Working with unique data on land values in 35 major Chinese markets and a panel of firms outside the real estate industry, we estimate standard investment equations that yield no evidence of a collateral channel effect. This is markedly different from previous work on the United States and Japan which finds economically large impacts. One reason for this appears to be that some of the most dominant firms in China are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which are unconstrained in the sense that they do not need to rely on rising underlying property collateral values to obtain all the financing necessary to carry out their desired investment programs. However, we also find no collateral channel effect for non-SOEs when we perform our analysis on disaggregated sets of firms. Norms and regulation in the Chinese capital markets and banking sector can account for why there is no collateral channel effect operating among these firms. We caution that our results do not mean that there will be no negative fallout from a potential real estate bust on the Chinese economy. There are good reasons to believe there would be, just not through a collateral channel effect.

本文针对商业银行流动性风险国际监管框架的演变，探讨监管重点与流动性风险变化的互动关系，从而梳理出国际流动性风险监管的目的、手段和发展趋势，进而研究其对我国流动性风险监管实践的影响。 本文从分析商业银行流动性风险的成因入手，指出其根源是银行存款和贷款业务所形成的期限错配，因此这种风险是银行在经营活动中难以避免的。流动性风险区别于银行面临的其他风险的主要表现是其低频率、高损失的特点，这使得银行一旦面临流动性危机的打击就很难在短时间内恢复过来，所以必须引起银行管理层和监管机构的重视。从20世纪90年代起单一的流动性指标监管方法已经逐渐被综合的流动性风险管理体系所取代，但各国之间尚存在较大差异。 本文对次贷危机前美国、英国和东亚各国的流动性风险监管框架作了横向比较。经过比较后发现，在流动性风险监管体系中，存在两种不同的方法，即定性方法和定量方法。前者偏重在制度层面对银行进行指导以提高其流动性风险管理能力，而后者则偏重以硬性指标客观计量和评估流动性风险，两者互有优劣，不可偏废。相对来说，英美国家因为金融制度比较完善、人才水平较高，其监管机构以使用定性方法为主；而东亚各国由于金融发展水平较低，产品结构简单，从业人员水平参差不齐，所以更偏好使用定量方法。 当各国金融监管机构还在为如何在定性方法和定量方法之间进行取舍的时候，美国次贷危机和之后席卷全球的金融危机不期而至，这大大加快了流动性风险管理理念和监管实践的发展速度。作为次贷危机的受害者，本文深入分析了英国北岩银行（Northern Rock plc）的挤兑危机案例，对危机背景、银行的经营特点、事件经过和后续影响都作了较为细致的论述，并指出银行自身流动性风险管理不善是形成危机的主要原因，这表现在不合理的资产负债结构、期限错配、利率缺口以及内部控制的缺失。尽管北岩银行管理层对于流动性危机的发生负有不可推卸的责任，但是监管失败的教训同样发人深省，这间接促成了巴塞尔银行监管委员会（Basel Committee on Banking Supervision，以下简称巴塞尔委员会）制定后危机时代的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文回顾了历年巴塞尔委员会制定的流动性风险监管文件，将其大致分为次贷危机前和次贷危机后两大类。本文指出，巴塞尔委员会早期制定的流动性监管框架已经很难适应飞速发展的国际金融形势，面临诸多迫切需要解决的问题，包括融资渠道的变化、资产证券化、复杂金融工具的泛滥、抵押品的广泛应用、支付结算系统和日内流动性需求以及跨境资金流。在这些问题中，很大部分也同样存在于危机前的北岩银行，因此危机的爆发带有某种必然性。巴塞尔委员会在次贷危机后发布的《流动性风险管理和监督稳健原则》和《第三版巴塞尔协议：流动性风险计量、标准和监测的国际框架》奠定了第三版巴塞尔协议下国际流动性风险监管新框架的基石。前者制定的17项流动性风险监管新原则和后者引入的流动性覆盖率（Liquidity Coverage Ratio，简称LCR）和净稳定资金比例（Net Stable Funding Ratio，简称NSFR）两大指标分别从定性方法和定量方法两方面完善了现有的流动性风险监管框架，这也反映了未来国际流动性风险监管的趋势。 正如在本文开篇提到的，流动性风险是银行不可避免的风险，对于中国银行业来说，也不能置身事外。经过分析我国银行业的流动性风险现状，笔者认为我国银行的资产负债结构仍属传统，偏重以存款作为融资来源、以贷款作为盈利来源，因此长期流动性风险不容忽视而短期流动性风险尚属可控。同时，不同类型商业银行的流动性风险来源也有所不同。此外，国内银行的流动性风险管理水平也有待提高。与巴塞尔协议类似，在次贷危机前后，我国的流动性风险监管框架也有了质的飞跃，这主要归功于中国银监会颁布的《中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见》、《商业银行流动性风险管理指引》和《商业银行流动性风险管理办法（试行）》（征求意见稿）。这些法规系统性地借鉴巴塞尔委员会的先进经验，辅以本地化的监测工具，从而形成了兼顾定性方法和定量方法的有中国特色的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文最后指出，无论是定性方法还是定量方法，在流动性风险监管中都起着举足轻重的作用，两者不可偏废。监管机构在设计流动性风险监管框架并实施现场或非现场监管时，应灵活运用定性方法和定量方法并结合压力情景评估银行的流动性风险，这样才能全面有效地实施流动性风险监管，避免系统性的流动性危机。另外，本文还建议我国监管机构在本地化国际流动性风险监管框架方面做更多尝试。 With respect to the evolution of the international supervision framework for commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article aims to discuss the interaction between the regulatory focuses and the diversification of liquidity risk, in order to sort out the purposes, approaches and development trends of the international supervision on liquidity risk and their impacts on China’s supervision practice of liquidity risk. In regard to the causes of commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article points out that the mismatch of maturity between the bank’s deposits and loans is the fundamental reason. Such risk is inevitable when conducting banking business. The features of liquidity risk (i.e. low frequency but extremely severe) distinguish itself from other risks that the bank faces, which hinders the bank from a quick recovery after being stricken by a liquidity crisis. Therefore, both the bank management and the regulators must draw their attentions to it. From 1990s, the monitoring method of single indicator has been gradually replaced with the comprehensive liquidity risk management system. However, there are still big variances between different countries. This article compares the framework for liquidity risk supervision between the United States, the United Kingdom and the East Asian countries prior to the subprime mortgage crisis. It is noted after comparison that there are two different approaches in the liquidity risk supervision system, namely the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. The former emphasizes improving the bank’s liquidity risk management skill by guiding the bank from governance perspective, while the latter prefers measuring and evaluating the liquidity risk by means of objective indicators. Each of these two approaches has its pros and cons that neither should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. Relatively speaking, the Anglo-American countries prefer qualitative approaches due to their mature financial system as