We examine how Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings influence international stock returns, highlighting that the standard Fed news channel creates an even-week pattern in the United States and other highly integrated developed markets. By analyzing the Chinese market, we demonstrate that the news channel contributes to higher returns, operating in non-US countries even without international equity flows. Additionally, we identify an uncertainty channel that produces a contrasting odd-week pattern. Placebo tests indicate that the effectiveness of the uncertainty channel may depend on the financial market’s openness. Overall, our research enriches and extends the existing view on how the Federal Reserve, as the leader of central banks, shapes international stock market returns throughout the entire FOMC cycle.

Using a comprehensive factor zoo, we document a notable factor MAX premium in the Chinese market. Factors with high maximum daily returns consistently outperform those with low maximum returns by 0.82% per month in the future, on a risk-adjusted basis. This premium remains robust controlling for various factor characteristics, and is not sensitive to the selection of factors. The factor MAX anomaly stands apart from lottery-type stock anomalies and contributes to elucidate most of these anomalies. The factor MAX premium concentrates in high-eigenvalue principal component factors, shedding light on the prevalent lottery preferences for factor investing in China’s A-share market. We document pronounced existence of factor MAX anomaly in the United States and other G7 countries.

This paper investigates the impact of two global crises, the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 crisis, on herding behavior in the Chinese and U.S. stock markets. We find no evidence of herding behavior during these two global crises in the U.S. stock market, yet significant herding emerges under the COVID-19 crisis in Chinese mainland stock market. Additionally, the observed herding behavior in mainland China is primarily driven by sentiment. Our results reveal and explain the differences in the effects of financial crisis and public health crisis on herding behavior, as well as variations between emerging and developed stock markets.

A lack of sufficient information about potential borrowers is a major obstacle to access to financing from the traditional financial sector. In response to the need for better information to prevent fraud, to increase access to finance and to support balanced sustainable development, countries around the world have moved over the past several decades to develop credit information reporting requirements and systems to improve the coverage and quality of credit information. Until recently, such requirements mainly covered only banks. However, with the process of digital transformation in China and around the world, a range of new credit providers have emerged, in the context of financial technology (FinTech, TechFin and BigTech). Application of advanced data and analytics technologies provides major opportunities for both market participants – both traditional and otherwise – as well as for credit information agencies: by utilizing advanced technologies, participants and credit reporting agencies can collect massive amounts of information from various online and other activities (‘Big Data’), which contributes to the analysis of borrowing behavior and improves the accuracy of creditworthiness assessments, thereby enhancing availability of finance and supporting growth and development while also moderating prudential, behavioral and conduct related concerns at the heart of financial regulation. Reflecting international experience, China has over the past three decades developed a regulatory regime for credit information reporting and business. However, even in the context of traditional banking and credit, it has not come without problems. With the rapid growth and development of FinTech, TechFin and BigTech lenders, however, have come both real opportunities to leverage credit information and data but also real challenges around its regulation. For example, due to fragmented sources of borrower information and the involvement of many players of different types, there are difficulties in clarifying the business scope of credit reporting and also serious problems in relation to customer protection. Moreover, inadequate incentives for credit information and data sharing pose a challenge for regulators to promote competition and innovation in the credit market. Drawing upon the experiences of other jurisdictions, including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Singapore and Hong Kong, this paper argues that China should establish a sophisticated licensing regime and setout differentiated requirements for credit reporting agencies in line with the scope and nature of their business, thus addressing potential for regulatory arbitrage. Further, there is a need to formulate specific rules governing the provision of customer information to credit reporting agencies and the resolution of disputes arising from the accuracy and completeness of credit data. An effective information and data sharing scheme should be in place to help lenders make appropriate credit decisions and facilitate access to finance where necessary. The lessons from China’s experience in turn hold key lessons for other jurisdictions as they move from credit information to credit data regulation in their own financial systems.

The development of the wealth management market is based on the needs of investors. The logic of market regulation should also be based on the interests of investors. On the basis of summarizing the regulatory experience of the global wealth management market, suggestions are put forward to improve the system of China's wealth management market . The fundamental driving force for the establishment of a regulatory legal system for the wealth management market comes from the needs of the development of the wealth management market. Moreover, the structure and process of this institutional construction are also closely related to the structure and development of market demand. China's current wealth management market has become a huge financial sector, and the deepening of the market and the diversification of participants all put forward requirements for the construction of a fair and scientific regulatory system. Wealth management business is different from traditional financial business in many aspects such as function, business standard and business model, and its basic legal relationship is also far from traditional business. The commonality of business in China's current wealth management market is in line with the basic elements of the legal relationship of trust. From the perspective of the realistic basis and the nature of the industry, it is appropriate to define the basic legal nature of wealth management business as a trust relationship. Due to factors such as information asymmetry and economic scale, financial investors are in a serious imbalance and imbalance when they trade with financial institutions. Therefore, the financial supervision system should grasp this core contradiction, give investors the status of consumer protection, and establish the concept of protecting wealth consumers. The regulation of wealth management operators should grasp the requirements of the basic trust relationship, take the basic principle of supervising the performance of trustee duties by financial management institutions, and implement a series of rules for trustees to be loyal and prudent in financial management. These rules should focus on risk prevention, and include establishment of access standards for wealth management business, supervision of independent development of wealth management business, supervision of full performance of prudent management duties by wealth management institutions, and guidance for healthy development of wealth management institutions. The experience in the supervision of developed wealth management markets such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore shows that the establishment of a legal system for the protection of wealth management consumers is an inevitable result of the development of the financial market, and it is necessary to set up special institutions and mechanisms to implement the concept of wealth management investor protection, and emphasize wealth management products. Providers' fiduciary obligations to investors, and functional supervision based on a unified system in the regulatory system can be used as a reference for China . China's wealth management market regulatory system include inconsistent rules, weak protection, biased guidance, and lack of independence. Due to the separate regulatory system, different game rules apply to homogeneous wealth management business operated by different types of financial institutions, resulting in rule conflicts and market injustice. However, the substantive rights of wealth management investors still exist in a vacuum that cannot be confirmed. At the same time, the status of consumers is far from being officially confirmed, and the consumer protection mechanism cannot truly achieve justice. As regulatory guidance still favors the concept and tools of supervising traditional businesses, wealth management institutions mainly expand extensively by selling products, and wealth management products also present serious "bond-like" characteristics. The "non-neutral " positioning of financial regulatory agencies has externalized into phenomena such as rule conflicts, "policy following suit" and "excessive maintenance of stability". Constructing and continuously improving China's wealth management market supervision system is: the purpose of supervision is to restore the effective operation of the market mechanism. The basic legal relationship in China's wealth management market should be recognized as a trust relationship. This is not only an essential requirement of the wealth management market, but also a practical need to integrate regulatory chaos. It is the trend of financial and economic development that the regulatory system positions the position of wealth management consumers. It should start with legislative policies, make key breakthroughs around consumers' substantive rights and protection mechanisms, and gradually improve investor protection mechanisms. The regulatory system should focus on supervising financial institutions to fulfill their fiduciary obligations, and establish sound access rules, business independence rules, prudent management rules, and strict market exit mechanisms. China's wealth management market supervision system should be based on unified legislation and gradually implement functional supervision in order to achieve effective management and harmonious development of the wealth management market.

