This study investigates how abnormally hot temperatures affect firms’ environmental behavior in China. We find that firms exposed to abnormally hot temperatures participate in more environmental engagement. We also find that this improvement effect is driven mainly by environmental concerns, including public concerns, CEOs, and governments. Our results remain intact after an array of robustness tests. Further analysis shows that the effect of abnormally hot temperatures on corporate environmental engagement is more pronounced in SOEs, heavily polluting firms, and firms located closer to local environmental protection agencies. Moreover, the positive impact of environmental engagement on firm value is stronger when firms are exposed to abnormally hot temperatures. Overall, this study sheds light on the potential stimulation of firms’ environmental actions by global warming, which is yet to be fully understood.

Using China's Strategic Emerging Industries Classification (CSEIC), which is enacted in 2018, as a quasi-natural experiment, this study investigates its impact on corporate innovation behaviors. In basic research, we find that: (1) The CSEIC significantly enhances both substantive and strategic innovation; (2) The effect of CSEIC is influenced by the characteristics of the enterprise. Specifically, in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the CSEIC significantly enhances substantive innovation and strategic innovation, while in non-SOEs, the CSEIC only significantly enhances substantive innovation. In further research based on entrepreneurial spirit, we find that: (1) The effect of CSEIC on strategic innovation is suppressed if entrepreneurial patriotism is higher, no matter whether the enterprise is SOEs or non-SOEs; (2) The effect of CSEIC on substantive innovation is enhanced, if and only if entrepreneurial integrity is higher in SOEs or International Vision is higher in non-SOEs. These findings offer valuable insights for policymakers aiming to foster innovation through targeted support for enterprise leaders, highlighting the need for tailored approaches considering the distinct characteristics of SOEs and non-SOEs.

This paper explores the ethical dimensions of firm-level digitalisation and its impact on ESG metrics during a decade (2010-2020) of rapid technological progress, focusing on Chinese-listed companies. Utilising a text-based index to measure digitalisation, we find that while digitalisation positively influences ESG ratings, supporting resource-based and dynamic capability theories, its relationship with corruption reveals complex dynamics. Surprisingly, corruption strengthens digitalisation’s positive impact on ESG, raising concerns about technology being used to enhance ESG appearances artificially. A distinct difference emerges between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs; SOEs use digitalisation more ethically and are less influenced by corruption, indicating a more responsible approach to technology adoption. Through examining cash holdings, internal controls, and audit fees, we unpack how corruption influences the digitalisation-ESG nexus. These insights underscore the need for policy that encourages ethical digitalisation and highlight the potential role of SOEs in leading the charge towards sustainable and ethical digitalisation.

This paper develops an SOE (small open economy) dynamic general equilibrium model to study the impact of climate change on the current account. By calibrating the model to Chinese economy, we find the following results. First, the current account-output ratio improves in the first decade following an increase in global temperature caused by climate change. It then deteriorates in the following next three decades. Second, the overall current account-output ratio dynamics in response to climate change is neither affected by the types and stringency of climate policies, nor by the levels and growth rates of temperature increases. Third, the impact of an increase in temperature from 1.28 ℃ to 1.5 ℃ relative to the pre-industrial periods (1850-1900) on the current account-output ratio is equivalent to that of an approximate 0.14% permanent decline in TFP. Finally, although the current account-output ratio is likely to deteriorate in the first year when temperature increases instantly, it might not be true if the coefficient of relative risk aversion, or interest rate premium is larger, or debt sensitivity to interest rate is smaller.

This study examines the enduring effects of China’s planned economy on contemporary social attitudes. By leveraging spatial disparities in the historical distribution of state-owned enterprises and external shocks such as the First Five-Year Plan and the Third Front Construction movement, we find that a one percentage point increase in the historical SOE proportion of industrial output corresponds with a 0.57% to 0.89% increase in the contemporary preference for state-owned sectors. The results are robust after controlling the contemporary SOE employment share, and this effect does not apply to the younger generation born after the marketization reform. Furthermore, we provide evidence that city-level state ownership preferences significantly impact the likelihood of SOEs receiving subsidies, with this effect notably amplified in cities governed by locally-born leaders, but the share of locally-born leaders has been trending down.