well as professional practitioners. By contrast, East Asian countries rely on quantitative approach because of their under-developing financial system, simple product structure and less experienced practitioners. When the financial regulators in various countries were still wondering whether to adopt the qualitative approach or the quantitative approach, the subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States and thereafter became a global financial crisis. This crisis accelerated the development of the management theory and the supervision practice of liquidity risk. This article analyzes the bank run on Northern Rock plc (the Bank) in the United Kingdom, a victim of the subprime mortgage crisis, by elaborating the crisis background, the business features of the Bank, the incident course as well as the subsequent impacts. The major cause of the bank run was the Bank’s own mismanagement of its liquidity risk, which included unbalanced structure of assets and liabilities, maturity mismatch, interest rate gap and ineffective internal control as well. Although the management of the Bank bore the ultimate responsibility for this liquidity crisis, the lesson of the supervision failure was thought-provoking. It also indirectly led to the renewed framework for the post-crisis liquidity risk management and supervision by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee). This article reviews the historical documents of liquidity risk supervision that were formulated by the Basel Committee and divides them into two categories, i.e. before and after the subprime mortgage crisis. This article points out that the framework for liquidity risk supervision which was established by the Basel Committee at the early stage could no longer meet the rapid development of the international financial environment and faced many problems which need be solved urgently. These problems included the change of financing channels, asset securitization, misapplication of complex financial instruments, extensive use of collaterals, payment-settlement system, demand for intraday liquidity and cross-border cash flow. Northern Rock plc had most of these problems prior to its bank run crisis. Therefore, the crisis was with certain inevitability. After the subprime mortgage crisis, the Basel Committee issued “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision” and “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” which laid the foundation of the renewed international framework for the liquidity risk supervision under Basel III. The former defines 17 new principles of liquidity risk supervision whilst the latter introduces two key indicators, i.e. the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Both of the two foundational documents improve the existing framework for liquidity risk supervision from qualitative and quantitative aspects respectively. They also reflect the trends of international liquidity risk supervision. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the liquidity risk is inevitable to all banks including the China’s banks. Based on the analysis of the status quo of the Chinese banks’ liquidity risk, the author draws the conclusion that the structures of assets and liabilities of the China’s banks are traditional, i.e. the deposits are the source of financing while the loans are the source of profit. Hence, their long-term liquidity risk cannot be ignored whilst their short-term liquidity risk is still under control. In addition, the liquidity risk management skills of the China’s banks need further improvement. Similar to the Basel Accord, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (the CBRC) promulgated “Guidance Opinions on the Implementation of the New Supervisory Standards of Basel III in China Banking Sector”, “Guidelines on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks” and “Administrative Measures on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks (Trial) (Draft for Consultation)” right after the subprime mortgage crisis, which made great improvement in the framework for liquidity risk supervision in China. By referring to the advanced experiences of the Basel Committee, together with the help of the localized monitoring tools, these regulations forms a new framework for liquidity risk management and supervision with Chinese characteristics which takes into account both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Finally, this article reminds that both the qualitative and quantitative approaches play equally important roles in the field of liquidity risk supervision that neither of them is dispensable. When designing the framework for liquidity risk supervision and conducting the on-site or off-site inspections, the regulators should apply flexibility in the use of qualitative and quantitative approaches and attach importance to the stress scenarios to assess the bank’s liquidity risk. By this means, comprehensive and effective supervision on liquidity risk can be achieved to prevent systemic liquidity crisis. Furthermore, it is suggested that the domestic regulators should make more efforts to localize the international framework for liquidity risk supervision.

