Firms’ export and import participation are positively correlated, a pattern known as two-way complementarity. In this paper, we refine its concept, develop empirical measures, identify its micro-foundations, and explore associated welfare implications. In a general equilibrium trade model with heterogeneous firms, we show that twoway complementarity emerges endogenously from the way trade costs align firms’ joint import and export decisions. We then derive an ACR-style gains-from-trade formula that incorporates this channel. Two-way complementarity amplifies aggregate trade elasticities, leading to smaller inferred welfare gains from a given decline in domestic trade shares after a trade reform. Using Chinese micro data, we document empirical support for the model predictions and find that failing to account for the complementarity overstates China’s gains from WTO accession by around 40%.

We study how expanding access to intellectual property (IP)-backed credit affects firm innovation and aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). Exploiting China's IP-backed financing pilot as a quasi-natural experiment, we use difference-indifferences estimates to show that the policy increases R&D participation, raises firm-level productivity, and reduces capital misallocation. To interpret these effects and quantify their aggregate implications, we develop a dynamic model of heterogeneous firms that borrow subject to collateral constraints backed by tangible assets and IP, and choose R&D investment and the accumulation of wealth. R&D raises future productivity and creates collateralizable IP. We estimate the model by the method of simulated moments, using the policy-induced shift in R&D participation to identify the change in IP pledgeability. The estimated model implies that a nationwide adoption of IP-backed financing would raise long-run TFP by 14%, with roughly two-thirds coming from static gains due to improved capital allocation and the remainder from dynamic gains driven by higher innovation that accumulate over time. Relative to a comparable expansion of lending backed by tangible collateral, IP-backed financing delivers larger productivity gains by easing constraints for high-productivity but low-wealth firms and by strengthening incentives to accumulate IP as collateral for future borrowing.

This paper studies the evolution of China's production and trade patterns during its integration into the global economy. We document and explain new facts concerning changes in production and exports at the industry and firm levels using microdata and a quantitative Ricardian and Heckscher–Ohlin model with heterogeneous firms. Counterfactual simulations reveal that capital deepening made China's production and exports more capital-intensive, although labor-biased productivity growth acted as a counterforce. Consistent with the data, our model demonstrates that China's trade openness peaked around the mid-2000s and fell until the 2020s, while the world's exposure to Chinese exports rose continuously.

This paper argues that ffnancial lease, a dominant representation of shadow banking in China, plays a special role in improving the capital allocation efficiency. In a two-sector general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firm, information asymmetry and financial frictions, this paper shows that existence of finance lease market increases aggregate TFP by allowing low productivity SOE firms to lend out and allowing high productivity POE firms to leverage up. Due to the repossession advantage, financial leasing is a “good“ form of shadow banking that does not necessarily cause financial systemic risks.

This paper documents that ffrms are increasingly financing innovation using their stock of innovation, measured as patents. We refer to this behavior as financing innovation with innovation. Drawing on patent collateral data from both the US and China, we first show that (1) in both countries, the total number and share of patents pledged as collateral have been rising steadily, (2) Chinese firms employ patents as collateral on a smaller scale and with a lower intensity than US firms, (3) firms increase their borrowing and innovation after they start to use patent collateral. We then construct a heterogeneous firm general equilibrium model featuring idiosyncratic productivity risk, innovation capital investment, and borrowing constrained by patent collateral. The model emphasizes two barriers that hinder the use of patent collateral: high inspection costs and low liquidation values of patent assets. We parameterize the model to firm-level panel data in the US and China and find that both barriers are significantly more severe in China than in the US. Finally, counterfactual analyses show that the gains in innovation, output, and welfare from reducing the inspection costs in China to the US level are substantial, moreso than enhancing the liquidation value of patent assets.

We document that monetary policy has asymmetric effects on investments by large and small firms in China. Large firms’ investment are highly responsive to monetary expansions, but less affected by monetary contractions. In contrast, small firms’ investments are less responsive to monetary expansions, but significantly affected by monetary contractions. We argue that this asymmetric responses of large and small firms stem from their differential access to credits in a two-tiered banking system. Large firms borrow from the big state-owned banks, which have a strong depositor base, whereas small firms borrow mainly from small banks which does not have a large depositor base and therefore rely heavily on the inter-bank market for financing their loans to small firms. We build a DSGE model with heterogeneous banks, heterogeneous firms, and an inter-bank market that is calibrated to the Chinese data. We show that the model’s quantitative predictions about the effects of monetary policy on large and small firms are consistent with the facts we documented.

We document that monetary policy has asymmetric effects on investments by large and small firms in China. Large firms’ investment are highly responsive to monetary expansions, but less affected by monetary contractions. In contrast, small firms’ investments are less responsive to monetary expansions, but significantly affected by monetary contractions. We argue that this asymmetric responses of large and small firms stem from their differential access to credits in a two-tiered banking system. Large firms borrow from the big state-owned banks, which have a strong depositor base, whereas small firms borrow mainly from small banks which does not have a large depositor base and therefore rely heavily on the inter-bank market for financing their loans to small firms. We build a DSGE model with heterogeneous banks, heterogeneous firms, and an inter-bank market that is calibrated to the Chinese data. We show that the model’s quantitative predictions about the effects of monetary policy on large and small firms are consistent with the facts we documented.