intra-regional RER flexibility, which is otherwise the lack of a regional currency, is almost nine times as large as the long-run effect of a unilateral RMB appreciation. By contrast, the corresponding long-run effect is statistically insignificant for the case of ordinary exports that are produced primarily by using local inputs. The long-run coefficient of this intra-regional RER flexibility implies that the actual volume of processing exports is 20 percent below the potential. The magnitudes of these effects are consistent with the hypothesis that a common currency would further integrate East Asian production networks and promote regional economic integration.

We study the effects of Chinese monetary policy shocks on China's major trading partners in East Asia by estimating structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models for six economies in the region. We find that a monetary expansion in Mainland China leads to an increase in real GDP (temporary) and the price level (permanent) in a number of economies in our sample, most notably in Hong Kong and the Philippines. The impact could result from intertemporal substitution present in a general equilibrium framework which allows for positive domestic impacts of foreign monetary expansions. Our results emphasize the growing importance of China for its neighboring economies and the significance of Chinese shocks for the design of monetary policy in Asian economies.

摘要：一国经常项目赤字只有获得足够资金支持才能维持，基于此本文将美国经常项目赤字可持续性问题转化为能否稳定地获得外源性融资的问题。文章从供给和需求角度探讨了美国与东亚之间特殊融资安排的形成与稳定性问题，并用两种方法估计了美国经常项目赤字可持续的必要条件及调整的时间。本文认为国际金融体系下美元霸权和东亚国家内需不足导致了东亚国家的资金供给，美国消费主导型经济导致经常项目赤字进而引致资金的需求，供求之间能达到短期均衡。但是由于制度安排的缺陷，这种特殊的融资安排长期必然走向崩溃。届时美国赤字调整不可避免，中国应采取措施方法赤字调整带来的风险。 Abstract: The current account deficits are sustainable only if it was adequately financed. On this basis, this paper has translated the problem concerning the sustainability of current account deficits into the question of stability of outside financing. Then, our paper discuss the special financing arrangement between East Asia and US, hence after, we further discuss the necessary conditions for the “sustainability” and time to adjust deficits. This paper justified that: East Asia becomes the supplier of financing because of the dollar hegemony under the absent of international financing system and lack of inner demand, US become the demander of financing for sake of the demand-led growth. The demand and supply will reach an equilibrium in short run, but the special financing arrangement dooms to be collapsed for short institutional arrangements, the US has to adjust its currents account deficits passively.

This paper studies the relationship between corporate leverage and the ultimate corporate ownership structure, particularly the separation of cash flow rights and control rights. We empirically disentangle the three potential effects of the divergence of control rights from cash flow rights on corporate leverage, i.e., the non-dilution entrenchment effect, the bonding role of debt and the fear-of-financial-distress entrenchment effect. Our evidence from the East Asian corporations mainly supports the notion that controlling shareholders with relatively small ownership share tend to increase leverage out of the motive of raising external finance without diluting their shareholding dominance. The separation of cash flow rights and control rights contributes to the risk-taking tendency of the large controlling shareholders in capital structure choice.