This work explored the changes in production decision-making trends of Chinese steel enterprises under the influence of the carbon border adjustment mechanism. First, using evolutionary game theory, the interactive mechanism of complex production strategies among steel enterprises considering the carbon border adjustment mechanism was studied, including the impact of government subsidy coefficients, additional profits and carbon tax prices on enterprise decisionmaking.Second, the influence of key parameters on the dynamic evolutionary process was analysed. On this basis, the empirical simulation method was used to verify the game model and the main conclusions. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters was determined using Matlab software. The results showed that additional profits from green investment, government subsidy coefficients, input-output values and carbon tax prices had a higher impact on the evolution of enterprise production strategies. The results of this study provide a decision-making basis for the selection of future production methods for steel enterprises.

As first noted by Borch (1960), it seems natural to consider allocations of premium among reciprocal reinsurers as a problem in cooperative game theory. In the present paper, we address this problem by defining and studying the characteristic function associated with the reinsurers’ payoffs from concluding a reciprocal treaty. First, we use the characteristic function to describe the core and bargaining set previously identified by Baton and Lemaire (1981a, 1981b). Given that the core and bargaining set may consist of more than one point, it is necessary to develop a framework for selecting a unique premium allocation. However, this effort is greatly complicated by the large number of potentially desirable mathematical properties associated with various premium-allocation methods. To address this difficulty, we consider two specific contexts for reciprocal reinsurance – within-corporate-group and between-corporate-group transactions – and provide a detailed analysis of the mathematical properties most desirable for each context. Using these properties, we are able to compare competing allocation methods to determine which is the most suitable. Our analysis shows that the Shapley value provides the most attractive allocation method for the within-group problems, whereas the nucleolus provides the most compelling outcome for the between-group case.

摘 要 会计信息失真问题，现已成为我国会计界、经济界乃至我国政府面临的重大课题。它不仅影响到与企业有利益关系的投资者、债权人等群体的经济利益，而且影响到整个国家的经济秩序和社会秩序，为了探究失真的真正动因，本文从多层次多角度进行了论证。 本文先从会计信息的定义入手，对会计信息的界定作出了精辟的阐述，继而对失真作了逐级的分解，得出失真的标准。 然后用实证分析的方法从证券市场及国企等不同方面具体分析会计信息失真的深层次根源，并列举了两个案例进行佐证。 最后以纳什比衡的博奕理论结尾，再度从理论上和实际上总结出失真的根源。 ABSTRACT Accounting Information on Fraud is an important problem that our accounting field and economic field and our government must to face.Not only investors and creditors that are associated with enterprise’s advantages and disadvantages,but also all of the country’s economic order and public order are effected.In order to look into the real causes on Fraud ,this paper will expand and prove in many ways. At first I’ll discuss the meaning of on Accounting Information on Fraud.Then to resolve step by step and to obtain a standard on Fraud. Secondary,using cause study method to test in depth the origin that the security market’s and state enterprise’s Accounting Information on Fraud.And list two cases to proof. In the end,I’ll use John Nash’s the game theory on Fraud to summarize the origin on Fraud from the actual situation and theoretical again.

In a real options and game-theoretic framework, this paper examines the optimal R&D investment timing of an incumbent under uncertainty, which faces the threat of preemption by a potential entrant. We incorporate incomplete information into the model by assuming that the incumbent does not know the entrant’s investment timing but know its distribution. We find that incomplete information reduces the erosion of waiting option value by the competition, and therefore waiting is still valuable even in the presence of preemption and competition. The entrant's hazard rate has the impact on the incumbent's optimal investment timing: the more the hazard rate is, the earlier the incumbent invests.