This paper examines the causes and consequences of venture capital (VC) stage financing. Using information about the geographic location of an entrepreneurial firm and the distance between the VC investor and the firm, I distinguish between three different hypotheses: the monitoring hypothesis, which argues that the VC staging and monitoring of entrepreneurial firms are substitutes; the hold-up hypothesis, which argues that staging is a mechanism for mitigating the hold-up problem between the entrepreneur and the VC investor; and the learning hypothesis, which argues that staging creates value through the real options generated by learning by VC investors. My analysis of the causes of stage financing suggests that VC investors located farther away from an entrepreneurial firm tend to finance the firm using a larger number of financing rounds, shorter durations between successive rounds, and investing a smaller amount in each round; however, VC investors’ propensity to stage is independent of whether or not the firm is located in a close-knit community. My analysis of the consequences of stage financing suggests that VC staging positively affects the entrepreneurial firm’s propensity to have a successful exit, operating performance in the IPO year, and post-IPO survival rate, but only if the firm is located far away from the VC investor; however, the entrepreneurial firm’s performance is independent of whether or not it is located in a close-knit community. Overall, the evidence supports the monitoring hypothesis, but does not provide any support for the hold-up or learning hypotheses.