We study how politicians' activities affect the stock market and firm performance. Using hand-collected data on China's national leaders' corporate visits, we investigate the industry-wide implications of these visits. We find that over the six days surrounding a visit, an average industry peer's value increases by 2\% of its total assets. This result reflects investors' favourable interpretation of leaders' visits as a signal of more government support for the entire industry. However, the industry peer's profitability plummets by more than 15\% in the next three years. Further analysis reveals that after the visits, industry peers increase their investments, presumably in anticipation of additional government subsidies and credits. However, these resources are insufficient, and the profitability of these firms suffers. Our findings suggest that national leaders' visits do not help boost the targeted industries, and firms should carefully interpret the politicians' activities.

While a wide range of managerial practices suggest that coopetition plays a crucial role in advancing firm innovation, how this effect occurs and the boundary conditions remain unclear. The literature revealing the specific mechanisms by which inter-firm coopetition affects firm innovation, including mediating mechanisms and boundary conditions, is still insufficient. By integrating the resource dependence theory and the capability view, this study explores how firm agility links inter-firm coopetition and open innovation within industrial clusters. In addition, based on conceptualizing coopetition as a concept containing three elements (cooperation, constructive conflict, and destructive conflict), this study examines government intervention in industrial clusters as a boundary factor and explores how it affects the relationship between inter-firm coopetition and firm agility. Based on the analysis of a sample of 181 industrial cluster firms in China, the results of this study show that firm agility mediates the relationship between cooperation, constructive conflict, and open innovation, respectively, and that government intervention diminishes both the facilitating effect of constructive conflict on firm agility and the negative effect of destructive conflict on firm agility. The findings contribute to the understanding of how and when coopetition affects open innovation and provide a theoretical basis for firms to utilize coopetition to innovate successfully.

This study explores how the application of democratic rule in land reform decision-making determines villagers’ political trust towards different levels of the government in China. Based on analyses of a two-period household survey data we find that in China’s most recent Collective Forest Tenure Reform, the use of democratic rule improves villagers’ trust for town and county cadres, whereas the impact on trust towards village cadres is only significant for the democracy involving all the villagers or households in a village. This pattern of trust is partly explained by our findings that the democratic process helped decrease the unresolved inter-village forestland disputes whilst there seems no such impact on the within-village land disputes. Heterogeneity analyses show that democratic decision-making has a more pronounced effect in improving trust for villagers with lower income, and those without affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or to the village committee.

ESG is emerging as a new benchmark for measuring a company's sustainable development capabilities and social impact. As a measure of ESG performance, ESG ratings are increasingly receiving attention from companies, the general public, and government institutions, and are becoming an important reference factor influencing their decision-making. This paper investigates the impact of corporate ESG ratings on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and its mechanisms of action. Focusing on listed companies in China, we find that higher ESG ratings contribute to improving a company's TFP, and this conclusion remains valid after robustness tests and addressing endogeneity issues. Further exploration into the reasons behind this result reveals that ESG ratings can be seen as a signal that a company sends to the outside world, representing its overall performance. Higher ESG ratings enhance a company's TFP by reducing market financing constraints and obtaining government subsidies. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive impact of ESG ratings on TFP is more pronounced for companies with higher levels of attention, reputation, and audit quality. Additionally, we explore whether ESG ratings can serve as a predictive indicator for measuring a company's TFP. This hypothesis was tested using machine learning algorithms, and the results indicate that models incorporating ESG rating indicators significantly improve the accuracy of predicting a company's TFP capabilities.

