We construct firm-level indicators to capture the engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, henceforth) via textual analysis. We find that higher firm engagement in BRI predicts higher stock returns in the subsequent 12 months. The top 10% high-BRI firms have 12.42% higher annual returns than bottom 10% low-BRI firms in China A-Share market. Additionally, two fundamental channels of increased earnings and reduced liabilities explain the higher expected returns of high-BRI firms. Furthermore, we reveal that the phenomenon is more pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises. For large-cap firms, BR Report is a more effective indicator for predicting future stock returns, while BR Beta performs better for small-cap firms. These findings contribute to the measurement of firm engagement in BRI and its impact on the stock market.

The study aims to explain the economic impact of Internet implication in tourism sector by taking sample of mega project listed countries (which provide big pitch to boost tourism business). Our work find the volatility cause of tourism revenue at country i, by examining the inbound tourist expenditures as a factor of technological infrastructure. We deploy data ranging from 1990 to 2017 and uses error correction model as representative of Autoregressive-Distributed Lag (ARDL) model after addressing diagnostic tests (for data reliability concern). We found long- and short-run association between tourism expenditure and information and communication technology (ICT) proxies in case of developed economies, while only short-run association in underdeveloped countries. The startling scenario about underdeveloped economies are also confirmed by one-way causation in our analysis. After sensitive analysis at each slot, the study concludes that tourism revenue is streaming low across those boundaries where tourists a

Despite nearly twenty years of privatization, mixed-ownership reform has been the mainstay of SOE reform in China in recent years. This raises the question of whether the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms (Mixed firms) is better than private-owned enterprises (POEs). Although Mixed firms suffer more from government intervention, unclear property rights, and interest conflicts between state shareholders and private shareholders, they can also benefit from the external resources controlled by the state. Therefore, the performance of Mixed firms is still unclear. Collecting data from the Chinese A-share listed market, we divide the firms into POEs, Mixed firms controlled by the state (MixedSOEs), and Mixed firms controlled by the private sectors (MixedPOEs). Measuring profitability using ROA and ROE, we find that on average, POEs perform better than Mixed firms, and MixedPOEs have a higher profitability than MixedSOEs. Within Mixed firms, more state shares are related to lower profitability, and more private shares are related to higher profitability. Using the NBS survey data, we further find that on average, SOEs exhibit the lowest profitability, with MixedSOEs and MixedPOEs in the middle, and POEs have the highest profitability. We try to address the endogeneity challenge in several ways and get similar results. Overall, our analysis provides new evidence on the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms.

This paper investigates whether and how high-speed rail (HSR) construction affects local bank performance. Using the difference-in-difference method, we find that the city commercial banks (CCBs) significantly experience an overall decrease in ROA after HSR is introduced in the headquarters city. Mechanism analysis suggests that the HSR-driven city connectivity imposes the local CCBs on the intensified banking competition related to capital flows, and governance improvements associated with information flows. HSR exerts more pronounced impacts under higher financial liberalization. The findings are robust to the endogeneity concerns. We highlight the indispensable role of transport infrastructure in banking development.

We develop measures for technology decoupling and dependence between the U.S. and China based on combined patent data. The first two decades of the century witnessed a steady increase in technology integration (or less decoupling), but China’s dependence on the U.S. increased (decreased) during the first (second) decade. Decoupling in a technology field predicts China’s growing dependence on U.S. technology, which, in turn, predicts less decoupling further down the road. Decoupling is associated with more patent outputs in China, but lower firm productivity and valuation. China’s innovation-oriented industrial policies trade o↵ the inherent conflict between indigenous innovation and firm competitiveness.

We examine the effects of controlling shareholder stock pledge on corporate acquisition decisions and associated performance. Consistent with our aggravated expropriation hypothesis, we find that pledging firms in China initiate more takeovers, but these acquisitions conducted by pledging firms experience lower announcement returns. We adopt the difference in differences and the instrumental variable approaches to establish causality. Channel tests further reveal that pledging acquirers overpay for the deals and are more likely to be involved in related party transactions. Cross-sectionally, we find that the relations between the share pledge and corporate acquisitiveness and returns are more pronounced for non-SOEs and firms with high-level excess cash. Lastly, we document that pledging acquirers underperform in the long-run in terms of lower ROAs and a greater likelihood of goodwill impairment. Overall, our findings indicate that controlling shareholders increasingly expropriate minority shareholders through self-serving corporate takeovers after the stock pledge.