The Chinese government has actively traded in the stock market through governmentsponsored institutions, the National Team, since the 2015 market crash. I adopt Koijen and Yogo’s (2019) demand system approach in China’s stock market to understand the impact of government participation. Estimation results indicate the government tilts towards large, less risky, and SOE stocks. During the crash, government participation indeed stabilized the market: the large-scale purchases reduced the cross-sectional market volatility of annual return by 1.8% and raised the market price by 11%. When the market ffuctuation returns to normal, the government acts more like an active investor; its price impact remains high but does not contribute to the cross-sectional volatility. Based on the theoretical framework of Brunnermeier et al. (2020), I investigate the interaction between the Nation Team and retail investors to reveal the government trading strategy. No evidence shows that government participation signiffcantly distorts market information efficiency.

This paper explores the impact of political network on insider trading activities in China. We find that stronger political network discourages insider trading. Such effect is more pronounced among long-standing and high-level connections, and persists in the events of M&A and public policy announcement when insiders may make profitable informed trading. This finding points to new cost of being politically connected. In exploring the underlying mechanisms, we confirm that the muted insider trading is related to preferable financial and policy support, and are more pronounced for SOEs in provinces with stronger market force and legal enforcement.

Despite nearly twenty years of privatization, mixed-ownership reform has been the mainstay of SOE reform in China in recent years. This raises the question of whether the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms (Mixed firms) is better than private-owned enterprises (POEs). Although Mixed firms suffer more from government intervention, unclear property rights, and interest conflicts between state shareholders and private shareholders, they can also benefit from the external resources controlled by the state. Therefore, the performance of Mixed firms is still unclear. Collecting data from the Chinese A-share listed market, we divide the firms into POEs, Mixed firms controlled by the state (MixedSOEs), and Mixed firms controlled by the private sectors (MixedPOEs). Measuring profitability using ROA and ROE, we find that on average, POEs perform better than Mixed firms, and MixedPOEs have a higher profitability than MixedSOEs. Within Mixed firms, more state shares are related to lower profitability, and more private shares are related to higher profitability. Using the NBS survey data, we further find that on average, SOEs exhibit the lowest profitability, with MixedSOEs and MixedPOEs in the middle, and POEs have the highest profitability. We try to address the endogeneity challenge in several ways and get similar results. Overall, our analysis provides new evidence on the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms.

This study documents how the political hierarchy plays a significant role in determining corporate environmental governance. By conducting difference-in-differences analysis to investigate listed firms in China, this study demonstrates that local and central SOEs headquartered in jurisdictions far removed from central government supervision have worse environmental governance than POEs. Verticalization reforms implemented in 2016 enable provincial environmental protection bureaus to direct lower-level bureaus. Local governments cannot control environmental protection bureau leaders for economic development. This study finds that the corporate environmental governance of local SOEs has significantly improved following the reform, as local environmental protection bureaus no longer have conflicts of interest with local governments. However, the reform has not resulted in improvements to corporate environmental governance in central SOEs, whose executives occupy higher status than provincial Environmental Protection Bureau leaders, nor in POEs, which were already managed before the reform. Further evidence indicates that local SOEs experience an increase in abatement investments and relationship building expenses following the reform. Lastly, our study reveals that verticalization reform costs are negligible. Local SOEs have not experienced a decline in financial performance or corporate valuation. This study suggests that policymakers should consider the political ranking of government agencies and enterprises to improve environmental governance.

Despite the lack of electoral accountability, China has built an expanding welfare system that is set to include most citizens. Why does China defy the conventional prediction of an exclusive autocratic welfare state? This paper looks at the critical time when China first established its social security system in the 1990s and argues that the state adopts a “demand-driven strategy” where the redistribution effort varies with the expected collective action of economic losers. Analyzing an original granular county-level dataset of China’s laid-off workers and social security taxation, the paper finds that a group of newly-emerged economic losers, precipitated by state policy, drives the local states’ efforts to redistribute. In particular, the number of laid-off state-owned enterprise workers explains 46% of the variations in social security collection among non-state-owned enterprises. Instrumental variable estimation, with legacy state-owned enterprises established in historical contingencies as the instrument for laid-off workers, shows consistent results. Further analysis on mechanisms demonstrates that layoffs lead to an increase in SOE protests, which in turn foster greater redistribution.