America and China have different cultures. For example, Chinese culture emphasizes the group, while American culture emphasizes the individual. Chinese culture emphasizes integration, while American culture emphasizes analysis. In addition, there are differences in customs, religious beliefs, and nonverbal communication between the United States and China. This article examines the cultural differences between China and the United States in historical geography, traditional thought, cognitive systems, and language. In the following, I will explain and discuss the reasons for the cultural differences between China and America. The author hopes this article will be helpful for readers interested in cultural differences between China and the United States and global trade exchanges. [译]美国和中国拥有截然不同的文化。例如，中国文化强调集体，而美国文化则重视个体；中国文化注重综合，而美国文化则倾向于分析。此外，在风俗、宗教信仰以及非言语沟通方面，美国和中国之间也存在差异。本文从历史地理、传统思想、认知系统和语言等多个角度探讨了中美两国之间的文化差异。在下文中，我将解释并讨论中美文化差异产生的原因。作者希望本文能对那些对中美文化差异和全球贸易交流感兴趣的读者有所帮助。

Against the backdrop of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union (BREXIT), this study examines predictability in the stock markets of sixteen European countries, the United States, and the BRICS (Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa) by analyzing how their returns predict the returns of sixteen commodities at different quantile levels. The study builds upon existing literature on predictability and extends it by investigating the impact of the BREXIT crisis on these markets. The findings suggest that investors can hedge their portfolios with various commodities during times of the BREXIT crisis, but caution is advised, and the trend of both equities and commodities should be closely monitored before making investment decisions.

The objective of this study is to create optimal two-asset portfolios consisting of stocks from Western Europe, the United States, and the BRICS (Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa), as well as sixteen commodity types during the BREXIT period. We utilized dynamic variances and covariances from the GARCH model to derive weights for the two-asset portfolios, with each portfolio consisting of one equity factor and one commodity factor. Subsequently, hedge ratios were calculated for these various assets. Our findings indicate that portfolios consisting of European stocks do not require the inclusion of commodities, whereas the other equities do.

The equity premium puzzle, properly termed the American Equity Premium Puzzle, is one of the most significant empirical anomalies in finance, as it pertains to the observation that the expected return on equities has been consistently higher than that of bonds for many years, and that this premium is excessive. This paper presents one answer to the Equity Premium Puzzle, viz., the Disruptive Dependency Theory. The Disruptive Dependency Theory states that the world can be viewed in terms of “core” and “periphery” nations. Thus, there is a "core" set of nations in the world that are strong and a "periphery" that is relatively weak. This has been the state of the world since the end of the Second World War. The nations in the "core" are the strong nations. This includes the United States, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom. What constitutes the "periphery" is a bit nebulous, but certainly the weakest nations such as island nations (Vanuatu, Togo, Jamaica, Antigua & Barbuda) belong the periphery. The nations in the core use the following to exert their influence on the nations in the periphery: (a) political strategies; (b) economic strategies; (c) social and cultural strategies; (d) technological strategies. Disruptive innovation has emerged as one of the chief strategies. With the rise of disruptive innovation, they are able to "disrupt" existing business in a very large number of periphery nations, thereby a very small number of individuals are becoming super-rich billionaires while the rest of the world remains still quite poor. According to this theory, it is the power differential of nations that historically resulted in the equity premium for stocks being excessively high. This paper explores the implications of the Disruptive Dependency Theory and its potential contribution to understanding the Equity Premium Puzzle.

We review theoretical and empirical work on the economic effects of the United States and China trade relations during the last decades. We first discuss the origins of the China shock, its measurement, and present methods used to study its economic effects on different outcomes. We then focus on the recent U.S.-China trade war. We discuss methods used to evaluate its effects, describe its economic effects, and analyze if this increase in trade protectionism reverted the effects of the China shock. The main lessons learned in this review are: (i) the aggregate gains from U.S.-China trade created winners and losers; (ii) China's trade expansion seems not to be the main cause of the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment during the same period; and (iii) the recent trade war generated welfare losses, had small employment effects, and was ineffective in reversing the distributional effects due to the China shock.