We examine how organizational learning and organizational disruption jointly arise when Chinese audit firms have U.S. cross-listed clients and which effect dominates. Among public companies listed only in China, we define the treatment group as companies audited by Chinese audit firms serving at least one U.S. client, similar companies audited by firms without U.S. clients as the control group. Survey evidence indicates strong incentives and opportunities to learn from U.S. engagements and frequent learning activities in treatment audit firms. The archival evidence however shows that their domestic audit quality declines relative to the control group. The effect is more pronounced when U.S. clients demand more audit resources, when domestic clients are more sensitive to limited audit attention, and when U.S. and domestic clients are more similar. Overall, our findings indicate a negative externality of U.S. cross-listing audit when resource constraints hinder an effective firm-wide learning.

This paper employs a difference-in-differences approach to study whether a Chinese audit firm improves its competencies through organizational learning after one of its audit teams has a client cross-listed in the US. Among a group of companies that are listed only in China, we define those audited by firms that have cross-listed clients as the treatment group, and companies audited by other firms as the control group. We find an improvement in audit quality for the treatment group after their audit firms have cross-listed client experience in the US. A large-scale survey of auditors corroborates these findings and sheds light on specific actions undertaken by audit firms to facilitate learning. Both the empirical and survey results highlight the benefits of auditing crosslisted clients in the US and its positive externality on improving the audit quality of non-US-listed companies.