This paper studies how mutual fund managers update their beliefs as macroeconomic conditions change. Using regulator-mandated reports from Chinese mutual funds, we measure the intensity of belief updating from year-over-year changes in stated outlooks and decompose those updates into macro and micro themes. We show that belief updating is state-contingent: funds with more intensive belief updating shift their narratives toward macro (micro) topics during recessions (expansions) and concurrently reduce (increase) procyclical stock exposures and on-site company visits. This state-contingent belief updating predicts superior performance when matched to prevailing economic conditions, with macro-oriented updates paying off mainly for high-updating funds in recessions and micro-oriented updates paying off more broadly in expansions. Investors recognize this signal of skill, allocating greater flows to these funds, especially when past returns are less informative. Finally, belief updating is stronger for younger managers and for funds from newer, smaller families, consistent with signaling under career and competitive pressures.

This paper examines why tax incentives fail to stimulate participation in China's third-pillar commercial pension insurance, emphasizing the role of rational inattention. Using household survey data from China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) spanning 2014-2022 and a difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) design, we find that pilot policy generated a statistically insignificant average effect on participation, with rational inattention - proxied by financial literacy - explaining much of its ineffectiveness. We develop a dynamic consumption-portfolio model featuring costly information acquisition, and then resolve limitations of standard models through a dynamic framework with distinct savings channels and policy-focused rational inattention. The models show that rational inattention distorts perceptions of tax benefits and wage growth, raising participation costs, while multiple savings channels dilute incentives. Only households with higher financial literacy substantially respond to the policy. Our results reveal how cognitive frictions undermine pension reform and offer implications for designing behaviorally-informed retirement schemes.