We investigate the unintended real effects of regulator-led minority shareholder activism on corporate innovation. We use manually collected data from the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a novel regulatory investor protection institution controlled by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) that holds 100 shares of every listed firm. We find that by exercising its shareholder rights, the CSISC substantially curtails the innovation output of targeted firms. This effect is amplified in cases involving a high level of myopic pressure and few innovation incentives. We further observe variation in the real effects of different intervention methods. Textual analysis reveals that CSISC intervention with a myopic topic and negative tone contributes to a decrease in innovation. The results of a mechanism analysis support the hypothesis that regulator-led minority shareholder activism induces managerial myopia and financial constraints, impeding corporate innovation. Furthermore, CSISC intervention not only diminishes innovation output but also undermines innovation efficiency. In summary, our findings suggest that regulator-led minority shareholder activism exacerbates managerial myopia to cater to investors and financial constraints, ultimately stifling corporate innovation.

Site visits allow visitors to physically inspect productive resources and interact with onsite employees and executives face-to-face. We posit that, by allowing visitors to acquire investmentrelated information and monitor the management team, site visits offer disciplinary benefits for corporate investments. Using mandatory disclosures of site visits in China, we find that corporate investments become more responsive to growth opportunities as the intensity of site visits increases, consistent with the notion that site visits yield disciplinary benefits. We also find that the positive association between site visits and investment efficiency is more pronounced when visitors can glean more investment-related information and when they have stronger incentives and greater power to monitor managers. This positive association is also stronger among firms with more severe agency problems and higher asset tangibility. The overall evidence supports the notion that site visits serve as a unique venue for institutional investors and financial analysts to acquire valuable information and serve a monitoring function, which generates disciplinary benefits for corporate investments.

According to prospect theory [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk, Eco- nometrica, 47, 263–292], gains and losses are measured from a reference point. We attempted to ascertain to what extent the refer- ence point shifts following gains or losses. In questionnaire studies, we asked subjects what stock price today will generate the same utility as a previous change in a stock price. From participants’ responses, we calculated the magnitude of reference point adapta- tion, which was significantly greater following a gain than following a loss of equivalent size. We also found the asymmetric adap- tation of gains and losses persisted when a stock was included within a portfolio rather than being considered individually. In studies using financial incentives within the BDM procedure [Becker, G. M., DeGroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method. Behavioral Science, 9(3), 226–232], we again noted faster adaptation of the reference point to gains than losses. We related our findings to several aspects of asset pricing and investor behavior.

We examined reference point adaptation following gains or losses in security trading using participants from China, Korea, and the US. In both questionnaire studies and trading experiments with real money incentives, reference point adaptation was larger for Asians than for Americans. Subjects in all countries adapted their reference points more after a gain than after an equal-sized loss. When we introduced a forced sale intervention that is designed to close the mental account for a prior outcome, Americans showed greater adaptation toward the new price than their Asian counterparts. We offer possible explanations both for the cross-cultural similarities and the cross-cultural differences.

We investigate the causal impact of a company's environmental and social (ES) risk on the borrowing costs of its peer firms (that share lending banks). Using a regression discontinuity design based on the voting outcomes of ES-related shareholder proposals in US public companies' annual meetings from 2005 to 2021, we find that the passage of ES-related proposals leads to an average increase of 38 basis points in the loan costs for peer firms in the subsequent year. The negative spillover is more pronounced for peers with lower bargaining power in their banking relations or having lower ex-ante ES scores, on credit lines rather than term loans, and during the earlier years, validating that banks indeed channel the spillover. Notably, the spillover is particularly significant if the peer firms locate in the same states as the focal firm, or when the proposals reflect a higher degree of disagreement between the proposing shareholders and the managers, or for loans issued by banks lacking prior incentives or expertise in pricing ES risks (``non-ES banks''). We interpret these findings as evidence that the passage of ES-related shareholder proposals releases new information related to peers' ES risks and especially raises the awareness of ES risks among non-ES banks, prompting them to adjust loan rates for their portfolio companies accordingly.

