Local financial development is crucial for advancing regional financial supply side structural reform, enabling local governments to leverage financial instruments to effectively mobilize land resources and foster competitive growth. The introduction of numerous financial products linked to land-related rights and interests has resulted in a pronounced transmission and interconnection of fiscal and financial risks across regions. This study examines the impact of local financial development on land financialization in China using panel data from prefecture-level cities and detailed information on land mortgages. The findings indicate that the establishment of city commercial banks (CCBs) contributes to the progress of land financialization by incentivizing local government financing vehicles to participate in land mortgage financing, increasing the transfer of debt risks to the financial sector. Notably, the impact of CCBs on land financialization is more pronounced in regions with urban agglomeration, high GDP manipulation, inadequate local financial regulation, and robust implicit government guarantees. Further analysis reveals that CCB establishment has negative spillover effects on land financialization in neighboring areas, while expansion strategies such as establishing intercity branches, engaging in cross-regional mergers, and relaxing regulations have mitigated the rise of land financialization at the regional level. This study provides policy recommendations that focus on reducing local governments’ reliance on land financing and enhancing the prevention and management of financial risks.

A lack of sufficient information about potential borrowers is a major obstacle to access to financing from the traditional financial sector. In response to the need for better information to prevent fraud, to increase access to finance and to support balanced sustainable development, countries around the world have moved over the past several decades to develop credit information reporting requirements and systems to improve the coverage and quality of credit information. Until recently, such requirements mainly covered only banks. However, with the process of digital transformation in China and around the world, a range of new credit providers have emerged, in the context of financial technology (FinTech, TechFin and BigTech). Application of advanced data and analytics technologies provides major opportunities for both market participants – both traditional and otherwise – as well as for credit information agencies: by utilizing advanced technologies, participants and credit reporting agencies can collect massive amounts of information from various online and other activities (‘Big Data’), which contributes to the analysis of borrowing behavior and improves the accuracy of creditworthiness assessments, thereby enhancing availability of finance and supporting growth and development while also moderating prudential, behavioral and conduct related concerns at the heart of financial regulation. Reflecting international experience, China has over the past three decades developed a regulatory regime for credit information reporting and business. However, even in the context of traditional banking and credit, it has not come without problems. With the rapid growth and development of FinTech, TechFin and BigTech lenders, however, have come both real opportunities to leverage credit information and data but also real challenges around its regulation. For example, due to fragmented sources of borrower information and the involvement of many players of different types, there are difficulties in clarifying the business scope of credit reporting and also serious problems in relation to customer protection. Moreover, inadequate incentives for credit information and data sharing pose a challenge for regulators to promote competition and innovation in the credit market. Drawing upon the experiences of other jurisdictions, including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Singapore and Hong Kong, this paper argues that China should establish a sophisticated licensing regime and setout differentiated requirements for credit reporting agencies in line with the scope and nature of their business, thus addressing potential for regulatory arbitrage. Further, there is a need to formulate specific rules governing the provision of customer information to credit reporting agencies and the resolution of disputes arising from the accuracy and completeness of credit data. An effective information and data sharing scheme should be in place to help lenders make appropriate credit decisions and facilitate access to finance where necessary. The lessons from China’s experience in turn hold key lessons for other jurisdictions as they move from credit information to credit data regulation in their own financial systems.

