We examine the relationship between customer concentration and capital structure adjustment speed using a sample of US listed firms from 1977 to 2020. We found that the customer-concentrated firms have a lower speed of leverage adjustment. Customer concentration affects leverage adjustment speed mainly through increased cash flow volatility and asset specificity. The negative association is more pronounced in firms with high relationship-specific investments and low switching costs for their customers. Stock market reacts to leverage deviation strongly for firms with concentrated customers. Our findings highlight the vital role of customers as key stakeholders in capital structure decisions.

This study explores how foreign competition impacts the capital structure of domestic firms. While import competition is associated with a decrease in domestic firms’ leverage, we propose a novel perspective concerning the positive effect of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) on leverage. FDI competition can boost demand for debt via productivity spillover to domestic firms, and also increase supply of debt by inducing lenders to herd toward foreign investors. Using Chinese firm-level data, we find that the positive effects of industry inward FDI on domestic firms’ leverage are more pronounced in high-tech industries and industries where foreign investors exhibit a high degree of herding behavior. Our instrument variable approach, employing industry exchange rates and import tariffs, supports these findings. Additionally, we reveal that the positive effect of FDI on local firms’ leverage is amplified when the firms have stronger absorptive capacities, receive foreign capital, and experience more human capital transfers from foreign rivals.

Using data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2022, a difference-in-differences model is employed to empirically examine the impact of bankruptcy regimes, marked by the establishment of the bankruptcy court, on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). The results show a significant decline in TFP among firms in regions following the establishment of the bankruptcy court. This result remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests reveal that bankruptcy court heightens firms’ risk aversion by endowing excessive rights to creditors. Consequently, firms tend to downwardly adjust capital structure, curtail innovation investment, and accumulate liquid assets as coping measures, ultimately contributing to a decline in TFP. However, well-developed market mechanisms can alleviate the negative impact of bankruptcy court excessively protecting creditors. Specifically, when firms are located in regions with weak government intervention and strong financial development, as well as in market environments with low uncertainty and strong competition, this negative impact can be mitigated. Moreover, we find that under bankruptcy court operations, while a series of risk reduction measures taken by firms triggers a decline in TFP, it mitigates the risk of financial distress. These findings provide fresh insights into the dual nature of creditor protection and offer valuable references for governments to improve the bankruptcy legal system.

Serfling (2016) examines how the increase in firing costs impacts the capital structure decisions of firms and hypothesizes that higher firing costs of labor lead to a decline in a firm’s financial leverage use by directly increasing its distress costs and indirectly lifting its operating leverage. Stricter labor protection laws passed in China in 2007 provide an opportunity to revisit the issue within a controlled environment. Employees of SOEs already enjoy the benefits that the new labor law imparts. So, SOEs are exposed to lower firing costs than their non-SOE counterparts. Additionally, the exposure to bankruptcy is more limited for SOEs than non-SOEs. We hypothesize and show that non-SOE firms’ financial leverage decreases more than SOEs, confirming the leverage-lowering effect of labor protection laws. Further, the decline in financial leverage is more pronounced for a labor-intensive firm or one that encounters steep competition.

After the Chinese stock market dropped one-third in three weeks in June 2015, reportedly driven by lack of liquidity due to the fire sales by margin buyers, the government used hundreds of billions of dollars to purchase shares directly in the secondary market. We validate that margin trading is associated with the surge of stock market before the crisis. We find that firms in systemically important industries, firms with more political ties, and firms with high risk of falling into liquidity spiral are more likely to be rescued. More importantly, compared with matched un-rescued firms, rescued firms did not have higher stock return, but experienced higher volatility, lower liquidity, and lower price efficiency afterwards. Market quality even deteriorated further after the subsequent sale of the purchased shares. Last, rescued firms experience a modest decline in operational performance, while capital structure and investment remained the same. Our evidence suggest that a direct purchase rescue in the secondary stock market could generate serious unintended consequences.

corporate governance. We hypothesize that (a) Firms in more individualistic cultures should suffer more from agency problems and should use more corporate governance practices; (b) Firms in more individualistic cultures should use more debt since financing policy can also be used to control managerial opportunism, but the cultural effect should be smaller in firms with already higher corporate governance standards. Using the corporate governance scores from ASSET4, we find that individualism can explain a large variation in firm-level corporate governance and the empirical results are consistent with the our hypotheses.