Using iterative experiments to uncover causal links between critical policy details and outcomes helps to optimize policy design. This paper studies a large-scale staged fiscal stimulus program conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, in which a provincial government in China disbursed digital coupons to 8.4 million individual accounts in consecutive waves and updated the program design each time. We find that ruling out unproductive program features leads to a pattern of increasing treatment effects over the waves and that program design matters more than the size of the fiscal stimulus in boosting spending. Our results show that (i) general coupons with no constraints on where the vouchers can be redeemed are more effective than specialized coupons in stimulating consumption in the targeted sectors; (ii) coupon packets with fewer denominations and shorter redemption windows tend to be more effective; and (iii) low-income residents and non-local residents are equally or even more responsive to the coupon program than other groups. Our results illustrate that generating variations in iterative policy experiments, combined with a timely assessment of individuals’ responses to marginal incentives, optimizes program design.

Using data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2022, we employ a difference-indifferences model to empirically examine the impact of bankruptcy regimes, marked by the establishment of bankruptcy courts, on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). The results show a significant decline in TFP among firms in regions following the establishment of bankruptcy courts. This finding remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests reveal that establishing bankruptcy courts increases firms’ risk aversion incentives by endowing creditors with excessive rights. Consequently, firms tend to reduce liabilities, curtail R&D investment, and accumulate liquid assets as coping measures, ultimately contributing to a decline in TFP. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced for firms with high financial risk. However, the improvement of the market mechanism can alleviate the negative impact of bankruptcy courts excessively strengthening creditor protection. Specifically, when firms are located in regions with weak government intervention and strong financial development, as well as in market environments with low uncertainty and strong competition, this negative impact can be mitigated. These findings provide fresh insights into the dual nature of creditor protection and offer valuable references for governments to improve the bankruptcy legal system.

This paper examines the impact of collateral shocks on corporate financialization using a sample of Chinese-listed firms from 2008 to 2021. We find a statistically and economically significant positive effect of collateral appreciation on financialization, consistent with profit-chasing motives, even after addressing endogeneity concerns. Additional tests reveal the effects are more pronounced among financially constrained, bank-dependent, and high-agency-cost firms. Financialization also elevates the risktaking and financial risks of firms. Overall, we provide novel evidence that collateral shocks stimulate corporate financialization, with implications for incentives, regulation, and systemic risk monitoring.

This paper examines the fiscal motives behind municipal governments' decisions to allocate commercial and residential land when two categories of land use are subject to different fiscal revenue alternatives: business-related tax and/or land rent. We use urban parcel-level land transfers during China’s peak period of urbanization, match commercial parcels with residential parcels, and find significant price discounts on commercial parcels relative to adjacent residential parcels. The observed discounts arise from the future tax flows from commercial use, i.e., expected taxes from developed commercial land reduce its transfer price. We conduct a structural estimation to examine the implications on land use structure of future taxes lowering land transfer prices. Results show that while prospective taxes increase commercial land supply, a significant portion of the favorable treatment impact is mitigated by market price responses, suggesting that the land market counters commercial land favoritism when local revenues include both business-related taxes and land value-based charges. The results have implications for the design of urban public revenue systems.

In reality, we find assets traded in the transparent centralized market and opaque decentralized market. To explain the traders' choices of venues, we develop a model of dynamic learning and dynamic market choice between the centralized market and decentralized markets. With heterogeneous trader value correlation, we find that when asset sensitivity or volatility is sufficiently low, traders prefer the decentralized market; when asset sensitivity or volatility is intermediate, switching between centralized and decentralized markets can be the optimal market choice; when asset values are sensitive to volatile fundamentals, assets are traded only in the centralized market. We provide empirical evidence in support of the model predictions. We discussed the welfare implications of various market designs under endogenous market choices. We find that introducing post-trade transparency in the decentralized market improves welfare. Surprisingly, introducing pre-trade transparency in the decentralized market may decrease welfare as it increases traders' incentives to choose a decentralized market earlier and hurts future traders in the centralized market.