The development of the wealth management market is based on the needs of investors. The logic of market regulation should also be based on the interests of investors. On the basis of summarizing the regulatory experience of the global wealth management market, suggestions are put forward to improve the system of China's wealth management market . The fundamental driving force for the establishment of a regulatory legal system for the wealth management market comes from the needs of the development of the wealth management market. Moreover, the structure and process of this institutional construction are also closely related to the structure and development of market demand. China's current wealth management market has become a huge financial sector, and the deepening of the market and the diversification of participants all put forward requirements for the construction of a fair and scientific regulatory system. Wealth management business is different from traditional financial business in many aspects such as function, business standard and business model, and its basic legal relationship is also far from traditional business. The commonality of business in China's current wealth management market is in line with the basic elements of the legal relationship of trust. From the perspective of the realistic basis and the nature of the industry, it is appropriate to define the basic legal nature of wealth management business as a trust relationship. Due to factors such as information asymmetry and economic scale, financial investors are in a serious imbalance and imbalance when they trade with financial institutions. Therefore, the financial supervision system should grasp this core contradiction, give investors the status of consumer protection, and establish the concept of protecting wealth consumers. The regulation of wealth management operators should grasp the requirements of the basic trust relationship, take the basic principle of supervising the performance of trustee duties by financial management institutions, and implement a series of rules for trustees to be loyal and prudent in financial management. These rules should focus on risk prevention, and include establishment of access standards for wealth management business, supervision of independent development of wealth management business, supervision of full performance of prudent management duties by wealth management institutions, and guidance for healthy development of wealth management institutions. The experience in the supervision of developed wealth management markets such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore shows that the establishment of a legal system for the protection of wealth management consumers is an inevitable result of the development of the financial market, and it is necessary to set up special institutions and mechanisms to implement the concept of wealth management investor protection, and emphasize wealth management products. Providers' fiduciary obligations to investors, and functional supervision based on a unified system in the regulatory system can be used as a reference for China . China's wealth management market regulatory system include inconsistent rules, weak protection, biased guidance, and lack of independence. Due to the separate regulatory system, different game rules apply to homogeneous wealth management business operated by different types of financial institutions, resulting in rule conflicts and market injustice. However, the substantive rights of wealth management investors still exist in a vacuum that cannot be confirmed. At the same time, the status of consumers is far from being officially confirmed, and the consumer protection mechanism cannot truly achieve justice. As regulatory guidance still favors the concept and tools of supervising traditional businesses, wealth management institutions mainly expand extensively by selling products, and wealth management products also present serious "bond-like" characteristics. The "non-neutral " positioning of financial regulatory agencies has externalized into phenomena such as rule conflicts, "policy following suit" and "excessive maintenance of stability". Constructing and continuously improving China's wealth management market supervision system is: the purpose of supervision is to restore the effective operation of the market mechanism. The basic legal relationship in China's wealth management market should be recognized as a trust relationship. This is not only an essential requirement of the wealth management market, but also a practical need to integrate regulatory chaos. It is the trend of financial and economic development that the regulatory system positions the position of wealth management consumers. It should start with legislative policies, make key breakthroughs around consumers' substantive rights and protection mechanisms, and gradually improve investor protection mechanisms. The regulatory system should focus on supervising financial institutions to fulfill their fiduciary obligations, and establish sound access rules, business independence rules, prudent management rules, and strict market exit mechanisms. China's wealth management market supervision system should be based on unified legislation and gradually implement functional supervision in order to achieve effective management and harmonious development of the wealth management market.

This paper focuses on evidence from stock markets as it investigates the spillovers from the United States to mainland China and Hong Kong SAR during the subprime crisis. Using both univariate and multivariate GARCH models, this paper finds that China's stock market is not immune to the financial crisis, as evidenced by the price and volatility spillovers from the United States. In addition, HK's equity returns have exhibited more significant price and volatility spillovers from the United States than China's returns, and past volatility shocks in the United States have a more persistent effect on future volatility in HK than in China, reflecting HK's role as an international financial center. Moreover, the impact of the volatility from the United States on China's stock markets has been more persistent than that from HK, due mainly to the United States as the origin of the subprime crisis. Finally, as expected, the conditional correlation between China and HK has outweighed their conditional correlations with the United States, echoing increasing financial integration between China and HK.

