We construct a daily Chinese Housing Market Sentiment Index by applying GPT-4o to Chinese news articles. Our method outperforms traditional models in several validation tests, including a test based on a suite of machine learning models. Applying this index to household-level data, we find that after monetary easing, an important group of homebuyers (who have a college degree and are aged between 30 and 50) in cities with more optimistic housing sentiment have lower responses in non-housing consumption, whereas for homebuyers in other age-education groups, such a pattern does not exist. This suggests that current monetary easing might be more effective in boosting non-housing consumption than in the past for China due to weaker crowding-out effects from pessimistic housing sentiment. The paper also highlights the need for complementary structural reforms to enhance monetary policy transmission in China, a lesson relevant for other similar countries. Methodologically, it offers a tool for monitoring housing sentiment and lays out some principles for applying generative AI models, adaptable to other studies globally.

This research study primarily examines the digital transformation’s internal mechanism promoting enterprises’ total factor productivity (TFP) based on the matching and learning mechanism. Afterward, this research article empirically examines the digital transformation’s influential mechanism on enterprises’ TFP, using the Chinese listed companies’ data on the “A” stock market for the time period ranging from 2007 to 2019. The major study findings are as follows: (1) the improvement of the digital transformation significantly increases enterprises’ TFP. The proposed conclusion remains robust after a series of robustness- and the endogeneity test. (2) Furthermore, mechanism analysis reveals that digital transformation effectively enhances enterprises’ TFP by eliminating resource misallocation in the industry. In addition to this, digital transformation relies on the mechanism of “learning by doing” to promote the technological innovation’s spillover effect; hence, effectively enhancing enterprises’ TFP. (3) Heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that the digital transformation’s impact on enterprises’ TFP is heterogeneous in the context of enterprise size, enterprise type, and enterprise ownership. Lastly, this study puts forward that government bodies should intensify the construction and investment in digital infrastructure, promote a series of institutional reforms, and support digital technological R&D practices.

We study the role of firm heterogeneity and imperfect competition for global production networks and the gains from trade. We develop a quantifiable trade model with two-sided firm heterogeneity, matching frictions, and oligopolistic competition upstream. More productive buyers endogenously match with more suppliers, thereby inducing tougher competition among them to enjoy lower input costs and superior performance. Transaction-level customs data confirms that downstream French and Chilean firms import higher values and quantities at lower prices as upstream Chinese markets become more competitive over time, with stronger responses by larger firms. Moreover, suppliers charge more diversified buyers lower mark-ups. Counterfactual analysis indicates that entry upstream benefits high-productivity buyers, while lower matching or trade costs benefit all buyers, with the biggest boost to mid-productivity buyers. All three shocks generate sizeable welfare gains, especially under package reforms. Global production networks thus mediate bigger effects and cross-border spillovers from industrial and trade policies.

In China, inadequate levels of cross-regional investment represent a challenge. Our study uses the bailout reform initiated in China in 2014 to test whether market-oriented reforms of this type can help stimulate national economic integration. We observed that following a bond default event, nonlocal listed firms tend to establish a higher proportion of subsidiaries in the province where the default occurred. This phenomenon can be attributed to China’s bailout reform signaling a reduction in local protectionism in financial and product markets. Meanwhile, we found that the effects of bond defaults on cross-regional investment are more pronounced under the following conditions: when the impact of the bond default is greater; when the economic and fiscal conditions of the province where default occurs are better; when local protectionism in the home province is higher; and when the degree of asset specificity of the listed firms is lower. Finally, we found that China’s bailout reform has led to positive economic consequences, including reduced operational risks and improved total factor productivity (TFP) of firms. Overall, our paper supplements the literature on bond defaults and cross-regional investment.

This study documents how the political hierarchy plays a significant role in determining corporate environmental governance. By conducting difference-in-differences analysis to investigate listed firms in China, this study demonstrates that local and central SOEs headquartered in jurisdictions far removed from central government supervision have worse environmental governance than POEs. Verticalization reforms implemented in 2016 enable provincial environmental protection bureaus to direct lower-level bureaus. Local governments cannot control environmental protection bureau leaders for economic development. This study finds that the corporate environmental governance of local SOEs has significantly improved following the reform, as local environmental protection bureaus no longer have conflicts of interest with local governments. However, the reform has not resulted in improvements to corporate environmental governance in central SOEs, whose executives occupy higher status than provincial Environmental Protection Bureau leaders, nor in POEs, which were already managed before the reform. Further evidence indicates that local SOEs experience an increase in abatement investments and relationship building expenses following the reform. Lastly, our study reveals that verticalization reform costs are negligible. Local SOEs have not experienced a decline in financial performance or corporate valuation. This study suggests that policymakers should consider the political ranking of government agencies and enterprises to improve environmental governance.

