Using subsidiary-level data of 3,863 Chinese nonfinancial listed firms, we find their capital expenditures increase with foreign sales, and the difference arises from the investments of the firms’ foreign subsidiaries. We show that the foreign sales-foreign investment association becomes more sensitive when the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) increases in the domestic market. However, foreign EPU does not play such a significant role. We provide one possible explanation that due to global diversification, MNEs can hedge foreign EPU using their international subsidiary network, resulting in the overall investments unchanged. However, given China’s tight regulatory capital controls, the MNEs may be less able to hedge the domestic EPU, so that they reallocate investments from the domestic markets to the foreign markets, consistent with the transaction cost assumption underlying the real options theory. Robust tests show that access to foreign capital, profitability and institutional factors have little explanatory power over the MNEs’ foreign investment.

We empirically evaluate 20 prominent contributions to a broad range of areas in the empirical corporate finance literature. We assemble the necessary data and then apply a single, simple econometric method, the connected-groups approach of Abowd, Karmarz, and Margolis (1999), to appraise the extent to which prevailing empirical specifications explain variation of the dependent variable, differ in composition of fit arising from various classes of independent variables, and exhibit resistance to omitted variable bias and other endogeneity problems. In particular, we identify and estimate the role of observed and unobserved firm- and manager-specific characteristics in determining primary features of corporate governance, financial policy, payout policy, investment policy, and performance. Observed firm characteristics do best in explaining market leverage and CEO pay level and worst for takeover defenses and outcomes. Observed manager characteristics have relatively high power to explain CEO contract design and low power for firm focus and investment policy. Estimated specifications without firm and manager fixed effects do poorly in explaining variation in CEO duality, corporate control variables, and capital expenditures, and best in explaining executive pay level, board size, market leverage, corporate cash holdings, and firm risk. Including manager and firm fixed effects, along with firm and manager observables, delivers the best fit for dividend payout, the propensity to adopt antitakeover defenses, firm risk, board size, and firm focus. In terms of source, unobserved manager attributes deliver a high proportion of explained variation in the dependent variable for executive wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, board size, and sensitivity of expected executive compensation to firm risk. In contrast, unobserved firm attributes provide a high proportion of variation explained for dividend payout, antitakeover defenses, book and market leverage, and corporate cash holdings. In part, these results suggest where empiricists could look for better proxies for what current theory identifies as important and where theorists could focus in building new models that encompass economic forces not contained in existing models. Finally, we assess the relevance of omitted variables and endogeneity for conventional empirical designs in the various subfields. Including manager and firm fixed effects significantly alters inference on primary explanatory variables in 17 of the 20 representative subfield specifications.

This paper investigates the value effect of large investors through their impact on corporate investment policy using a sample of listed firms in the Chinese stock market where large shareholdings and concentrated ownership are a norm. We find that the impact of capital expenditures on firm value is closely related to the level of large shareholdings (non-tradable or state shareholdings). Capital expenditures are negatively associated with firm value if firms are controlled by entrenched large shareholders. Although there is a general tendency of over-investment, the negative impact of over-investment is cancelled out if firms are controlled by incentive-aligned large shareholders. We also find that, the incentive-alignment effect of large investors is stronger in scenarios where agency conflicts are more intensified. Our findings suggest that capital investment is an important channel through which the value effect of large investors is achieved.

We explore whether compensation policies in bidding firms counter or exacerbate agency conflicts by examining CEO pay and incentives around corporate takeovers. We find that even in mergers where bidding shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of the time. In the years following mergers, CEOs of poorly performing firms receive substantial increases in option and stock grants that offset any effect of long-term underperformance on their wealth. As a result, the CEO’s pay and his overall wealth become insensitive to negative stock performance, but his wealth rises in step with positive stock performance. Corporate governance matters; bidding firms with stronger boards retain the sensitivity of their CEOs’ compensation to poor performance following the acquisition. In comparison, we find that CEOs are not rewarded for undertaking major capital expenditures, and that they receive only minor downside protection. Our results highlight that acquisitions are treated differently from other capital investments by the board in setting CEO compensation and our evidence is consistent with the self-serving management hypothesis in corporate acquisitions.