We develop a new type of contingent capital, called contingent convertible security (CCS), which is like a contingent convertible bond (CCB) but differently can be interconverted \emph{repeatedly} and automatically between debt and equity depending on two specified levels of the cash flow generated by the firm that issues the CCS. We derive closed-form expressions of the equilibrium prices of corporate securities and optimal capital structure when the cash flow of the firm is modeled as geometric Brownian motion. Especially, we provide very simple formulas on optimal capital structure including a CCB. We show that the CCS can not only decrease default risk like a CCB, but also can significantly increase the firm's value. In particular, the CCS can be used to solve financing problems of small- and medium-sized enterprises as well as banks.

We empirically evaluate 20 prominent contributions to a broad range of areas in the empirical corporate finance literature. We assemble the necessary data and then apply a single, simple econometric method, the connected-groups approach of Abowd, Karmarz, and Margolis (1999), to appraise the extent to which prevailing empirical specifications explain variation of the dependent variable, differ in composition of fit arising from various classes of independent variables, and exhibit resistance to omitted variable bias and other endogeneity problems. In particular, we identify and estimate the role of observed and unobserved firm- and manager-specific characteristics in determining primary features of corporate governance, financial policy, payout policy, investment policy, and performance. Observed firm characteristics do best in explaining market leverage and CEO pay level and worst for takeover defenses and outcomes. Observed manager characteristics have relatively high power to explain CEO contract design and low power for firm focus and investment policy. Estimated specifications without firm and manager fixed effects do poorly in explaining variation in CEO duality, corporate control variables, and capital expenditures, and best in explaining executive pay level, board size, market leverage, corporate cash holdings, and firm risk. Including manager and firm fixed effects, along with firm and manager observables, delivers the best fit for dividend payout, the propensity to adopt antitakeover defenses, firm risk, board size, and firm focus. In terms of source, unobserved manager attributes deliver a high proportion of explained variation in the dependent variable for executive wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, board size, and sensitivity of expected executive compensation to firm risk. In contrast, unobserved firm attributes provide a high proportion of variation explained for dividend payout, antitakeover defenses, book and market leverage, and corporate cash holdings. In part, these results suggest where empiricists could look for better proxies for what current theory identifies as important and where theorists could focus in building new models that encompass economic forces not contained in existing models. Finally, we assess the relevance of omitted variables and endogeneity for conventional empirical designs in the various subfields. Including manager and firm fixed effects significantly alters inference on primary explanatory variables in 17 of the 20 representative subfield specifications.

We examine effects of capital structure management and misvaluation on the payment method in mergers and acquisitions. In a sample of 3,097 transactions, we find evidence both for leverage optimization and misvaluation as drivers for the decision to pay with cash or stock. Our evidence also shows that it is difficult to pay with overvalued stock unless justified by economic fundamentals. Few bidders try and often only succeed after going hostile. Paying with cash while capital structure optimization suggests stock payment is more common. These firms are reluctant to pay with undervalued stock and experience positive long-term excess returns.

This study examines the effect of transaction costs and information asymmetry on firms’ capital-structure decisions in 40 countries. The findings indicate that transaction costs affect both capital-market timing and capital-structure rebalancing. Past market-timing activity has a significantly negative impact on the current debt ratio, and this impact is stronger for firms facing lower transaction costs of external financing, as defined by legal origin, capital-market development, and securities rules in their home countries. Further analysis indicates that firms in countries with lower transaction costs also rebalance their capital structure more quickly after a deviation from the target, but the rebalancing does not eliminate the market timing effect on capital structure completely.