This study examines the impact of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) on the stock price crash risk of Chinese commercial banks. In addition, it explores how Governance and Digital Transparency curtail the effect of EPU on stock price crash risk. Using a sample of 50 Chinese A-share-listed banks from 2012 to 2024, the study reveals that EPU significantly increased the banks’ stock price crash risk. The findings are robust to alternative measures of EPU and stock price crash risk. Further, governance and FinTech adoption mitigate the positive effect. The mitigating effect persists across high- and low-risk bank subsamples. In addition, we perform a battery of analyses to support our main findings. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications.

This paper studies whether financial technology (FinTech) changes loan contract design by reducing banks’ reliance on collateral in corporate lending. Using loan-level data on Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2023 and exploiting the People’s Bank of China’s 2019 FinTech Development Plan as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks with stronger pre-policy FinTech capability significantly reduce secured lending after the policy shock. In the benchmark specification, the probability that a loan is secured falls by 1.64 percentage points, or about 2.7% relative to the baseline secured-loan share. The result is robust to alternative loan classifications, matching procedures, alternative measures of FinTech adoption, aggregated lending outcomes, and alternative inference procedures. The pattern is more pronounced among small and medium-sized enterprises, lower-tier branches, and branches located outside bank headquarters’ cities, where borrower information is likely to be more limited. Supplementary analyses are consistent with FinTech reducing banks’ information-production costs and suggest that technological proximity to FinTech-active peers may amplify the collateral-reducing effect. Overall, the evidence indicates that FinTech can enhance banks’ screening capacity and shift lending decisions away from reliance on asset-based guarantees toward information-based credit assessment.

This paper identifies the marginal investors in China’s stock market and examines their impact on stock pricing. To clearly distinguish between the equity constraint channel and the debt constraint channel, we construct the capital ratio factor and the debt constraint factor for banks and securities companies, the two most critical financial intermediaries in China’s stock market. Our results demonstrate that banks indeed serve as marginal investors and influence stock market efficiency primarily through the equity capital constraint channel. Furthermore, we find that the bank capital ratio factor significantly explains stock mispricing in China, with the single-factor model based on bank equity capital producing substantially smaller pricing errors compared to traditional multi-factor models.

We exploit a unique financial regulatory tool with data-governance functions as a quasi-natural experiment to explore the determinants of bank risk-taking. The paper finds that Examination Analysis System Technology (EAST) reduces bank risk-taking. This result is more pronounced in banks with higher capital adequacy ratios and higher liquidity levels. We also find that the inhibitory effect of EAST on bank risk is more significant for banks in eastern regions and listed banks. Our findings highlight the positive impact of data regulation on promoting financial stability.

This study develops a novel deep learning framework for bank distress prediction, designed to overcome the limitations of static network analysis and to enhance model interpretability. We propose a Spatio-Temporal Attention Network that uniquely captures the time-varying nature of systemic risk. Methodologically, it introduces two key innovations: (1) a dynamic interbank network whose connection weights are adjusted by the volatility of the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR), reflecting real-time market liquidity changes; and (2) a dual spatio-temporal attention mechanism that identifies critical time steps and pivotal contagion pathways leading to a distress event. Empirical results demonstrate that the model significantly outperforms traditional benchmarks across key metrics including accuracy and F1-score. Most critically, the architecture proves exceptionally effective at reducing Type II errors, substantially minimizing the failure to identify at-risk banks. The model also offers high interpretability, with attention weights visualizing intuitive risk evolution patterns. We conclude that incorporating dynamic, liquidity-adjusted networks is crucial for superior predictive performance in systemic risk modeling.

We compile a Chinese counterpart to the TRACE dataset and provide the first trade-level analysis of China’s wholesale corporate bond market—the second largest in the world. In contrast to the dealer-dominated, core–periphery networks typical of over-the-counter markets in developed economies, China’s corporate bond market shows limited dealer intermediation. Designated dealers are reluctant to intermediate trades,and non-dealers supply the majority of liquidity, leading to wide price dispersion and low trading activity. This weak dealer participation is not driven by information asymmetry but stems from balance sheet constraints among smaller dealers and large state-owned banks’ privileged access to profitable lending opportunities.

We construct the most comprehensive bankruptcy database of Chinese firms to date and document significant real effects arising from the establishment of specialized bankruptcy courts. Specifically, the recovery rate for unsecured creditors increases by 38.6 percentage points after the reform. This improvement is not driven by shorter case durations or lower direct bankruptcy costs, as intuition might suggest. Instead, it results primarily from greater efficiency in the discovery and disposal of assets during bankruptcy proceedings. The reform also increases the likelihood of reorganization and promotes capital infusion in such cases. Higher recovery rates generate broader spillovers: reductions in non-performing loans, expansion of unsecured lending by local banks, relaxation of firms’ financial constraints, shifts in capital structure and investment, and greater public willingness to file for bankruptcy when distressed.

This study employs an imbalanced panel dataset of 524 Chinese commercial banks from 2009 to 2020 to investigate the influence of Basel III on banks' loan loss provisions. Our findings reveal no significant change in the relationship between loan loss provisions and capital adequacy, although it indicates a heightened impetus for Tier 1 capital management. Furthermore, the study finds that earnings management motivations, particularly related to pre-provision profits, influence banks' loan loss provisions. Basel III's enactment reduces the ability of high-earning banks to manipulate earnings using loan loss provisions. This research provides empirical evidence from China for the global assessment of Basel III's impact on commercial banks.

Banks have a significant funding-cost advantage if their liabilities are protected by bailout guarantees. We construct a corporate finance-style model showing that banks can exploit this funding-cost advantage by just intermediating funds between investors and ultimate borrowers, thereby earning the spread between their reduced funding rate and the competitive market rate. This mechanism leads to a crowding-out of direct market finance and real effects for bank borrowers at the intensive margin: banks protected by bailout guarantees induce their borrowers to leverage excessively, to overinvest, and to conduct inferior high-risk projects. We confirm our model predictions using U.S. panel data, exploiting exogenous changes in banks' political connections, which cause variation in bailout expectations. At the bank level, we find that higher bailout probabilities are associated with more wholesale debt funding and lending. Controlling for loan demand, we confirm this effect on bank lending at the bank-firm level and find evidence on loan pricing consistent with a shift towards riskier borrower real investments. Finally, at the firm level, we find that firms linked to banks that experience an expansion in their bailout guarantees show an increase in their leverage, higher investment levels with indications of overinvestment, and lower productivity.

How do Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities that limit the impacts of banks’ unrealized capital loss on the regulatory capital measures affect banks’ exposure to deposit run risks when policy rates increase? And how should regulators design policies on classifying securities as HTM jointly with bank capital regulation? To answer these questions, we develop a model of bank runs in which banks classify long-term assets as HTM or Asset-for-Sale (AFS). Banks trade off the current cost of issuing equity to meet the capital requirement when the interest rate increases against increasing future run risks when the interest rate increases further in the future. When banks underestimate interest rate risks or have limited liability to depositors in the event of default, capping held-to-maturity long-term assets and mandating more equity capital issuance may reduce the run risks of moderately capitalized banks. Using bank-quarter-level data from Call Reports, we provide empirical support for the model’s testable implications.