Why do firms appoint expired independent directors? How do expired independent directors affect corporate governance and thus impact investment decisions? By taking advantage of the sharp increase in expired independent directors’ re-employment in China caused by exogenous regulatory shocks, Rule No. 18 and Regulation 11, this paper adopts a PSM-DID design to test the impact of expired independent directors on CSR performance. We find that firms experience a significant decrease in CSR performance after re-hiring expired independent directors and the effect is stronger for CSR components mostly related to internal governance. The results of robustness tests show that the main results are robust to alternative measures of CSR performance, an extended sample period, alternative control groups, year-by-year PSM method, and a staggered DID model regarding Rule No. 18 as a staggered quasi-natural experiment. We address the endogeneity concern that chance drives our DID results by using exogenous regulatory shock, an instrumental variable (the index of regional guanxi culture), and placebo tests. We also find that the negative relation between the re-employment of expired independent directors and CSR performance is more significant for independent directors who have more relations with CEOs and raise less objection to managers’ decisions, and for firms that rely more on expired independent directors’ monitoring roles (e.g., a lower proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, high growth opportunities, and above-median FCF). The mediating-effect test shows that the re-employment of expired independent directors increases CEOs’ myopia and thus reduces CSR performance. In addition, we exclude the alternative explanation that the negative relation is caused by the protective effect brought by expired independent directors’ political backgrounds. Our study shows that managers may build reciprocal relationships with expired independent directors in the Chinese guanxi culture and gain personal interest.

This paper employs a proprietary data set on commodity producers’ profit margins (PPMG) and establishes a robust positive relationship between commodity producers’ profitability growth and future returns of commodity futures. The spread portfolio that longs top-PPMG futures contracts and shorts bottom-PPMG futures contracts delivers a statistically significant average weekly return of 36 basis points. We further demonstrate that profitability is a strong SDF factor in commodity futures market. We theoretically justify our empirical findings by developing an investment-based pricing model, in which producers optimally adjust their production process by maximizing profits subject to aggregate profitability shocks. The model reproduces key empirical results through calibration and simulation.

We examine the effect of minority shareholder voting rights on labor investment efficiency using a sample of Chinese firms. Taking advantage of the difference-in-difference setting, our study reveals that the expansion of minority shareholder voting rights has a detrimental effect on labor investment efficiency. Through analysis of holding period and a managerial shortsightedness index based on textual analysis, we find that this outcome can be attributed to the fact that minority shareholders typically prioritize short-term gains over long-term corporate growth. Moreover, the impact of voting power is more pronounced in determining the investment efficiency of rank-andfileemployees. Our results are more significant for firms that face severe financial constraints, are non-state-owned enterprises, exhibit lower levels of internal control, possess fewer female managers, demonstrate lower human capital quality and higher labor intensity. Taken together, our paper suggests that minority shareholders could be myopia in making labor decisions.

This paper investigates the effect of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) on the ESG performance of their underlying firms. Using data from China, we find that ETFs enhance the ESG performance of their underlying firms. This finding remains consistent after several robustness and endogeneity tests. Further, we show that the effect is more pronounced for non-SOEs, firms in low-polluting industries, and firms at growth and maturity stages. Studying the mechanisms behind these results, we find that ETFs mitigate the corporate agency problems, enhance the willingness of managers to invest in ESG, and improve the ESG performance.

Site visits allow visitors to physically inspect productive resources and interact with onsite employees and executives face-to-face. We posit that, by allowing visitors to acquire investmentrelated information and monitor the management team, site visits offer disciplinary benefits for corporate investments. Using mandatory disclosures of site visits in China, we find that corporate investments become more responsive to growth opportunities as the intensity of site visits increases, consistent with the notion that site visits yield disciplinary benefits. We also find that the positive association between site visits and investment efficiency is more pronounced when visitors can glean more investment-related information and when they have stronger incentives and greater power to monitor managers. This positive association is also stronger among firms with more severe agency problems and higher asset tangibility. The overall evidence supports the notion that site visits serve as a unique venue for institutional investors and financial analysts to acquire valuable information and serve a monitoring function, which generates disciplinary benefits for corporate investments.

