In this paper, we investigate the availability of external finance for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprises (PEs) across all manufacturing industries in China. Employing a disequilibrium model, we find that SOEs are generally less financially constrained than PEs, but the difference is of small magnitude and has been steadily declining over time. We also reveal a positive relation between the advantage of SOEs in accessing external funds and the level of SOE monopoly at the industry level. In general, while SOEs and PEs are equally constrained in competitive downstream industries, we find a significant comparative advantage in accessing external finance for SOEs in monopolized mid- and upstream industries. The policy implication is straightforward: to finance PEs better, the Chinese government should consider breaking the existing monopolies or near monopolies of SOEs in certain industries further, rather than encouraging banks to favor PEs in their lending.

This paper studies the role of the soft budget constraint in shaping firm dynamics and long-run economic growth. We develop a Schumpeterian model with two sectors: consumption and investment, and two types of firms: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs). Within this framework, multi-product firms require fixed inputs of investment goods to operate — a resource that is also crucial for firm expansion, and the soft budget constraint allows subsidized firms to continue operating on loss-making product lines. This distortion raises the price of investment goods, suppresses firm dynamics, and dampens aggregate growth. To quantify the mechanism, the model is calibrated using Chinese firm-level data. Our quantitative exercise shows that eliminating the SOE soft budget constraint friction reduces the price of investment goods by 9.82 percent, increases the overall TFP growth rate by 0.12 percentage points, and generates a welfare gain of 4.94 percent.

This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy, introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers' leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance. Privately owned developers(POE) are hit harder than state-owned firms (SOE), with larger drops in sales and higher default risk. Using granular project-level data, we show that the policy reduces developer sales primarily by curtailing new-project supply: breached developers launch fewer projects. On the demand side, homebuyers reallocate purchases from privately owned developers to SOEs, further widening the POE-SOE gap. The policy also reduced local governments’ land-transfer revenues and increased reliance on local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) for land purchases. These LGFV-acquired parcels exhibit very low subsequent development rates, which may increase local governments’off-balance-sheet debt risks.

This study investigates the impact of RegTech adoption in the M&A regulatory review process on deal performance. Leveraging the staggered implementation of the SOEs Online Supervision System (SOSS) by China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) across its central and 31 provincial offices from 2018 to 2021, we find that SOSS directly enhances SASAC’s decision-making efficiency and improves its capacity to screen and approve higher-quality M&A deals. More importantly, SOE-led M&A transactions exhibit higher announcement returns as well as improved long-run stock and operating performance following the system’s implementation. The positive impact of SOSS is more pronounced for acquirers with stronger technological infrastructure, in transactions characterized by low transparency and weak governance, and in provinces with more stringent external scrutiny. Overall, by addressing regulator-firm information asymmetry and reinforcing managerial accountability, SOSS improves regulatory effectiveness in overseeing major investment activities among SOEs.

This paper examines how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects mergers and acquisitions (M&As) between companies with different levels of financing constraints. Existing literature overlooks the interactive effect of EPU and financing constraints on M&As, and empirical evidence regarding EPU's influence on financially constrained firms remains limited. China's unique ownership structure provides a valuable context for this analysis, as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) face fewer financing constraints than private firms. Using a 2007-2021 sample of Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies, we find that high EPU decreases the likelihood of private firms acquiring SOEs, while increases the likelihood of private firms being acquired by SOEs. These results suggest that under high EPU, financially constrained firms experience greater survival pressure, limiting their capacity to alleviate constraints by acquiring less-constrained targets. Conversely, less-constrained firms enhance their bargaining power and are more likely to acquire financially stressed counterparts. EPU facilitates control transfers from high-constraint to low-constraint firms, contributing to long-term market returns and improving financial market allocation efficiency. Our study contributes to the literature by shedding light on how EPU shapes divergent M&A behaviors based on firms’ financing constraints.