We examine the effects of controlling shareholder stock pledge on corporate acquisition decisions and associated performance. Consistent with our aggravated expropriation hypothesis, we find that pledging firms in China initiate more takeovers, but these acquisitions conducted by pledging firms experience lower announcement returns. We adopt the difference in differences and the instrumental variable approaches to establish causality. Channel tests further reveal that pledging acquirers overpay for the deals and are more likely to be involved in related party transactions. Cross-sectionally, we find that the relations between the share pledge and corporate acquisitiveness and returns are more pronounced for non-SOEs and firms with high-level excess cash. Lastly, we document that pledging acquirers underperform in the long-run in terms of lower ROAs and a greater likelihood of goodwill impairment. Overall, our findings indicate that controlling shareholders increasingly expropriate minority shareholders through self-serving corporate takeovers after the stock pledge.

Using proprietary individual level loan data, this paper explores the economic consequences of the 2009 bank entry deregulation in China. Such deregulation leads to higher screening standards, lower interest rates, and lower delinquency rates for corporate loans from entrant banks. Consequently, in deregulated cities, private firms with bank credit access increase asset investments, employment, net income, and ROA. In contrast, the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) does not improve following deregulation. Deregulation also amplifies bank credit from productive private firms to inefficient SOEs due mainly to SOEs’ soft budget constraints. This adverse effect accounts for 0.31% annual GDP losses.

According to “whether the product of a company contacts with the consumers directly or not”, we divide all listed companies of Chinese transportation equipment manufacturing industry into two kinds. Then we calculate corporate social responsibility（CSR） score by using content analysis method to evaluate corporate annual report. We find out companies, whose products have a direct contact with consumers, tend to perform more social responsibility. When we use ROA to evaluate corporate financial performance and regress ROA on CSR score and other control variables, we find that the companies mentioned above have relatively remarkable better financial performance. After decomposing ROA by sales revenue, further test proved that CSR influences CFP positively by increasing sales revenue of a company. It ultimately prove that consumers do care about companies to be social responsible.

We empirically evaluate 20 prominent contributions to a broad range of areas in the empirical corporate finance literature. We assemble the necessary data and then apply a single, simple econometric method, the connected-groups approach of Abowd, Karmarz, and Margolis (1999), to appraise the extent to which prevailing empirical specifications explain variation of the dependent variable, differ in composition of fit arising from various classes of independent variables, and exhibit resistance to omitted variable bias and other endogeneity problems. In particular, we identify and estimate the role of observed and unobserved firm- and manager-specific characteristics in determining primary features of corporate governance, financial policy, payout policy, investment policy, and performance. Observed firm characteristics do best in explaining market leverage and CEO pay level and worst for takeover defenses and outcomes. Observed manager characteristics have relatively high power to explain CEO contract design and low power for firm focus and investment policy. Estimated specifications without firm and manager fixed effects do poorly in explaining variation in CEO duality, corporate control variables, and capital expenditures, and best in explaining executive pay level, board size, market leverage, corporate cash holdings, and firm risk. Including manager and firm fixed effects, along with firm and manager observables, delivers the best fit for dividend payout, the propensity to adopt antitakeover defenses, firm risk, board size, and firm focus. In terms of source, unobserved manager attributes deliver a high proportion of explained variation in the dependent variable for executive wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, board size, and sensitivity of expected executive compensation to firm risk. In contrast, unobserved firm attributes provide a high proportion of variation explained for dividend payout, antitakeover defenses, book and market leverage, and corporate cash holdings. In part, these results suggest where empiricists could look for better proxies for what current theory identifies as important and where theorists could focus in building new models that encompass economic forces not contained in existing models. Finally, we assess the relevance of omitted variables and endogeneity for conventional empirical designs in the various subfields. Including manager and firm fixed effects significantly alters inference on primary explanatory variables in 17 of the 20 representative subfield specifications.