This paper studies how dividing candidates in a tournament into separate tracks with differentiated performance criteria affects incentives and aggregate outcomes. We exploit China’s Major Function Oriented Zoning plan, which assigns counties to devel-opment or conservation tracks, with the latter de-emphasizing growth indicators. Using a staggered Difference-in-Differences design, we find that prefectures introducing a con-servation track achieved higher aggregate economic performance despite relaxing growth-based evaluation for part of their subordinate counties. To explain this counterintuitive ef-fect, we develop a stylized Tullock contest model that highlights two institutional features: promotion opportunities remain open to officials in both tracks, and counties within the same prefecture continue to interact across tracks. The model further predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between the size of the conservation track and overall performance, which is supported by empirical evidence.

The endurance of empire in China over much of the past two millennia contrasts starkly with the political fragmentation in Europe since the fall of Rome. To explain the persistence of China’s empire, we analyze the role of keju, the imperial civil service examination system. We argue that the systematic implementation of keju from the Song dynasty onward tied local elites to the imperial state, sustaining political integration and reducing secessionist conflicts. Exploiting panel data covering 4,243 grid cells and 22 centuries, we find robust evidence that areas producing more jinshi – the top exam passers – experienced significantly fewer secessionist wars. Our study shows how the examination system created the political incentives for imperial durability.

Research Question/Issue: This study investigates whether and how political connections affect customer complaints in the Chinese market, using a comprehensive dataset from the country’s largest online complaint platform. Research Findings/Insights: Analyzing 22,644 firm-year observations from 2018 to 2023, we find that politically connected firms experience significantly fewer customer complaints. A one-unit increase in political connection strength is associated with a 9% reduction in complaints relative to the sample mean. This effect operates through two primary mechanisms: a reputation-motivation channel and a financial resource channel. The mitigating effect is more pronounced for firms in highly marketized regions, those with higher advertising expenditures, companies facing greater earnings pressure, and those with lower tangible asset ratios. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study contributes to the literature on political connections and corporate governance by demonstrating how political capital translates into tangible consumer experience advantages. It also advances research on the determinants of customer complaints by highlighting the role of internal governance mechanisms, particularly managerial political ties. Our findings support the Corporate Reputation and Financial Resource Hypotheses while challenging alternative explanations based on regulatory shielding or managerial complacency. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For corporate leaders, our results underscore the importance of reputation management and quality investment, particularly when political connections are absent. Policymakers should consider strengthening public monitoring institutions to reinforce reputational incentives across markets. Investors may use customer complaints as an indicator of product quality and operational stability in their investment decisions.

Recent technological advancements have enabled the emergence of business organizations fully managed by algorithms, such as decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) or through artificial intelligence (AI), as observed in China’s online food delivery sector. These organizations are collectively referred to as algorithm-managed firms (AMFs). Given machines’ capabilities in data collection and analysis, human directors are increasingly being replaced by algorithms or AI in specific sectors. This article contends that algorithms can effectively take over human directors’ managerial, monitoring, and mediating roles. The diminishing role of human directors raises certain concerns of stakeholder protection. Unlike human directors, algorithm directors or managers would not consider stakeholders’ interests unless clearly instructed to do so. However, the algorithm supplier and the AMFs may lack the incentives to fully consider stakeholders because they do not always internalize the social costs. To address the challenges of AMFs, policymakers need to consider different regulation strategies. First, they must choose between command-and-control regulations and target-based regulations. Command-and-control regulations often do not work well because regulators lack enough information or control over complex algorithms. Instead of setting detailed technical rules, policymakers should adopt target-based regulations that let the algorithm balance various interests and regulate its own operations. Second, policymakers should decide between entity-based and algorithm-based regulations. Algorithm-based regulation is more suitable because it prevents companies from passing costs onto society. The state could consider regulating the composition of the board of directors of the algorithm supplier to ensure that they incorporate the concerns of stakeholders’ interests in the development of the algorithm. Additionally, corporate law doctrines that protect creditors and other stakeholders, such as piercing the corporate veil and limiting liability for corporate torts, must be revisited and modified because their foundational assumptions no longer align with the realities of AMFs.