利率工具作为央行货币政策的重要组成部分，也是实施货币政策的主要手段之一。中央银行根据货币政策实施的需要，适时地运用利率工具，对利率水平和结构进行调整，以此影响社会资金供求状况，调节微观经济主体的具体经济行为，进而实现既定的货币政策目标。 自2008年经济危机以来，中国人民银行多次利用存款准备金率和利率工具对国家宏观经济进行调节，特别是2010年以来为了应对由之前过度宽松货币政策导致的严重通胀形势，央行5次提高存贷款基准利率，12次提高存款准备金率至21.5%的历史高位。尽管如此，但是国内利率水平依然处在低位，实际利率持续为负。存准率过度提高导致货币供给大幅减少，利率水平维持低位使货币需求上升，这样扭曲的货币政策导致了我国宏观经济在各方面的失衡，并且遭到了来自各界的非议。究竟利率工具的宏观经济调控效果如何呢，为何央行不愿意使用价格型货币政策工具——利率进行调控呢？虽然目前存准率工具的使用次数要远多于利率工具，但是随着今后利率市场化改革的深入推进和我国金融体制的开放改革，今后利率调控工具将会成为央行调节宏观经济运行节奏的主要手段。因此，研究利率政策调控对宏观经济的影响将有助于我们明确利率调控的效果、认清宏观经济变化的原因，在利率市场化的背景下也能够为央行制定科学的货币政策提供决策依据。 本文是按照“回顾改革以来利率政策的调整历史→实际利率变动对主要宏观经济目标的实证检验→影响利率政策效果的原因分析→增强利率调控效果的政策建议”的基本思路，展开全文的分析讨论。在对改革开放三十年以来的利率政策历史回顾分析的基础上，采用定性和定量分析相结合的方法，对利率变动与经济增长率、通货膨胀率以及城镇登记失业率进行实证检验，得出不同阶段实际利率的变化对不同宏观经济目标的影响。在此基础上得出全文结论，实际利率与经济增长率的关系从正相关逐渐发展为负相关，与通胀率则是显著的负相关，而实际利率与城镇登记失业率则呈现很弱的相关性。然后具体分析影响我国利率政策调控宏观经济效果的原因，主要包括利率管制政策、金融市场发展建设及经济主体行为三个方面。最后在前文讨论的基础上提出增强利率调控效果的政策建议，主要包括放松利率管制、继续推进利率市场化改革、完善货币市场发展建设、加强央行宏观调控能力等方面。 Interest rate policy is an important component of monetary policy，also the one main instruments of monetary policy implementation．According to the People’s Bank of China monetary policy needs in a timely manner，use of interest rate tools，include the level of interest rates and interest rate structure in order to affect the supply and demand of funds，micro-economic regulation of the main acts，and to achieve monetary policy objectives． After 2008 world economic crisis, the interest rate and deposit-reserve ratio has been changed more times to adjust China’s macroeconomic. Especially since 2010 to cope with the serious inflation caused by the prior overly lax monetary policy, the central bank raised the benchmark deposit and lending interest rates 5 times and 12 times to raise the deposit reserve ratio to 21.5% highs. In spite of this, but the domestic interest rate level is still low, the real interest rate is negative for longtime. Money supply is greatly reduced by the excessive increase of deposit reserve ratio, and monetary demand rises because the level of interest rates remains low. Such distortion of the monetary policy in our country makes our macro economy imbalance in all aspects, and has received criticism from all walks of life. How about the interest rate tool of macroeconomic regulation and control effect, why the central bank is not willing to use price monetary policy tools -- interest rate regulation? Although the deposit-reserve ratio has been changed more than the interest rate, but with the market-oriented reform of interest rate and financial system, interest rate regulation will be the main method of macroeconomic adjusting control. So studying on macroeconomic effects of real interest rate would help us to be more clearly knowing the results of the interest rate policy and understanding the reasons for changes in the economy. Furthermore，in our country, the interest rate is not fully market-oriented, the study is also helpful for authorities to make the correct monetary and interest rate policy. “Review the history of interest rate policy adjustment from Reform and Opening up→the empirical test of real interest rate on the main macroeconomic goals→the reasons analysis which have influence on the effects of interest rate policy→the policy recommendations which make interest rate regulation more effective" This is the main train of thought of this paper, around which expand the analysis and discussion. Based on the review of the history of interest rate policy after Reform and Opening-up from 1980, used the combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, through analyzed the effects of real interest rates which impacted on the three macroeconomic objectives, include the GDP growth rate、the inflation rate and the urban registered unemployment rate, we get the result that in different stages, the interest rate policy have different impacts on economic objectives. At the last, we get the whole conclusion and analyzed the reasons which caused interest rate policy to be ineffective on the macro economy. Finally, according to China’s financial market, this paper gave some reform suggestions which can make interest rate policy to be more effective on macro economic adjusting control.

