In this paper, we identify cross-sectional anomalies in excess returns of industrial bonds at the issuer and secondary market levels, and find that liquidity, risk, and historical return variables can generate cross-sectional excess returns that cannot be explained by traditional bond factors. We also introduce a risk premium factor that is economically and statistically significant in industrial bonds based on the risk characteristics prevalent in credit bonds and that cannot be explained by long-standing bond market factors. We show that the newly identified risk factor outperforms the other anomalies considered in this paper in explaining the cross-sectional returns of industrial bonds.

This paper examines the Urban Construction Investment Bond (UCIB) as a tradable product in the financial market and a financial tool for local government in China. The development of this financial product is contextualised in infrastructure finance and local government debt. The creation of UCIB helps finance infrastructure investment and potentially reveal the relative risks through the secondary market. The spatial distribution of UCIB demonstrates different relative risks of this financial instrument in local conditions. The government uses this financial tool to bridge the emerging capital market and infrastructure finance, and the Chinese financial market now treats UCIB as an emerging asset class. The development of UCIB has sped up the pace of financialisation in China. Although relative risks help investors choose different UCIBs, the overall risk of UCIB cannot be ignored.

Using the staggered introduction of regional specialized debt recovery courts as a quasi-natural experiment, we estimate the causal effect of law enforcement on financing cost of corporate bonds in China. With primary market issuing data, we show that the introduction of specialized courts reduces issuers’bond financing cost by 15%. The analysis of secondary market trading data confirms the results that the yield spreads of existing bonds reduce significantly. Exploring regional-, firm- and bond-level heterogeneity, we find the effects to be much stronger when ex-ante default risk is high. Our case-level analyses further support that enforcement cost reduction in debt dispute resolution is a channel for the reduction of cost of bond. Our paper has important policy implications in light of the recent bond default wave in China, suggesting that creditors protection through highly efficient law enforcement is important for bond market development and will eventually benefit bond issuers as well.

In Chinese culture, digit 8 (4) is taken as lucky (unlucky). We find that the numerological superstition has a profound impact across China’s stock, bond, foreign exchange and commodities markets, affecting asset prices in both the primary and secondary markets. The superstition effect, i.e., the probability of asset price ending with a lucky (unlucky) digit far exceeds (falls short of) what would be expected by chance, is prevalent. The effect is driven by investors’ reliance on superstition as an anchor to face uncertainty in asset pricing and the overoptimism of unsophisticated investors. While the superstition effect does not lead to systemic mispricing for assets traded by sophisticated investors, it implies overpricing for assets involving more unsophisticated investors.

After the Chinese stock market dropped one-third in three weeks in June 2015, reportedly driven by lack of liquidity due to the fire sales by margin buyers, the government used hundreds of billions of dollars to purchase shares directly in the secondary market. We validate that margin trading is associated with the surge of stock market before the crisis. We find that firms in systemically important industries, firms with more political ties, and firms with high risk of falling into liquidity spiral are more likely to be rescued. More importantly, compared with matched un-rescued firms, rescued firms did not have higher stock return, but experienced higher volatility, lower liquidity, and lower price efficiency afterwards. Market quality even deteriorated further after the subsequent sale of the purchased shares. Last, rescued firms experience a modest decline in operational performance, while capital structure and investment remained the same. Our evidence suggest that a direct purchase rescue in the secondary stock market could generate serious unintended consequences.

We find that firms that timed their external financing more in the past (i.e., that issued more capital when market conditions were good) have a lower expected cost of equity than those that timed their issuance less. This result is economically significant, and holds for numerous specifications. The benefits of market-timing activity are more pronounced for equity than for debt. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the gains from future market-timing activity are priced by current investors, and suggest that investors in the secondary market believe in the ability of firms to successfully time the market. We also find that the benefits of timing activity are enhanced for firms with a higher fraction of shares held by dedicated long-term investors, and are reduced for firms with shareholders that are more likely to time their own trades.

In this paper we study how a firm’s capital structure choice affects informed trading of its securities in the secondary markets and consequently, the information efficiency of its security prices. We identify two new factors as the potential determinants of the firm’s optimal capital structure policy: the liquidity premium caused by informed trading and, perhaps more importantly, the improved operating efficiency due to information revelation from its security prices. We show that, from these two perspectives, the optimal debt level is achieved at the point where there is no informed trading in the bond market and the informed traders are just about to trade in the bond market. Thus, the cost of debt financing differs in nature from that of the existing models. This has very different implications for the significance of the cost of debt financing and for financial system design. Our model can also explain the relative trading volumes in debt and equity markets.

A government policy aimed at the reduction of state shares in state-owned enterprises (SOE) triggered a crash in Chinas stock market. The sustained depression and spillover even after the policy adjustments were over constitute a puzzle the so-called state-share paradox. The empirical study finds evidence in two dimensions. First, a regime switching model with an absorbing state suggests that government policy switches the regime to liquidity black holes. Second, there is no evidence of light-to-liquidity during the crash, suggesting to model the crash as an aggregate phenomenon of the whole market. To carefully match the evidence, a theoretical model is set up within the framework of market microstructure. The state-share paradox is not a simply instance of news-driven crash. The model shows that Chinas stock market has distinctive features of liquidity production and price discovery. The irregularities of a representative liquidity supporter generate an inverted-S demand curve and give rise to potential liquidity black holes. Multiple equilibria and the resulting large drop in prices arise from supply dynamics of short-run investors, who buy the stock from the primary market liquidate their long positions in the secondary market. This study contributes a rational panics hypothesis to the literature. The rational panics hypothesis is neither an rational model with noise traders, nor a standard rational expectation model under the asymmetric information framework. It is based on homogeneous agents with incomplete information, and is consistent with the evidence of absorbing regime switching and the recent literature on state-dependent preference. Our findings have larger implications for ine¢ ciency of Chinas stock market.

Under the framework of Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE), the paper analyzes the impacts of insider trading on the secondary market in the order-driven system. We show that when insider trading is allowed, the average price will not change and there is a positive correlation between the future price and the current price. The volatility and liquidity change without sure direction with insider trading. The price efficiency is a special case with and without insider trading. The insider is benefit by insider trading wherever the outsider and liquidity trader may be benefit or hurt by insider trading.