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This paper examines whether mandatory ownership disclosure aligns incentives or distorts in-vestor beliefs. Using a sample of 1,436 Chinese equity-oriented mutual funds from 2012 to 2023,we find that higher managerial and senior ownership are significantly associated with larger in-flows, suggesting that investors treat ownership as a quality signal. However, we find no evidencethat ownership forecasts superior future returns or risk-adjusted alphas. Mechanism tests showthat the ownership-flow effect is much stronger in low-marketing funds and that managers increaseownership after weak flows, a countercyclical pattern inconsistent with overconfidence and consis-tent with strategic remedial signaling. Overall, ownership disclosure appears to operate primarilythrough investor perception rather than information about managerial ability, weakening the linkbetween capital allocation and true skill in the mutual fund industry.

This paper examines why tax incentives fail to stimulate participation in China's third-pillar commercial pension insurance, emphasizing the role of rational inattention. Using household survey data from China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) spanning 2014-2022 and a difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) design, we find that pilot policy generated a statistically insignificant average effect on participation, with rational inattention - proxied by financial literacy - explaining much of its ineffectiveness. We develop a dynamic consumption-portfolio model featuring costly information acquisition, and then resolve limitations of standard models through a dynamic framework with distinct savings channels and policy-focused rational inattention. The models show that rational inattention distorts perceptions of tax benefits and wage growth, raising participation costs, while multiple savings channels dilute incentives. Only households with higher financial literacy substantially respond to the policy. Our results reveal how cognitive frictions undermine pension reform and offer implications for designing behaviorally-informed retirement schemes.

Innovation is crucial for long-term corporate value and competitive advantage; however, it can misalign the interests of managers and investors. Balancing managers’ short- and long-term goals is a pivotal challenge in promoting innovation incentives. Therefore, this study examines innovative incentives for managers of publicly traded firms to address the issue of agency problems. The study focuses on economic value-added (EVA) reform implemented by China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which encourages EVA-driven R&D investments as the primary management metric. The policy effectively motivates key corporate managers by reducing capital costs and stimulating increased innovation. Following this policy’s implementation, notable innovation disparities exist between state-owned enterprises and firms not subject to the reform. Furthermore, innovation incentives significantly affect overconfident company managers, yielding positive effects on innovation.

To address the challenges posed by renewable energy integration in power systems, China is advancing the development of Pumped Hydro Storage (PHS). However, the rapid growth of PHS installations, coupled with strict regulations and a high reliance on capacity compensation, has led to increasing financial burdens on other utilities. One solution is to reallocate the capacity compensation through market-based approaches to implement the “beneficiary-pays” principle. To achieve this goal, an operational policy named ’partial-regulated dispatch’ is proposed in this study. The analysis of this policy encompasses two crucial dimensions: the dispatch mechanism and business models. The dispatch mechanism evaluates PHS’s capacity contribution to grid stability, while the business models focus on enhancing PHS profitability to reduce dependency on capacity compensation while ensuring long-term economic sustainability. Furthermore, the flexibility of PHS is introduced as a criterion for assessing system security contributions, considering both individual unit vibration characteristics and multi-unit commitment strategies. The case study shows that through partial-regulated dispatch, PHS can reduce its reliance on capacity compensation by nearly 50% while ensuring its regulation service via flexibility compensation. This policy effectively balances economic viability with system support capabilities. Moreover, flexibility compensation provides PHS operators with a risk mitigation strategy in the complex power market environment. Under an appropriate operational strategy and policy incentives, the flexibility can be enhanced by nearly 30% in a fully marketized scenario, contributing to both system stability and operational efficiency.

Following the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the central government elevated the construction of ecological civilization to a central position within national strategy and introduced environmental governance indicators as mandatory criteria for evaluating officials, alongside GDP. These indicators served as an additional "threshold" for performance assessments. In the context of changes in the central government's development ideology and policies, this study utilizes matched data on the turnover of municipal party secretaries and local enterprise carbon emissions from 293 prefecture-level cities in China between 1990 and 2021. The research finds that turnovers of municipal party secretaries after the 18th National Congress have led to a significant reduction in carbon emissions from local enterprises, a trend that was not evident prior to the congress. This effect is more pronounced in situations where official turnover is primarily driven by promotion incentives, and less influenced by collusive behavior between the government and enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the decline in carbon emissions is more significant for private enterprises, non-heavy polluting enterprises, those located in the eastern region, and those in general prefecture-level cities, before and after municipal party secretary turnovers. This study enhances understanding of the relationship between the promotion incentives of Chinese officials and the carbon emissions of local enterprises, offering valuable insights for improving the official promotion assessment system and advancing local carbon reduction efforts.