China’s green-finance expansion shifts attention from how much firms disclose to whether transition claims remain credible when verification tightens. Using a 2007–2022 panel of Chinese A-share listed firms (crash-risk measures available through 2021), we measure transition credibility by decomposing firms’ transition signals into verifiable actions, narrative disclosure, and realized environmental outcomes, and we propose a transparent narrative–action gap measure (WordsMinusActions = WordsIndex − ActionIndex) to capture ‘words without deeds.’ Exploiting the staggered rollout of China’s Central Environmental Protection Inspections (CEPI) as a plausibly exogenous increase in verification and enforcement intensity, we find that firms with high pre-CEPI narrative–action gaps experience a sharp increase in stock price crash risk around inspections: NCSKEW rises by about 0.09 in the inspection year and 0.20 in the following year (≈0.24 SD), and DUVOL rises by about 0.04 and 0.10 (≈0.27 SD) relative to low-gap firms. Consistent with enforcement discipline, these high-gap firms subsequently reduce disclosure intensity and increase verifiable green actions, narrowing the narrative–action gap after CEPI. The evidence supports governance that rewards verifiable action and consistency over disclosure volume in markets.

Despite strong GDP growth and a favourable demographic profile, India faces an impending jobs crisis. A large share of the workforce remains employed in lowproductivity agriculture, while many new labour market entrants are absorbed into the persistently large informal sector. By contrast, China's rapid ascent was driven by manufacturing-led, export-oriented industrialisation, underpinned by large inflows of foreign direct investment and sustained technology transfer. India's manufacturing base remains modest in contrast. The bulk of well-paid, formal employment continues to be concentrated in the high-skill services sector. This paper contrasts the development trajectories of these two economies and identifies several underutilised jobs-growth levers in India: manufacturing, goods exports, manufacturing-oriented foreign direct investment and innovation. All of these remain underdeveloped, yet together they offer a pathway to more labour-absorbing, durable growth. Leveraging them effectively would be central to achieving India's 'Viksit Bharat 2047' ambition of attaining high-income status. The scale of India's challenge to employ eight to ten million labour-market entrants per year implies that job creation must become an explicit policy priority. This calls for greater trade openness, particularly with Asia and Europe, to integrate India into Asia-centric global supply chains as an alternative to China. Labour market reform is equally critical, making the effective implementation of the new labour codes essential. Strengthening innovation ecosystems and realigning education and skills policies to support industrialisation are also key. Without these structural shifts, India's current pattern of jobless growth risks transforming its demographic dividend into a long-term liability.

We study whether commodity risk is efficiently priced in the cross-section of US equities. We first provide novel evidence on firm-level risk exposure to up to 42 individual commodities. We then construct a mispricing measure as the realized return less the commodity-risk-implied return, and find that it strongly predicts next-month return reversal beyond the traditional short-term reversal. This commodity-risk-mispricing reversal is substantially stronger among small, less analyst- or media-covered stocks, is weakly associated with investor sentiment, and is less prevalent among firms that engage in commodity hedging. In particular, underpricing among these hedgers often remains persistent and even intensifies after the 2004 financialization of commodity markets. This implies that despite the overall decline in mispricing, financialization has likely introduced more costs than benefits for corporate risk management.

Firm characteristics help estimate conditional factor loadings. Larger libraries contain new and overlapping information. We use the cross-sectional distribution of firm characteristics as a ruler to evaluate IPCA loading spaces. With factor counts fixed, expanding from 36 to 153 characteristics can improve in-sample fit while representing momentum and size positions less fully. Reallocating shared exposures changes attribution without changing joint fitted returns. With coefficients fixed, exposure references alter holdings, trading, and subsequent risk at the same characteristic target. Statistical factor models should be evaluated not only by return fit, but also by the exposures they represent and the investment decisions they support.

This paper asks whether a personally experienced bubble crash leaves a lasting imprint on investment style. We study this in China’s stock market, where two technology-growth booms —the 2014–2015 Internet boom and the 2025–2026 AI hardware boom—share a similar narrative but are separated by a decade of generational turnover. Following managers across the mutual funds they run from 2013Q1 to 2026Q1, we compare those who lived through the 2015 crash with otherwise similar managers who entered afterwards. We find that the caution of veteran managers reflects a scar rather than a symptom of ageing. Conditional on age and career length, managers who lived through the 2015 crash hold more value exposure and chase technology stocks less when prices have been rising, and this reluctance deepens with how much the crash hurt them—crash-window tenure, performance shortfalls, redemption pressure—rather than with age. These demand differences reach asset prices as well: stocks held disproportionately by managers without bubble memories carry significantly higher subsequent left-tail risk, whereas crash-experienced ownership stabilises the stock, particularly when ownership is broad. Heterogeneous institutional beliefs rooted in career experience therefore shape not only how managers invest but also the crash risk of the assets they hold.