This paper examines the impact of Chinese local government hidden debt on corporate ESG greenwashing. Extending fraud theory, we reveal that hidden debt shifts the boundary between government and market that drives the factors behind ESG greenwashing. Using the ESG greenwashing indicator of listed firms in the A-share market and the hidden debt-to-GDP ratio of 31 provinces from 2012 to 2023, we find that local government hidden debt is positively correlated with corporate ESG greenwashing. The impact is more significant for firms that are state-owned, without active primary-level Party organizations, or not on China’s key pollution supervisory list. Mechanism analysis indicates that expansion of local government hidden debt brings firms with higher LGFVs’ share-holding for the SOEs, heavier environmental tax burden, and less social responsibility preference, all of which are related with ESG greenwashing. Reducing local government special debt and improving tax compliance can help alleviate this impact. These findings highlight the necessity of fiscal risk management in achieving genuinely sustainable corporate development.

This study examines how full-time external supervisors affect corporate irregularities using listed Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a research sample. We find that full-time external supervisors restrain corporate irregularities. This outcome continues to hold after accounting for potential endogeneity concerns. Further mediating effect analysis shows that full-time external supervisors mitigate corporate irregularities by curbing managers' opportunistic behavior. Additionally, the heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that the impact of full-time external supervisors on corporate irregularities varies significantly across different types of SOEs and internal control environments. Overall, this paper enriches and expands the literature on the effectiveness of full-time external supervisors in emerging economies and provides new insights for dealing with corporate irregularities.

This paper develops an SOE (small open economy) dynamic general equilibrium model to study the impact of climate change on the current account. By calibrating the model to Chinese economy, we find the following results. First, the current account-output ratio improves in the first decade following an increase in global temperature caused by climate change. It then deteriorates in the following next three decades. Second, the overall current account-output ratio dynamics in response to climate change is neither affected by the types and stringency of climate policies, nor by the levels and growth rates of temperature increases. Third, the impact of an increase in temperature from 1.28 ℃ to 1.5 ℃ relative to the pre-industrial periods (1850-1900) on the current account-output ratio is equivalent to that of an approximate 0.14% permanent decline in TFP. Finally, although the current account-output ratio is likely to deteriorate in the first year when temperature increases instantly, it might not be true if the coefficient of relative risk aversion, or interest rate premium is larger, or debt sensitivity to interest rate is smaller.

Based on the sample of Chinese A-listed firms from 2003 to 2020, this paper investigates the effect of common institutional ownership on labor income share. The result shows that common institutional ownership can significantly increase firms’ labor income share. Mechanism tests indicate that common ownership can: 1) alleviate financial constraints by reducing the debt financing costs and increasing the trade credit financing, thus increasing the labor income share; 2) improve corporate innovation and therefore enhances the demand for highly-skilled labor, which eventually boost labor income share. Competitive hypothesis test represents that common institutional ownership can reduce the monopoly power of enterprises and decrease monopoly rent, so as to increase the proportion of labor in the distribution. Further analyses present that the network formed by the common ownership can effectively exert the financing support role of SOEs and the knowledge spillover effect of innovative-advantage firms, which contributes to the labor income share increasing of other related firms in the network connection. This study not only enriches the economic consequences of common institutional ownership, but also provides policy guidance for the government to further optimize the income-distribution pattern by deepening the reform of the financial market.

This paper explores the impact of government intervention on local analysts’ earnings forecasts, based on a scenario of financial misconduct in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, under the influence of the government, local analysts’ earnings forecasts for SOEs with financial misconduct are less accurate and more optimistically biased. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that forecast bias by local analysts is greater when officials have stronger promotion incentives, when regions are less market-oriented and have a larger share of the state-owned economy, and when SOEs contribute more to taxation and employment. In further analysis, we find that local analysts have a more optimistic tone in reports targeting non-compliant SOEs. Local analysts who depend heavily on political information will also issue more biased and optimistic forecasts on SOEs with violations. Finally, as a reward for achieving government goals, the local brokerages affiliated with these analysts and providing these optimistic forecasts are more likely to become underwriters in seasoned equity offerings of SOEs. This paper reveals that government intervention significantly influences analyst forecasts, providing implications for understanding the sources of analyst forecast bias.