This paper investigates how domestic policy uncertainty stemming from discretionary fiscal policy disrupts the efficient capital allocation across firms. While fiscal policy represents the government’s reaction to economic conditions, its volatility presents firms with considerable uncertainty about conditions affecting their future profitability and consequently disrupts firms’ decisions on investment in the presence of capital adjustment costs. Using firm-level data from Chinese manufacturing industries spanning from 1998 to 2007, we find that reducing fiscal policy volatility leads to a decrease in the dispersion of marginal revenue product of capital, accounting for 8.9 percent of the observed improvement in capital allocation during the sample period. In addition to various fiscal reforms to curb fiscal policy volatility directly, policies contributing to lower capital adjustment costs and lower reliance of firms on government expenditure can alleviate the adverse effects caused by fiscal policy volatility.

Purpose – To examine whether and how the different levels of regional economic incentives would have an effect on underwriters’ market share in general. Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on Chinese IPO firms during the period 2006-2016, this study examines the impact of different levels of regional economic incentives on underwriters’ market share. Findings – The authors find thatregional economic incentives have a positive impact on underwriters’ market share and that local economic incentives have a significantly strongerimpact than central economic incentives. Furthermore, the authors find that IPO firms with underwriters driven by regional economic incentives experience worse post-IPO performance than firms with underwriters driven by central economic incentives, which do not experience a significant decline in post-IPO performance. Originality/value – Taken together, the authors’ findings are consistent with the notion that performance assessment motivates officials at various levels of government to bring companies in their jurisdiction to the IPO market prematurely. In addition, the results indicate that central economic incentives play a significantrole in driving China’s macroeconomic development and market-oriented system reforms. As such, they are one of the major driving forces behind China’s market-oriented system reforms.

This chapter introduces alternative financial institutions (AFIs) in China that do not fall within traditional financial institution (FI) models. We describe their business models and development dynamics in the context of economic and financial reforms and technological advancement. We find that various AFIs are formed based on social, business, and virtual networks to overcome capital allocation barriers, reduce costs, or improve efficiency, providing financial services for the underserved. However, without proper regulations, these AFIs could pose alarming levels of risk on financial stability. They repeat a boom-and-bust pattern, in parallel with the government's initial laissez faire approach but later harsh interferences: being taken over by formal FIs or shut down as illegal practices until the exceptional Ant-Financial case. Improving investors' financial knowledge and regulators’ competency is critical for China to advance its financial system and develop mature FIs and AFIs. We recommend key features required in such a regulatory framework.

This paper reviews the current housing crisis in China and explores the roles of supply-demand imbalances and local governments in the real estate sector. To prevent the housing downturn from further dragging down economic growth, Beijing suspended the financing restrictions on developers imposed in August 2020. These restrictions, known as the “three red lines” that limited new borrowing by developers, led Chinese property developers to default on a record number of debt obligations and triggered the most serious housing slump China has seen since 1998. The property sector saw its value added decline by more than 5 percent in 2022, even as the overall economy grew at 3 percent. But the current dynamics in the housing market reflect a repeated pattern: Loosening financing restrictions on developers and using housing as a macroeconomic stabilization tool risks reinforcing the boom-bust housing cycle. China’s real estate sector is a systemic problem. Without serious reforms to address concerns such as supply-demand imbalances and local governments’ deep connections with real estate, housing slumps like the one in 2022 may recur.

The widespread replacement of gross receipt tax (GRT) with value-added tax (VAT) is an important phenomenon in the past half-century. Theory predicts that such tax reforms reduce vertical integration, increase production efficiency, and improve industrial structure. We exploit the tax reform that replaced GRT with VAT for service industries in China and find empirical evidence consistent with theoretical predictions. First, the tax reform increases the probability and intensity of outsourcing for both manufacturing and service firms. The increase is larger for industries more heavily reliant on treated intermediate industries for production and for firms with higher capital–labor intensity. Second, the reform increases total factor productivity and labor productivity. Third, the reform affects industry structure by boosting sales and promoting the employment of treated service industries.