The global financial crisis is hitting China hard with great adversity. In response, China start to formulated the plan for dealing with the financial crisis and its possible fallout in June 2008 when China was in the critical stage of putting up the Olympic Games. The Chinese leadership judges the crisis is going to be a serious disaster but not as bad as the great depression of the 1930s. An America-type crisis is unlikely to happen in the country and the main threat would be the Chinese real sector being dragged down under, which in turn sparks a crisis in the financial sector. China’s strategy for combating the crisis therefore is to deal with the immediate crisis effects in the real economy in the first place, and looks for opportunities in the meantime. The overwhelming emphasis is placed on expanding domestic demand to fuel growth. Following this strategy, China has rolled out a comprehensive package of combating measures. The fiscal expansion hit the headlines with extensive government financial support for infrastructure and public service projects. Yet the Chinese monetary stimulus is actually more powerful. The stance of Chinese monetary policy has changed from being precautionary against inflation with flexibility to appropriate easing to promote growth. After several rounds of rate cuts, the Chinese version of quantitative easing takes the central stage. In China’s battle with the financial crisis, the monetary stimulus is playing a leading role at the moment. The international dimensions of China’s monetary policy typify how China turns a crisis into a world of opportunity. China has taken a conservative approach to managing her reserves in which the huge international reserves are taken as self insurance rather than an avenue for international leverage. Within this framework and if safety of these foreign assets can be assured, China can provide finance to countries in crisis through international financial organisations. In addition to the Panda Bonds, the chief way for China to make funding contribution is through IMF. For this matter, China supports the motion to increase the IMF’s lending capacity and would buy the bonds it issues. China is actively calling for reform of international financial architecture. Chinese advisers have publically argued that the increase in China’s funding contribution has to be paralleled by an increase in China’s profile in the power structure in the IMF. In many occasions, China has also acted as spokesman of the emerging and developing economies by making cases for increasing their say in world financial affairs. But on the whole, China has been cautious not to committing herself too much as she knows probably she has little to gain from international policy coordination. Against this backdrop, China has chosen to focus on regional financial cooperation proactively and considerable progress has been made in this area. China’s dealing with the current financial crisis is unassuming. What she has done is down-to-earth common sense. However, the Chinese approach is shown signs of working. Despite the early success of crisis handling, there remain fundamental problems in China’s structure of economic growth. How to redress structural imbalances in the economy, to boost domestic demand, to calm down the property market and, above all, to create millions of jobs, are still the major huge challenges China is facing.

Chinese authorities have traditionally relied mainly on administrative and quantitative measures in conducting monetary policy, with interest rates playing a less prominent role. Additional support for this view resides in a number of earlier studies that have found that the impact of interest rates on the real economy has been miniscule. However, taking into account numerous reforms in the financial sector and more widely in the Chinese economy, interest rates may have gained some influence in the last few years. It is important to study the effectiveness of interest rates also in light of future reforms of the monetary policy tools in China. Whereas administrative policy measures were effective in guiding the behaviour of state-owned enterprises, the authorities may need to increase the use of more market-oriented monetary policy tools as the share of the economy in private and foreign ownership grows. We use a vector error correction model to study, within a credit demand framework, whether the impact of interest rates in China has become stronger over the last decade. Our results suggest that loan demand has indeed become more dependent on interest rates, albeit the channel from interest rate to the real economy is still weak.

The Financial Services Authority (FSA) has gained some useful experience from a single financial services regulator in the UK. It reflects the outcome of a long process of gradual change in the regulation of Britain’s financial sector. The process of regulatory change was itself motivated by, and was at times a catalyst for, more fundamental changes in the structure of the regulated industry. Thus to understand the policy background to the Act it is necessary to understand the processes of both industry and regulatory change extending back over several decades.

China’s non-performing loans were as high as 35 percent of state banks’ total loans, or about RMB 3,549 billion (about 40 percent of its GDP) in 2000. The adequacy ratios of the four state banks were only between 1.4 percent to 4.6 percent in September 2000. Moreover, non-bank financial institutions as a group as early as 1996 had non-performing assets equal to 50 percent of their total assets. By Western accounting standards, China’s most financial institutions are insolvent. Be conventional standards for measuring financial sector robustness, China is past the point at which a systemic banking crisis might be expected. China faces enormous risks delaying the state bank reforms due to increasing capital account leaks, increasing large proportion of household deposits in banks’ total liabilities, and gradual structural shift of Chinese saving behavior. China needs to resolutely address the financial reforms soon to avoid a financial crisis, which will lead to a broad anti-regime coalition against the Chinese government. Nevertheless, China faces enormous difficulties. First, the 2000 Chinese official estimate puts the financial cost of restructuring the state banks at RMB 2,260 billion ($273 billion), or close to 30 percent of GDP. Second, the current AMC scheme is fraught with difficulties. Finally, the required financial sector reforms are closely interlinked with many other reforms such that a sequential or partial approach will not be effective.