This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy—introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers’ leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance, with privately-owned developers disproportionately affected relative to state-owned firms. Using granular project-level data, we document significant drops in sales and a demand shift from private to state-owned developers. The policy also reduced local governments’ land sale revenues, prompting greater reliance on hidden local government financing vehicles for land purchases. The policy induced broad structural changes in China’s housing and land markets.

This study investigates whether corruption differentially affects contracting through auctions and negotiations. Using data on Chinese land-market transactions, where corruption is known to be present, we first show that, on average, it exerts similar effects on transactions carried out via auctions and negotiation. However, this finding masks important heterogeneity – auctions featuring healthy competition are less affected by corruption, and significantly less so than negotiation. We then develop a simple model of bidding under the possibility of corruption that rationalizes our findings.

We investigate whether and how political connections penetrate through headquarter-subsidiary relationships. Our results show that even though the headquarters of politically connected listed firms pay comparable land prices as other firms, their subsidiaries pay 12.1-13.2% less. The price discount, driven by corruption rather than government subsidies, is exacerbated when the land is sold through informationally opaque supply methods and when land is for commercial or residential use. The anti-corruption campaign has successfully mitigated such price distortions. Our findings also show that better legal protection and private sector development are crucial for fair markets.

Using land transaction data in China, we investigate whether and how political connections penetrate through headquarter-subsidiary relationships. The results show that even though the headquarters of politically connected listed firms pay comparable land prices as other firms, their subsidiaries pay 12.1-13.2% less. The price discount, driven by corruption, is exacerbated when the land is for commercial or residential use and is disposed of through informationally opaque supply methods. The anti-corruption campaign has successfully mitigated such price distortions. Our findings also show that better legal protection and private sector development are crucial for fair markets.

China’s land market features a substantial industrial discount: industrial-zoned land is an order of magnitude cheaper than residential land. In contrast to explanations centered on subsidies to industry, we find that a primary determinant of this price gap is local public finance. Under the "land finance" system, land sales are an important source of revenues for Chinese local governments. We show that local governments, who serve as monopolistic land sellers in China, face a trade-off between supplying residential or industrial land that is determined by the different time profiles of revenues from industrial and residential land sales, local governments’ financial constraints, and the extent of local governments’ tax revenue sharing with other levels of government.