Informal institutions can play a crucial role in fostering corporate and policy innovation, especially when formal institutions are weak. However, their intangible nature makes them difficult to quantify. In this paper, we proxy the strength of kinship-based informal institutions using surname homogeneity among business owners, specifically, the extent to which they share a limited number of surnames within the same county. Our analysis reveals that a one-standard-deviation increase in the strength of informal institutions leads to a 21.1% increase in patent filings and an 18.9% increase in policy innovation. We find that kinship-related informal institutions foster corporate innovation by compensating for weak formal institutions, enhancing protection for intellectual property rights, facilitating access to finance, improving public service delivery, and promoting supply chain cooperation. We also suggest that kinship-related informal institutions encourage local governments to engage in policy experimentation, which relies on the collaboration of business owners. This experimentation process is easier to coordinate and monitor in counties dominated by a few kinship networks. Both informal institutions and policy innovation contribute to economic development and foster entrepreneurial market entries. However, the positive impact of informal institutions declines over time as formal institutions strengthen in China.

Based on the sample of Chinese A-listed firms from 2003 to 2020, this paper investigates the effect of common institutional ownership on labor income share. The result shows that common institutional ownership can significantly increase firms’ labor income share. Mechanism tests indicate that common ownership can: 1) alleviate financial constraints by reducing the debt financing costs and increasing the trade credit financing, thus increasing the labor income share; 2) improve corporate innovation and therefore enhances the demand for highly-skilled labor, which eventually boost labor income share. Competitive hypothesis test represents that common institutional ownership can reduce the monopoly power of enterprises and decrease monopoly rent, so as to increase the proportion of labor in the distribution. Further analyses present that the network formed by the common ownership can effectively exert the financing support role of SOEs and the knowledge spillover effect of innovative-advantage firms, which contributes to the labor income share increasing of other related firms in the network connection. This study not only enriches the economic consequences of common institutional ownership, but also provides policy guidance for the government to further optimize the income-distribution pattern by deepening the reform of the financial market.

Amid growing global interest in state interventions, this paper examines the impact of Chinese government infrastructure investments on improving firm productivity. It centers on a policy aimed at directing regional governments to foster a more conducive market environment for private enterprises. Our analysis reveals that the positive effect of infrastructure investment on firm productivity is increased by 42.5% for private firms in industries that benefitted from improved market entry opportunities and an even more striking 97.9% in provinces where arbitrary fines were curtailed. These findings underscore the complementary roles of state interventions and the development of market mechanisms in boosting firm productivity.

This paper explores the impact of government intervention on local analysts’ earnings forecasts, based on a scenario of financial misconduct in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, under the influence of the government, local analysts’ earnings forecasts for SOEs with financial misconduct are less accurate and more optimistically biased. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that forecast bias by local analysts is greater when officials have stronger promotion incentives, when regions are less market-oriented and have a larger share of the state-owned economy, and when SOEs contribute more to taxation and employment. In further analysis, we find that local analysts have a more optimistic tone in reports targeting non-compliant SOEs. Local analysts who depend heavily on political information will also issue more biased and optimistic forecasts on SOEs with violations. Finally, as a reward for achieving government goals, the local brokerages affiliated with these analysts and providing these optimistic forecasts are more likely to become underwriters in seasoned equity offerings of SOEs. This paper reveals that government intervention significantly influences analyst forecasts, providing implications for understanding the sources of analyst forecast bias.

We develop a model economy with active financial markets in which a policymaker's adoption of a gradualistic approach constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In our model, the ex ante policy proposal influences the supply side of the economy, while the ex post policy action affects the demand side and shapes market equilibrium. When choosing policies, the policymaker internalizes the impact of her decisions on the precision of the firm-value signal. Moreover, financial markets provide a price signal that informs the government. The policymaker learns about the productivity shocks not only from firm-value performance signals but also from financial market prices. Access to information through both channels creates strong incentives for the policymaker to adopt a gradualistic approach in a time-consistent manner. Smaller policy steps yield more precise information about the productivity shock. These results hold robustly for both exogenous and endogenous information models.

This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy—introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers’ leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance, with privately-owned developers disproportionately affected relative to state-owned firms. Using granular project-level data, we document significant drops in sales and a demand shift from private to state-owned developers. The policy also reduced local governments’ land sale revenues, prompting greater reliance on hidden local government financing vehicles for land purchases. The policy induced broad structural changes in China’s housing and land markets.