Banks have a significant funding-cost advantage if their liabilities are protected by bailout guarantees. We construct a corporate finance-style model showing that banks can exploit this funding-cost advantage by just intermediating funds between investors and ultimate borrowers, thereby earning the spread between their reduced funding rate and the competitive market rate. This mechanism leads to a crowding-out of direct market finance and real effects for bank borrowers at the intensive margin: banks protected by bailout guarantees induce their borrowers to leverage excessively, to overinvest, and to conduct inferior high-risk projects. We confirm our model predictions using U.S. panel data, exploiting exogenous changes in banks' political connections, which cause variation in bailout expectations. At the bank level, we find that higher bailout probabilities are associated with more wholesale debt funding and lending. Controlling for loan demand, we confirm this effect on bank lending at the bank-firm level and find evidence on loan pricing consistent with a shift towards riskier borrower real investments. Finally, at the firm level, we find that firms linked to banks that experience an expansion in their bailout guarantees show an increase in their leverage, higher investment levels with indications of overinvestment, and lower productivity.

We leverage machine learning to introduce belief dispersion measures to distinguish different opinion (DO) and information asymmetry (IA). Our measures align with the human-based measure and relate to economic outcomes in a manner consistent with theoretical prediction: DO positively relates to trading volume and negatively linked to bid-ask spread, whereas IA shows the opposite effects. Moreover, IA negatively predicts the cross-section of stock returns, while DO positively predicts returns for underpriced stocks and negatively for overpriced ones. Our findings reconcile conflicting disagree-return relations in the literature and are consistent with Atmaz and Basak (2018)’s model. We also show that the return predictability of DO and IA stems from their unique economic rationales, underscoring that components of disagreement can influence market equilibrium via distinct mechanisms.

This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy—introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers’ leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance, with privately-owned developers disproportionately affected relative to state-owned firms. Using granular project-level data, we document significant drops in sales and a demand shift from private to state-owned developers. The policy also reduced local governments’ land sale revenues, prompting greater reliance on hidden local government financing vehicles for land purchases. The policy induced broad structural changes in China’s housing and land markets.

The economic institutionalist literature often suggests that sub-optimal institutional arrangements impart unique distortions in China, and excessive corporate debt is a symptom of this condition. However, lax monetary policies after the global financial crisis, and specifically, quantitative easing have led to concerns about debt bubbles under a wide range of institutional regimes. This study draws on data from Chinese listed firms, supplemented by numerous macroeconomic control variables, to isolate the effect of international capital flows from other drivers of firm leverage. We conclude that the rise in, and distribution of, Chinese corporate debt can partly be as-cribed to the effects of monetary policy outside of China and that Chinese institutional features amplify these effects. Whilst Chinese firms are affected by developments in the global financial ecosystem, domestic institutional realities and distortions may unevenly add their own particular effects, providing further support for and extending the variegated capitalism literature.

This paper investigates whether increased female representation on corporate boards affects firms’ bond financing costs. Exploiting the 2017 Big Three’s campaigns as a plausibly exogenous shock, we document that firms experiencing larger increases in female board representation, induced by the campaigns, experience significant reductions in bond yield spreads and improvements in credit ratings. We identify reduced leverage and enhanced workplace environment as key mechanisms, and show that the effects are stronger among firms with greater tail risk and information asymmetry. An alternative identification strategy based on California’s SB 826 regulatory mandate yields consistent results. Our findings suggest that board gender diversity enhances governance in ways valued by credit markets.

As digital technologies proliferate, firms increasingly leverage digital transformation strategically, necessitating new orientations attuned to digital technological change. This study investigates how digital orientation (DORI)- the philosophy of harnessing digital technology scope, digital capabilities, digital ecosystem coordination, and digital architecture configuration for competitive advantage – influences firms’ environmental, social, and governance performance (ESG_per). Analysis of Chinese A-share firms from 2010-2019 reveals DORI is associated with superior ESG_per, operating through the mediating mechanism of enhanced digital finance (DIFIN) as a fund-providing facilitator for sustainability initiatives. Additional analysis uncovers important heterogeneities – private firms, centrally owned state-owned enterprises, politically connected, and emerging companies exhibit the strongest DORI - ESG_per linkages. Prominently, the study findings are validated through a battery of robustness tests, including instrumental variable methods, and propensity score matching. Overall, the results underscore the need for firms to purposefully develop multifaceted digital orientation and furnishes novel theoretical insights and practical implications regarding DORI’s role in improving ESG_per.

We examine the relationship between customer concentration and capital structure adjustment speed using a sample of US listed firms from 1977 to 2020. We found that the customer-concentrated firms have a lower speed of leverage adjustment. Customer concentration affects leverage adjustment speed mainly through increased cash flow volatility and asset specificity. The negative association is more pronounced in firms with high relationship-specific investments and low switching costs for their customers. Stock market reacts to leverage deviation strongly for firms with concentrated customers. Our findings highlight the vital role of customers as key stakeholders in capital structure decisions.

This study examines how firm-level exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic affects the speed of leverage adjustment among 3260 US-listed firms from 2019q1 to 2022q1. Using a novel measure of COVID-19 exposure, we find that higher exposure significantly reduces the speed at which firms adjust their leverage towards target levels. This effect is more pronounced for financially constrained firms and those operating in competitive markets. We further show that COVID-19 exposure adversely impacts corporate liquidity, default risk, and financial flexibility. Our findings highlight the role of exogenous shocks in shaping corporate financing decisions.

Local financial development is crucial for advancing regional financial supply side structural reform, enabling local governments to leverage financial instruments to effectively mobilize land resources and foster competitive growth. The introduction of numerous financial products linked to land-related rights and interests has resulted in a pronounced transmission and interconnection of fiscal and financial risks across regions. This study examines the impact of local financial development on land financialization in China using panel data from prefecture-level cities and detailed information on land mortgages. The findings indicate that the establishment of city commercial banks (CCBs) contributes to the progress of land financialization by incentivizing local government financing vehicles to participate in land mortgage financing, increasing the transfer of debt risks to the financial sector. Notably, the impact of CCBs on land financialization is more pronounced in regions with urban agglomeration, high GDP manipulation, inadequate local financial regulation, and robust implicit government guarantees. Further analysis reveals that CCB establishment has negative spillover effects on land financialization in neighboring areas, while expansion strategies such as establishing intercity branches, engaging in cross-regional mergers, and relaxing regulations have mitigated the rise of land financialization at the regional level. This study provides policy recommendations that focus on reducing local governments’ reliance on land financing and enhancing the prevention and management of financial risks.

We demonstrate that personal political preferences of corporate managers influence cor- porate policies. Specifically, Republican managers who are likely to have conservative personal ideologies adopt and maintain more conservative corporate policies. Those firms have lower levels of corporate debt, lower capital and research and development (R&D) expenditures, less risky investments, but higher profitability. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Sept. 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as natural experiments, we demonstrate that investment policies of Republican managers became more conservative following these ex- ogenous uncertainty-increasing events. Furthermore, around chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers, including CEO deaths, firm leverage policy becomes more conservative when managerial conservatism increases.