This paper examines the fiscal motives behind municipal governments' decisions to allocate commercial and residential land when two categories of land use are subject to different fiscal revenue alternatives: business-related tax and/or land rent. We use urban parcel-level land transfers during China’s peak period of urbanization, match commercial parcels with residential parcels, and find significant price discounts on commercial parcels relative to adjacent residential parcels. The observed discounts arise from the future tax flows from commercial use, i.e., expected taxes from developed commercial land reduce its transfer price. We conduct a structural estimation to examine the implications on land use structure of future taxes lowering land transfer prices. Results show that while prospective taxes increase commercial land supply, a significant portion of the favorable treatment impact is mitigated by market price responses, suggesting that the land market counters commercial land favoritism when local revenues include both business-related taxes and land value-based charges. The results have implications for the design of urban public revenue systems.

This study investigates the impact of the land rental market (LRM) on labor productivity in rural China. Particular attention is given to farm and non-farm labor productivity. Using 2012 household-level data and a multinomial endogenous switching treatment regression (MESTR) technique, we find that rural households renting-in farmland increased labor productivity in the farm sector by about 55%, while labor productivity in the non-farm sector decreased by about 6%. We also find that rural households renting-out farmland had lower labor productivity in both the farm and non-farm sectors by 13% and 9%, respectively. More family labor transferred from the farm to the non-farm sector after renting-out land.

We examine communication of political connections in corporate China, and show that politically inclined positive words—words in connotation of political sentiment—serve as a distinct and effective signaling device for corporate political connections. Using a large sample of corporate news, we find that news’ political sentiment, instead of orthodox political measures such as occurrences of political nouns and political entities, reflects executives’ political connections for private enterprises, and is related to rent-seeking benefits in government subsidy, tax refund, financing constraints and political risk. Our results demonstrate that political sentiment is an effective way to decode subtle corporate political connections in modern China’s “Mind Politics” environment that infiltrates into private corporations.

Based on the matching data of China’s industrial enterprise database and enterprise patent database, this study investigates the effect and mechanism of government subsidy policy on the innovation performance of Chinese enterprises using the panel data matching and multi-period difference-in-difference model. Results show that the incentive effect of government subsidy policy on enterprises’ innovation performance is dominant, thus improving the innovation performance of Chinese manufacturing enterprises. However, the promotion effect on lowquality innovation is greater than that on high-quality innovation. Moreover, the government subsidy policy affects the innovation performance of enterprises by stimulating enterprises to increase their R&D investment, increasing the spending on rent-seeking and taking on more social responsibility. The government subsidy policy significantly affects the innovation performance of non-state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and technology-intensive industries. The impact of government subsidizing policies varies regionally. The policy effect on enterprise innovation performance is significant in the eastern and central regions but not in the western and northeast regions.

We examine communication of political connections in corporate China, and show that politically inclined positive words—words in connotation of political sentiment—serve as a distinct and effective signaling device for corporate political connections. Using a large sample of corporate news, we find that news’ political sentiment, instead of orthodox political measures such as occurrences of political nouns and political entities, reflects executives’ political connections for private enterprises, and is related to rent-seeking benefits in government subsidy, tax refund, financing constraints and political risk. Our results demonstrate that political sentiment is an effective way to decode subtle corporate political connections in modern China’s “Mind Politics” environment that infiltrates into private corporations.

China’s household wealth is growing rapidly and has become significant worldwide. While the government played an important role in economic growth and wealth accumulation, few research has explained why and how government expenditure redistributes household wealth in China. This study uses China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) household survey (2010-2018) and prefecture-level data to estimate the impact of government expenditure on household wealth, especially the value of housing asset. We find that the capitalization of government expenditure contributes an important part to housing value appreciation, which accounts for more than 50% of household wealth. Furthermore, the impact mechanism of government expenditure on households’ wealth has a substantial redistributive effect. Government expenditures greatly advance the net worth of households who own their houses, especially for households that own two or more houses, but contribute much less to those comprising rental tenants.

We examine communication of political connections in corporate China, and show that politically inclined positive words—words in connotation of political sentiment—serve as a distinct and effective signaling device for corporate political connections. Using a large sample of corporate news, we find that news’ political sentiment, instead of orthodox political measures such as occurrences of political nouns and political entities, reflects executives’ political connections for private enterprises, and is related to rent-seeking benefits in government subsidy, tax refund, financing constraints and political risk. Our results demonstrate that political sentiment is an effective way to decode subtle corporate political connections in modern China’s “Mind Politics” environment that infiltrates into private corporations.

We decompose the difference between a firm’s market and book values into two components: intangible assets that can be created by competing firms through SG&A/R&D expenditures, and the residual denoted as franchise value (FV). The estimated parameters in the model for creating intangible assets by capitalizing R&D/SG&A expenditures vary significantly across industries. Consistent with FV being a measure of economic rents and quasi-rents, ceteris paribus, higher FV firms face fewer product market threats, have higher markups, and their investments are less sensitive to their total Tobin’s Q. In contrast, firms with higher capitalized intangible assets, face higher product market threats.

We examine how hometown ties among local politicians affect capital allocation in China. We use a difference-in-differences design that relies on the exogenous replacements of city officials. Our results indicate that hometown ties between city party secretaries increase city-dyad investment by 10% and firm registrations by 1%. These effects are larger between distant cities and for the investment of small and private firms. Comparing the effects before and after the Chinese anti-corruption campaign, we provide nuanced evidence showing that, although hometown ties may entice the rent-seeking activities of officials, such activities may promote economic growth.

We study the labor markets in China and the United States, the two largest economies in the world, by examining the evolution of their cross-sectional age-earnings profiles during the past thirty years. We find that, first, the peak age in the cross-sectional age earnings profiles, which we refer to as the “golden age,” stayed almost constant at around 45-50 in the U.S., but decreased sharply from 55 to around 35 in China; second, the age-specific earnings grew drastically in China, but stayed almost stagnant in the U.S.; third, the cross-sectional and life-cycle age-earnings profiles were remarkably similar in the U.S., but differed substantially in China. We propose and empirically implement a decomposition framework to infer from the repeated cross-sectional earnings data the experience effect (i.e., human capital accumulation over the life cycle), the cohort effect (i.e., inter-cohort human capital growth), and the time effect (i.e., changes in the human capital rental prices over time), under an identifying assumption that the growth of the experience effect stops at the end of one’s working career. The decomposition suggests that China has experienced a much larger inter-cohort productivity growth and higher increase in the rental price to human capital, but lower returns to experience, compared to the U.S. We also use the inferred components to revisit several important and classical applications in macroeconomics and labor economics, including growth accounting and the estimation of TFP growth, and the college wage premium and skill-biased technical change.