We examine the impact of bankruptcy court establishment (BCE) on corporate acquisition activities using hand-collected data of city-level BCE in China from 2008 to 2020. The results show that BCE promotes corporate acquisition activities largely due to mitigated information asymmetry and decreased deal inefficiency. Our results highlight the important role of judiciary reform in corporate acquisition decisions in emerging markets.

It remains unclear whether state shareholding (SS) truly enhances firms’ fulfillment of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) or merely motivates them to strategically release “enhanced” CSR reports. Utilizing the reform that permits state–owned equity to participate in privately–owned enterprises (POEs) in China, we find that the participation of SS enhances POEs’ access to resources and alleviates their needs for legitimacy, leading to disparities in CSR disclosure and substantive CSR activities for POEs, consistent with the notion of greenwashing. The greenwashing behavior is particularly pronounced in the presence of large state-owned shareholder and when CSR disclosure is compulsory.

Exploiting a unique market-oriented media reform initiated in 1996 in China, we investigate the role of media environment in affecting firm behaviour. We find robust evidence that market-oriented media environment is conductive to firm innovation, with the reform promoting patent quantity and quality substantially. The effect is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. Matching firm data with 1.3 million news reports, we find the market-oriented media reform significantly improves the criticalness and unbiasedness of news coverage and shapes an innovation-friendly environment. Our findings highlight economic outcomes of relaxing media control and underline substantial gains from deepening the reform.

Despite nearly twenty years of privatization, mixed-ownership reform has been the mainstay of SOE reform in China in recent years. This raises the question of whether the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms (Mixed firms) is better than private-owned enterprises (POEs). Although Mixed firms suffer more from government intervention, unclear property rights, and interest conflicts between state shareholders and private shareholders, they can also benefit from the external resources controlled by the state. Therefore, the performance of Mixed firms is still unclear. Collecting data from the Chinese A-share listed market, we divide the firms into POEs, Mixed firms controlled by the state (MixedSOEs), and Mixed firms controlled by the private sectors (MixedPOEs). Measuring profitability using ROA and ROE, we find that on average, POEs perform better than Mixed firms, and MixedPOEs have a higher profitability than MixedSOEs. Within Mixed firms, more state shares are related to lower profitability, and more private shares are related to higher profitability. Using the NBS survey data, we further find that on average, SOEs exhibit the lowest profitability, with MixedSOEs and MixedPOEs in the middle, and POEs have the highest profitability. We try to address the endogeneity challenge in several ways and get similar results. Overall, our analysis provides new evidence on the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms.

In China, inadequate levels of cross-regional investment represent a challenge. Our study uses the bailout reform initiated in China in 2014 to test whether market-oriented reforms of this type can help stimulate national economic integration. We observed that following a bond default event, nonlocal listed firms tend to establish a higher proportion of subsidiaries in the province where the default occurred. This phenomenon can be attributed to China’s bailout reform signaling a reduction in local protectionism in financial and product markets. Meanwhile, we found that the effects of bond defaults on cross-regional investment are more pronounced under the following conditions: when the impact of the bond default is greater; when the economic and fiscal conditions of the province where default occurs are better; when local protectionism in the home province is higher; and when the degree of asset specificity of the listed firms is lower. Finally, we found that China’s bailout reform has led to positive economic consequences, including reduced operational risks and improved total factor productivity (TFP) of firms. Overall, our paper supplements the literature on bond defaults and cross-regional investment.

This study finds that reducing political influence over local courts weakens local government debt capacity. We establish this result by exploiting the staggered roll-out of a judicial centralization reform aimed at alleviating local court capture in China and find reduced judicial favoritism towards local governments post-reform. The majority of local government lawsuits are with contractors over government payment delays. The reform not only increases government lawsuit losses but also exposes their credit risk, as payment delays without court support signal government liquidity constraint. Investors respond by tightening lending and increasing interest rates, which curbs government spending.

This study documents how the political hierarchy plays a significant role in determining corporate environmental governance. By conducting difference-in-differences analysis to investigate listed firms in China, this study demonstrates that local and central SOEs headquartered in jurisdictions far removed from central government supervision have worse environmental governance than POEs. Verticalization reforms implemented in 2016 enable provincial environmental protection bureaus to direct lower-level bureaus. Local governments cannot control environmental protection bureau leaders for economic development. This study finds that the corporate environmental governance of local SOEs has significantly improved following the reform, as local environmental protection bureaus no longer have conflicts of interest with local governments. However, the reform has not resulted in improvements to corporate environmental governance in central SOEs, whose executives occupy higher status than provincial Environmental Protection Bureau leaders, nor in POEs, which were already managed before the reform. Further evidence indicates that local SOEs experience an increase in abatement investments and relationship building expenses following the reform. Lastly, our study reveals that verticalization reform costs are negligible. Local SOEs have not experienced a decline in financial performance or corporate valuation. This study suggests that policymakers should consider the political ranking of government agencies and enterprises to improve environmental governance.

Does large-scale privatization increase income inequality? To answer this question, we analyze the impact of China’s reform of state-owned enterprises on labor market outcomes in urban areas from 1992 to 2004, exploiting cross-prefecture variation in reform exposure stemming from initial differences in the employment shares of urban collective enterprises and state-owned enterprises. Our analysis reveals that workers in prefectures with higher exposure to the reform experienced a more rapid decline in employment and a slower increase in income, compared to those in less exposed areas. Further analysis shows that individuals with lower income and those with lower educational attainment experienced greater losses. A backof-the-envelope analysis indicates that the reform contributed to more than 40% of the study period’s increase in income inequality.

In the international context of the surging tide of anti-globalization, China will raise the establishment of pilot free trade zone as a national strategy, and achieve the goal of promoting highquality economic growth through a series of reform measures, such as promoting investment liberalization and facilitation, improving investment promotion and protection mechanisms, and improving the level of overseas investment cooperation. To study the role of the pilot free trade zones on investment, the panel data of 46 cities from 2005 to 2018 are used to empirically test the investment growth effect and investment spillover effect of the pilot free trade zones by using the Difference-in-Differences Spatial Dubin Model. The results show that the pilot free trade zones can significantly promote investment growth and have a spillover effect on investment in surrounding areas. Through the grouping regression of the eastern, central, and western regions, it is found that the eastern pilot free trade zones have the most obvious investment spillover effect on the surrounding areas, and the central pilot free trade zones have a siphon effect on the investment in the surrounding areas. In addition, different batches of pilot free trade zones or the same batch of pilot free trade zones have different investment spillover effects on surrounding areas at different time points. Finally, policy suggestions are put forward: strengthen the strategic implementation of the pilot free trade zones, improve the spatial radiation mechanism, promote linkage development and differentiated development, and make the pilot free trade zones better promote investment growth and investment spillover.

This paper highlights the crucial role of land allocation mechanisms in promoting industrial agglomeration by examining China’s 2007 industrial land market reform. By introducing transparency into the land-selling process, the reform facilitated more buyers to compete for land (reflected by increased land sale prices), enabling local governments to allocate land to the most suitable users. Combining comprehensive data sets that include information on initial local industrial structure, new industrial establishments, and industrial land transactions, the empirical analysis finds that the reform significantly increased the entry of firms from industries aligned with local specialization, particularly in areas that implemented the reform more strictly. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates a 1.3% increase in the national average total factor productivity of new entrants over three years post-reform due to a better match between new entrants and local industry specialization. Supporting evidence demonstrates the reform’s positive effect on economic growth (reflected in changes in nighttime lights), potentially through increasing local firms’ TFP.