We examine how a firm designs capital allocation and managerial compensation schemes to motivate a privately informed manager to (i) engage in innovative activity to search for, and (ii) guide the firm to invest in, a new investment project. We show that relative to the first-best, the firm allocates too little capital and provides too few incentives for the manager to expend innovative effort; the manager may violate the NPV rule by investing the allocated capital in a project with negative productivity. We provide several novel predictions that help identify firms that are likely to innovate and managers who are likely to follow the NPV rule. We also show that uncertainty and incentive pay can be positively related.

Motivated by diverse anecdotal evidences from the Chinese markets and focusing on a technologically following firm, this paper analyzes how the managerial compensation structure affects the managerial innovative incentives, the vertical differential output competition, and the evolutions of the industry structure. To this end, multiple effects of quality improvements are identified. The managerial conservatism in taking risky product innovations, which is resulted from the obliteration of the cost-adjusting effect by trivial incentive weight, is aggravated by foregone conservatisms. This leads to the widening of the quality gaps between it and the leading firm, and the deterioration of its market performances. After fulfilling an innovation, however, the firm becomes complacent. Driven by these two tendencies, the percentage of the industries in which the following firms abandon their R&D activities forever is decreasing in their incentive weights and increasing in time. The extensions of the process innovation, the managerial innovative agressiveness, and the interactions between product innovation and process innovation are also examined, as well as the implications of the compensation structure of the leading firm and the spillovers.

Using a sample of listed subsidiaries and their parent companies in China, I study top executive compensation and turnover and their relationship to firm performance in business groups in China. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation (CEO turnover) in a listed firm is positively (negatively) related to the accounting performance of its parent company. Using related party transactions to proxy for the correlation between the two firms, I find that management compensation in a listed firm is related to the performance of its parent company if related party transactions exist between them. In addition, I find a stronger relationship between the compensation (turnover) in a listed subsidiary and the performance of its parent company when the percentage of common directors and managers are less than median level. This result indicates that the incentive system can be used to align the interests of managers in the listed firm with that of its parent company when the information asymmetry is high and the parent company can not effectively monitor. Using brand name as a proxy for reputation, I find that management compensation and CEO turnover in group firms are more likely to be sensitive to the performance measures in their parent companies if both use the same brand name.

We propose a model of project selection and design of managerial compensation contract that features adverse selection and moral hazard. Our model generates the rather intuitive result that the ex ante probability of a specific project being selected (or, equivalently, its manager being hired) is increasing in the type of the project/manager. Ex post, however, the most capable manager (i.e., the one with the highest type) is not necessarily the one who will be hired to run a project. Basically, when the managers’ types are not identically distributed, picking the most capable manager or selecting the most promising project may actually be inconsistent with the provision of optimal incentives to alleviate the inherent agency problems. Therefore, our model offers a rational explanation to the phenomenon that apparently more capable candidates are occasionally passed over in recruitment and job promotion situations. Our analysis also holds obvious implications for firms’ capital budgeting decisions. If the severity of the principal-agent conflict is sufficiently great (say, between the headquater and the divisional manager) and if the verification of the true project type (the NPV value) by the headquarter is sufficiently costly, we may well see instances where corporate headquarters rationally allocate scarce resources to a lower-NPV project ahead of a higher-NPV project.