We examine how regulators tackle two types of widespread tunneling activities in China. Controlling shareholders and related parties can divert assets from listed firms or coerce firms to serve as guarantors on questionable loans. The government announced and enacted two new rules during the same period: the first rule prohibits asset diversion from listed firms for ‘non-operational’ purposes by large shareholders, while the second standardizes the practice of listed firms providing loan guarantees. Relative to firms not affected by either rule, firms complying with the first rule experience a reduction in the ownership stakes of controlling shareholders, an increase in investment, and significantly better performance. The second rule has no impact on firms. Our results highlight the importance of enforceability: laws and regulations that can be enforced at lower costs are much more likely to succeed, especially in countries with weak institutions.

The Chinese market is characterized by state-controlled and closely held firms as well as significant differences in economic development and legal structures at the provincial level and corporate regulations that require firms seeking external financing to show a history of dividend payment. Using a sample of listed Chinese firms, we investigate the firm’s choice of cash or stock dividends and market reactions to the announcement of these dividend choices. We find that profitable, low leverage, high cash holding, stronger shareholder protection firms, and those firms with state ownership prior to listing and undertaking subsequent equity offerings are more likely to pay dividends and cash dividends, in particular. In addition, we find that growing firms with high levels of retained earnings and investing more in fixed assets pay stock dividends. Firms appear to cater to investor demands in setting dividend policy; hence firms with a large proportion of non-tradable shares are more likely to pay cash dividends. Consistent with the use of stock dividends to attract the attention of analysts, we find that the announcement of a stock dividend initiation is associated with significant positive market reactions and increased analyst following.