This study explores the proclivity of institutional investors in China towards highESG stocks amidst the growth of ESG investment funds. Using A-share data from 2015-2022 and a Tobit model analysis, it is found that these investors indeed favor such stocks, particularly under extensive analyst coverage and in non-state-owned firms. However, rating discrepancies can impact this preference. The attraction lies in reduced operational risks and improved net profits. Notably, independent investors show a stronger ESG preference, especially within high-pollution industries. Thus, fostering ESG investment among institutional investors can improve resource allocation in China's capital market, favoring eco-friendly companies.

Local financial development is crucial for advancing regional financial supply side structural reform, enabling local governments to leverage financial instruments to effectively mobilize land resources and foster competitive growth. The introduction of numerous financial products linked to land-related rights and interests has resulted in a pronounced transmission and interconnection of fiscal and financial risks across regions. This study examines the impact of local financial development on land financialization in China using panel data from prefecture-level cities and detailed information on land mortgages. The findings indicate that the establishment of city commercial banks (CCBs) contributes to the progress of land financialization by incentivizing local government financing vehicles to participate in land mortgage financing, increasing the transfer of debt risks to the financial sector. Notably, the impact of CCBs on land financialization is more pronounced in regions with urban agglomeration, high GDP manipulation, inadequate local financial regulation, and robust implicit government guarantees. Further analysis reveals that CCB establishment has negative spillover effects on land financialization in neighboring areas, while expansion strategies such as establishing intercity branches, engaging in cross-regional mergers, and relaxing regulations have mitigated the rise of land financialization at the regional level. This study provides policy recommendations that focus on reducing local governments’ reliance on land financing and enhancing the prevention and management of financial risks.

We study when CEOs with legal expertise are valuable for firms. In general, lawyer CEOs are negatively associated with frequency and severity in employment civil rights, contract, labor, personal injury, and securities litigation. This effect is partly induced by the CEO’s man- agement of litigation risk and reduction in other risky policies. Lawyer CEOs are further associated with an increase in gatekeepers providing additional legal oversight and a decrease in innovative activities with high litigation risk. Lawyer CEOs are more valuable during periods of enhanced compliance requirements and regulatory pressure and in indus- tries with high litigation risk or better growth opportunities.

This paper investigates the high-frequency dynamics of macroeconomic expectations and disagreement among professional forecasters. We propose a novel mixed-frequency estimation approach that integrates daily asset returns with quarterly expectation data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Our findings indicate that consensus forecasts are updated efficiently according to Bayes' rule, independent of prior forecasts. By employing "representative forecasters" as proxies for real-world agents, we derive a simple yet intuitive evolution equation for disagreement, revealing that changes in disagreement are primarily driven by different interpretations of new information. Furthermore, we reconstruct daily series of expectations and disagreement concerning macroeconomic growth, achieving impressive R2 values of 93.3% and 84.5% against the true quarterly series.

This paper investigates the supervisory incentive effects of employee stock ownership plans based on a corporate risk-taking perspective using data from a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006-2021. The results show that employee stock ownership plans significantly enhance corporate risk-taking. The specific mechanism is that employee stock ownership plans reduce the two-tier agency costs between shareholders and managers and managers and employees, alleviate corporate financing constraints, and thus enhance the level of corporate risk-taking. It is also found that employee stock ownership plan enhances the level of corporate risktaking with high quality, because employee stock ownership plan not only promotes R&D investment which is beneficial to corporate value growth, but also reduces excessive investment and high debt which are detrimental to corporate value, and the corporate risk-taking is of higher quality and more substantial value effect. In addition, differences in the institutional design of employee stock ownership plans have different effects on corporate risk-taking: employee stock ownership plans that are leveraged, highly discounted, with longer lock-up periods and duration, and entrusted to third-party institutions have a stronger effect on corporate risk-taking; employee subscriptions can promote corporate risk-taking more than executive subscriptions; employee stock ownership plans in China do not have the problem of "free-riding There is no "free-rider" problem in China's employee stock ownership plan. The larger the issuance ratio of the employee stock ownership plan, the greater the number of participants, and the larger the scale of capital, the better the implementation effect.