Comprehensive evaluation and identification of the critical regulatory determinants of carbon emission efficiency (CEE) are very important for China’s low-carbon transition. Accordingly, this paper first employs an undesirable global super-hybrid measure approach to calculate the CEE of China’s iron and steel industry (ISI). We then further use spatial error and threshold regression models to examine the spatial and non-linear effects of heterogeneous environmental regulations on CEE, respectively. Our empirical results show that (1) CEE varies significantly across China’s regions, with the eastern region having the highest CEE score, followed by the western and central regions, with the northeast region ranking the lowest; (2) command-and-control and market-incentive regulations both promote CEE, whereas the public participation approach does not significantly contribute to performance gains; (3) all three types of environmental regulations exhibit a non-linear threshold effect on CEE; (4) openness level, technological progress, and industrial concentration enhance efficiency gains, while urbanization level exerts a negative impact on CEE. Our findings have important implications for the design of environmental regulations.

During the reform era, the Chinese government has been carrying out strategic industrial policies modelled on those in post-war Japan and South Korea, in the hope of transforming its highly fragmented manufacturing sector into one that comprises a small number of internationally competitive big businesses. Using the evolution of the Chinese steel industry structure from the late 1980s to the early 2000s as a case in point, this paper finds that the Chinese government's consolidation attempts have, by and large, not been very successful. The disappointing policy outcome is interpreted by a detailed examination of the industry policy mechanism in China. It is concluded that the institutional framework of the Chinese state differs from its counterparts in Korea and Japan in some fundamental aspects. Among these, the fragmented and uncoordinated Chinese bureaucracy contributes significantly to the inefficacy of policy implementation.