Traditional portfolio optimization typically relies on a single fitted return distribution, thus ignores non-normality and uncertainty across distributional states. Mean–variance–ambiguity (MVA) models, motivated by the smooth-ambiguity preferences of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) and the KMM-to-MVA Arrow–Pratt reduction of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Ruffino (2013), extend conventional risk penalties to account for distributional uncertainty, but they missed how state-conditional return distributions affect portfolio optimization stability. We develop Deep Mean–Variance–Ambiguity (Deep MVA) to resolve this gap by learning state-conditional return distributions and embedding the resulting conditional information loss into the ambiguity penalty. The resulting local certainty equivalent combines reduced-law mean–variance risk with a quadratic penalty for second-order disagreement. Conditional-mixture state resolution yields a Deep ambiguity covariance equal to the Traditional ambiguity covariance plus a positive-semidefinite state-feature increment. This increment is the conditional L2 loss from averaging state-specific distributions before optimization. On compact convex feasible sets, we show that the state-resolving program has stronger ambiguity-relevant curvature, lower mean-input sensitivity, and a unique global solution under restricted positive curvature or a common ridge; its projected iterations converge linearly. An LSTM-MDN learns state-conditional distribution densities from 60-minute bars, and Probability and VoV scores enter weekly MVA, with GARCH_Resid as a comparator. Tests on the SSE 50, CSI 300, and CSI 500 universes from 2017–2025 find statistically significant Sharpe out-of-sample improvements over Traditional MVA and MVO across all three universes and ambiguity specifications.

We examine whether and how the cultural background of corporate chairpersons, specifically clan culture, influences firm-to-firm lending decisions. Using hand-collected data on Chinese entrusted loans, a major segment of the country’s shadow banking sector, we find that firms led by chairpersons from prefectures with stronger clan culture are more likely to originate entrusted loans and charge lower spreads. We identify distinct mechanisms governing affiliated versus nonaffiliated transactions. In affiliated lending, our evidence suggests an in-group favoritism channel: culturally embedded chairpersons support affiliated parties despite higher ex-post default risk. Conversely, non-affiliated lending operates via an informational channel, where the positive impact of clan culture is more pronounced when geographic barriers are low, and manifests in larger size dispersion. Overall, our findings highlight the dual role of cultural norms in shadow banking, demonstrating that clan culture facilitates credit allocation while generating sharply different efficiency implications across relationship-based and arm’s-length markets.

The economic issue and development limitation has emerged during the middle-income stage, accumulated numerous hidden risks of 'irrational exuberance' and 'irrational depression' development and security becomes 'castles in the air', trapped in the predicament of economic hollowing-out and industrial hollowing-out.

We identify choke points in global production networks as industries bridging flows across global value chains. These industries exhibit low substitutability: US firms exposed to Chinese choke points during the 2022 Covid-19 lockdowns experienced large and persistent sales declines. The Red Sea crisis demonstrates how negative shocks to water transport, a single choke point, propagate throughout the global network. This structural fragility is priced in global stock markets: firms in choke point industries earn annualized benchmark-adjusted returns exceeding 6%. The premium compensates for aggregate consumption risk, as downturns in choke point industries predict lower future US and global consumption growth.

This paper examines whether subjective macroeconomic expectations predict equity risk premia in China. Using professional macro forecasts from the Wind database over 2011- 2023, we construct a composite macroeconomic expectation index via PLS. We find that the index significantly and positively predicts future equity premia both in-sample and out-ofsample, implying a countercyclical equity premium. The predictive power is robust to a wide range of macro-financial controls and delivers economically meaningful gains in portfolio allocation. Further analysis shows that controlling for forecast errors does not attenuate predictability, and the subjective index largely subsumes the information in realized macro variables, suggesting that it captures forward-looking macroeconomic conditions rather than belief bias. Cross-sectional and long-horizon results reinforce this interpretation.