As China’s shadow banking sector expands, the impact of listed companies’ involvement in financial stability and the real economy accumulates increasing attention. Despite being a crucial channel for non-financial firms to participate in shadow banking, the literature has given limited consideration to the acquisition of wealth management products (WMPs). Using data from Chinese listed firms between 2007 and 2020, we analyze how excessive equity financing affects companies’ WMP acquisitions. Our findings indicate that over-financing significantly boosts WMP purchases among these firms, particularly in cases of private ownership, raised environmental uncertainty, and strict financing constraints.

This paper researches into development of China’s shadow banking during 2020-2022, a special period marked by COVID-19 and strengthened global regulation on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation (NBFI). Research focus includes balance sheet evolvement, growth dynamics, and relation with macro-finance. Its business model surprisingly resembles western peers. They both fund underserved sectors and have similar exposure to balance sheet mismatch. Massive holding of bond investment (36.6% of total asset) is funded by uninsured interbank fund and wealth management product, which makes it more closely related with banks’ balance sheet and risk contagion from NBFI to traditional commercial banks more easily. This paper then re-summarizes growth dynamics of China’s shadow banking in a “Pull-Push” framework, and proposes concept of reintermediation in respective to disintermediation. Consecutive regulation on NBFI and real estate sector kept dragging on growth of shadow banking, and rendered it in liquidity surplus, which is invested into interbank market. This paper also provides empirical evidence on relation of China’s shadow banking with macro-finance, and notes several empirical breakdowns of pre- COVID relations among economic and financial indicators. Most important breakdown is the non-functionality of monetary policy transmission channel. Besides, it continued to twist de facto financial regulatory indicators, however with fading impact.

We show that government deleveraging causes corporate distress in a distorted financial market. Our difference-in-differences analysis exploits China’s top-down deleveraging policy in 2017, which reduces local governments’ borrowing capacity through shadow bank financing. Private firms with government procurement contracts experience larger accounts receivable increases, larger cash holdings reductions, and higher external financing costs. These firms also experienced greater likelihoods of ownership changes and deteriorated performance. Effects are muted for state-owned enterprises, which enjoy funding privileges in China’s financial system. Our paper thus reveals a novel channel of allocation inefficiencies where government deleveraging amplifies adverse impacts of financial distortions.

Deregulation may increase bank stability. Employing China’s loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) reform in 2015, we show that the deregulation of the LDR increases the stability of banks. Specifically, the deregulation of the LDR alleviates banks’ deposit competition, and decreases reliance on customer deposit funding. By doing so, it improves the loan structure among banks with a high LDR, which, in turn, increases the on-balance-sheet stability of these banks. Meanwhile, the deregulation of the LDR curbs high-LDR banks’ impulse to issue principal-floating wealth management products, a form of shadow banking, which thus increases their off-balance-sheet stability.