We develop a model of a financial institution to study how shareholder—debt holder conflicts interact with prudential capital regulation and accounting measurement rules. Our analysis highlights the result that, for highly leveraged financial institutions—when prudential regulation play an important role—debt overhang and asset substitution inefficiencies work in opposing directions. We demonstrate that, relative to the “historical cost” regime in which assets and liabilities on an institution’s balance sheet are measured at their origination values, fair value could alleviate the inefficiencies arising from asset substitution, but exacerbate those arising from underinvestment due to debt overhang. The optimal choices of accounting regime and prudential solvency constraint balance the conflicts between shareholders and debt holders. Under fair value accounting, the optimal solvency constraint declines with the institution’s marginal cost of investment in project quality and the excess cost of equity capital relative to debt capital. Fair value accounting dominates historical cost accounting provided the solvency constraints in the respective regimes take their optimal values. If the solvency constraints are sub-optimally chosen, however, historical cost accounting could dominate fair value accounting.

Using the introduction of margin trading in China, this study examines the effects of margin trading on the informativeness of trades and stock market liquidity. Using the methodology of Hasbrouck (1991 and 1993), I find that allowing investors to trade on margin leads to more informed trading. This increase in informed trading is mirrored by an increase in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread and a decrease in the relative weight placed on public information in trading decision. The discussed findings are more pronounced for stocks with relatively high levels of margin trading. Overall, the findings in the paper suggest that margin trading may lead to more information-based trading and lower levels of stock market liquidity.

The 2005 split-share reform in China mandated the conversion of previously non-tradable shares into tradable status. The reform was swift and changed investors?ability to trade corporate equities in a US$400 billion market. This paper examines the e¤ects of the 2005 stock market reform on ?rms? real and ?nancial outcomes. It does so exploiting multiple institutional features of the conversion program. We ?rst examine a small pilot trial conducted at the beginning of the reform, which we are able to replicate using the same data and selection criteria that was used by regulators. We also take advantage of the staggered nature of the larger conversion schedule, whereby over a thousand ?rms converted their outstanding shares at di¤erent times within a pre-speci?ed window. These various wrinkles produce counterfactuals against which to gauge the economic e¤ects of secondary equity trading. Using a time-varying treatment estimation approach, we identify increases in corporate pro?tability, investment, value, and productivity as pre-existing shares were allowed to trade in or- ganized exchanges. We also identify changes in ?rms?propensity to issue new shares, pay dividends, and engage in merger deals. Our ?ndings provide new insights on the role of stock markets in shaping corporate behavior and on the impact of regulation on economic growth.

This paper documents different timeliness in disseminating sanction and enforcement information (SEI) by two types of regulatory agencies in China and the different consequences that flow from them. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) does not make timely public disclosures of SEI and, instead, leave it up to the firms to make a public announcement under their general obligation to disclose price-sensitive information. The firms therefore have considerable discretion in deciding whether and when to disclose SEI. In contrast, the stock exchanges in Shenzhen and Shanghai make SEI public promptly through the media and the exchanges’ official websites. Using Chinese SEI data during the period 1999 to 2005, we find that the CSRC approach is associated with significantly lagged corporate disclosure (compared with the timely stock exchange approach) and a significantly negative (but delayed) stock price reaction. We also show that the sanctioned firm may take advantage of the less timely CSRC approach to delay its disclosure of SEI for opportunistic reasons such as completing material transactions. We conclude that the CSRC should make immediate public announcements of SEI as these contain price-sensitive information. Furthermore, the immediate dissemination of SEI will bring the CSRC into line with the disclosure practices of China’s stock exchanges and international market regulators.

China’s financial prices are informative enough for the PBC to introduce a monetary policy framework centered around interest rates. While bond yields are not fully efficient—reflecting regulation, liquidity, and segmentation—we find they contain considerable information about the state of the economy as well as evidence of an emerging transmission channel: changes in PBC rates influence the structure of Treasury, financial, and corporate bond yield curves, which are then associated with changes in growth and inflation. Coporate spreads are also a leading indicator of growth and inflation. While further liberalization will strengthen both efficiency and transmission, several necessary elements to move towards indirect monetary policy are already in place.