Using subsidiary-level data of 3,863 Chinese nonfinancial listed firms, we find their capital expenditures increase with foreign sales, and the difference arises from the investments of the firms’ foreign subsidiaries. We show that the foreign sales-foreign investment association becomes more sensitive when the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) increases in the domestic market. However, foreign EPU does not play such a significant role. We provide one possible explanation that due to global diversification, MNEs can hedge foreign EPU using their international subsidiary network, resulting in the overall investments unchanged. However, given China’s tight regulatory capital controls, the MNEs may be less able to hedge the domestic EPU, so that they reallocate investments from the domestic markets to the foreign markets, consistent with the transaction cost assumption underlying the real options theory. Robust tests show that access to foreign capital, profitability and institutional factors have little explanatory power over the MNEs’ foreign investment.

This paper examines the causes and consequences of venture capital (VC) stage financing. Using information about the geographic location of an entrepreneurial firm and the distance between the VC investor and the firm, I distinguish between three different hypotheses: the monitoring hypothesis, which argues that the VC staging and monitoring of entrepreneurial firms are substitutes; the hold-up hypothesis, which argues that staging is a mechanism for mitigating the hold-up problem between the entrepreneur and the VC investor; and the learning hypothesis, which argues that staging creates value through the real options generated by learning by VC investors. My analysis of the causes of stage financing suggests that VC investors located farther away from an entrepreneurial firm tend to finance the firm using a larger number of financing rounds, shorter durations between successive rounds, and investing a smaller amount in each round; however, VC investors’ propensity to stage is independent of whether or not the firm is located in a close-knit community. My analysis of the consequences of stage financing suggests that VC staging positively affects the entrepreneurial firm’s propensity to have a successful exit, operating performance in the IPO year, and post-IPO survival rate, but only if the firm is located far away from the VC investor; however, the entrepreneurial firm’s performance is independent of whether or not it is located in a close-knit community. Overall, the evidence supports the monitoring hypothesis, but does not provide any support for the hold-up or learning hypotheses.

We investigate the following important questions in international business: How do MNEs choose ownership strategies when facing strong uncertainty in foreign market entries? How are the choices affected by industry contingencies? Following the key tenets of real options theory, we propose that, under a high level of market uncertainty, MNEs choose more flexible (rather than more committed) ownership strategies that allow adjustment of investment decisions in future. We further suggest that using flexible strategies in response to uncertainty becomes less valuable for MNEs when the industry they enter in the host country enjoys strong sales growth potential, requires less irreversible investments, and has intense competition. Empirically, we analyze the ownership strategies (ownership structure and equity share) of over 5,000 new foreign investments in manufacturing industries in China during 2000- 2006. We find qualified support for our hypotheses and discuss the industry boundary conditions of adopting flexible ownership strategies in foreign market entries.

Theoretical models predict that the value of a real option should be increasing in the volatility of the underlying asset. Thus, if real options are economically important, then firm values should be positively related to volatility. Consistent with this prediction, we find evidence that stock returns are contemporaneously positively correlated with changes in volatility. Moreover, this positive relation is stronger for firms that are more likely to have more real options and for firms with more irreversible investment opportunities. Most importantly, we find that the sensitivity of firm values to changes in volatility declines significantly after firms exercise their real options. These results indicate that real options constitute an economically meaningful component of firm values.

本文首先对过去几十年来实物期权方法应用研究进展进行了回顾和总结，并指出了目前在实物期权方法应用中经常出现的一些模糊概念和误用的问题。通过一些实例的分析和讨论，对现有的一些研究结论提出了质疑，指出：由于问题构模及参数定义上的差异，一些在金融期权中成立的定理，如期权价值随着波动率增加、无风险利率增大或期权期限延长时，是递增的这一规律对于实物期权的而言可能会失效。并以实物期权在企业R&D 投资项目中为例，对这一问题以及与之相关的实物期权构模和参数选择等问题进行了详细深入的讨论和分析。文章还在对Penning and Lint（1997）及Agliardi Elettra（2003）等人的结果扩展的基础上，给出了当波动率、无风险利率和期权持有成本为时变函数的条件下四种复合期权的解析解，并利用数值计算结果证实了作者的观点。 Abstract: This study first reviews the literature of real options research in the past decades, and points out the problem of obscure concepts and misuse of real option frequently appeared in the application fields. By analyzing and discussing some cases, the author put forward doubt on some research results, and indicate that because of the discrepancy of modeling and parameter definition, some theorems which true for financial options, such as the value of options will increase when the volatility and risk-free rate increase or expiration date suspension, will not true for the real options. Using the application of real options in firm’s R&D project as an example, the paper analyses and discusses the problem in detail how to applying real options from aspects of modeling, parameter estimation and sensitivity analysis correctly, etc. By extending the results of Penning and Lint (1997) as well as Agliardi Elettra (2003), a close-form solution for a generalized of the Geske formula is derived for four types compound real options: call on call, call on put, put on call, put on put in the case of time-dependent volatility and risk-free rate and option-holding cost. The author’s findings are proven by numerical results in the last.

本文运用对称双头垄断时机选择期权博弈模型分析了经营成本对企业研发投资决策的影响。随着研发投资项目经营成本的增加，企业的投资收益下降而投资临界值上升。这使得企业即使面临竞争对手抢先进入的威胁，等待而不是立即投资仍然是最优的。经营成本对于企业的投资收益和投资临界值的影响大于项目投资成本，而且追随者企业对于经营成本更加敏感。 In this paper, we analyze the influence of operating costs on the R&D investment decision with a symmetrical duopoly real option timing game. As the operating costs increasing, the payoffs of firms decrease but investment thresholds increase, so firms prefer waiting to investing even facing the threat of preemption of the rival. We show that the investment thresholds are more sensitive to the change of the operating costs than that of the investment costs, and the operating costs have more influence on the payoffs of follower firm than that of leader firm.

In a real options and game-theoretic framework, this paper examines the optimal R&D investment timing of an incumbent under uncertainty, which faces the threat of preemption by a potential entrant. We incorporate incomplete information into the model by assuming that the incumbent does not know the entrant’s investment timing but know its distribution. We find that incomplete information reduces the erosion of waiting option value by the competition, and therefore waiting is still valuable even in the presence of preemption and competition. The entrant's hazard rate has the impact on the incumbent's optimal investment timing: the more the hazard rate is, the earlier the incumbent invests.