Recently, the Chinese Government has strengthened the enforcement of bankruptcy laws to protect creditors’ rights. This study shed light on the effect of creditor protection on asset-debt maturity mismatch by employing a quasi-natural experiment in China. The results show that creditor protection mitigates maturity mismatch, and the effect is more pronounced among financially constrained firms. Results remain robust after the dynamic effects test, placebo test, propensity score matching approach, entropy balancing method, and controlling for COVID-19 shocks. Mechanism tests show that creditor protection decreases the cost of debt and reduces over-investment. The effect of creditor protection is pronounced in private companies, financially independent companies, and companies with secured loans. Creditor rights can alleviate maturity mismatch in firms with medium ownership concentration and managerial ownership levels. Economic consequences studies suggest that creditor protection reduces corporate default risk. This study reveals the mechanism and effect of creditor protection on asset-debt maturity mismatch in emerging markets, providing recommendations to policymakers for assessing and improving bankruptcy law regimes.

We study the mandated introduction of a supervised auction for the primary bond market in China. The regulatory intervention significantly reduced the cost of debt for Chinese issuers. Most of the benefits flowed from reduced agency conflict between underwriters and issuers. Using unique bidder-level data from a lead underwriter, we develop replicable tools and techniques to identify collusive bidding behavior resulting in artificial (and economically costly) increases in bond yields. Such evidence can benefit global regulators, issuers, and investors currently using unsupervised auction mechanisms, for example, in securities issuance, construction projects, and procurement.

We examine empirically and theoretically the effects of industrial robot adoption on corporate financing. Empirically, using firm-level panel data on robot deployment in China, staggered across both provinces and industries, we find that robot adoption reduces the cost of debt and increases leverage. We hypothesize that the underlying reason is that being a substitute for labor, robots provide a hedge against fluctuations in labor costs. A model based on this hedging argument delivers additional testable predictions concerning determinants of the relation between robot adoption and corporate financing, which are borne out in the data, providing support for the proposed mechanism. Our evidence is inconsistent with alternative channels behind the observed relations.

We investigate how marginal corporate tax rate affects corporate policy changes in response to a regulatory credit crunch. With a surge in debt due to a fiscal stimulus after 2008, the Chinese government rolled out the “deleveraging” program in 2015 which, through tightening monetary policies, restricting credit flows, and regulating shadow banks, significantly increased firms’ cost of debt and the incentive to deleverage. With a difference-in-differences design, we find that high-tax-rate firms reduce leverage to a less extent than low-tax-rate firms after the initiation of the deleveraging program. This effect is stronger in non-state-owned firms and firms with less non-debt tax shields. More importantly, through retaining more debt, high-tax-rate firms reduce dividend and switch to equity financing to a less extent, and also cut less investments in fixed assets, R&D and human capital. We conclude that tax constitutes an important factor in shaping the micro-economic consequences of a credit crunch.

Using the staggered introduction of regional specialized debt recovery courts as a quasi-natural experiment, we estimate the causal effect of law enforcement on financing cost of corporate bonds in China. With primary market issuing data, we show that the introduction of specialized courts reduces issuers’bond financing cost by 15%. The analysis of secondary market trading data confirms the results that the yield spreads of existing bonds reduce significantly. Exploring regional-, firm- and bond-level heterogeneity, we find the effects to be much stronger when ex-ante default risk is high. Our case-level analyses further support that enforcement cost reduction in debt dispute resolution is a channel for the reduction of cost of bond. Our paper has important policy implications in light of the recent bond default wave in China, suggesting that creditors protection through highly efficient law enforcement is important for bond market development and will eventually benefit bond issuers as well.

This study investigates the impact of ultimate government ownership or control on the cost of debt of Chinese listed corporations. We first examine the relative level of cost of debt of corporations under government control compared to corporations under individual or family control. We then explore circumstances under which government control is likely to reduce a corporation’s cost of financing. Our results suggest that the benefits of government control are conditional on firm-specific financial circumstances and internal- and external-corporate governance environment. We find that, on average, government controlled corporations have lower cost of debt but the effect is not homogeneous. Government controlled corporations have lower cost of debt when they are highly financially constrained and have higher risk of being expropriated by controlling shareholders and in provinces where the local government is less effective, but not otherwise.

Agency theory posits that debt-like compensation (such as defined-benefit pensions and other deferred compensation) aligns managerial interests more closely with those of debtholders and reduces the agency cost of debt. Consistent with theory, we find that a higher CEO relative leverage, defined as the ratio of the CEO's inside leverage (debt-toequity compensation) to corporate leverage, is associated with lower cost of debt financing and fewer restrictive covenants, for a sample of private loans originated during 2006-2008. These findings persist after accounting for the endogeneity of CEO relative leverage, and are more pronounced for firms with higher default risk. Additional analysis on a sample of new public bond issues also shows a negative relation between CEO relative leverage and bond yield spread. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that debtholders recognize the incentive effects of executive debt-like compensation and adjust the terms of corporate debt contracts accordingly.

In this paper we study how a firm’s capital structure choice affects informed trading of its securities in the secondary markets and consequently, the information efficiency of its security prices. We identify two new factors as the potential determinants of the firm’s optimal capital structure policy: the liquidity premium caused by informed trading and, perhaps more importantly, the improved operating efficiency due to information revelation from its security prices. We show that, from these two perspectives, the optimal debt level is achieved at the point where there is no informed trading in the bond market and the informed traders are just about to trade in the bond market. Thus, the cost of debt financing differs in nature from that of the existing models. This has very different implications for the significance of the cost of debt financing and for financial system design. Our model can also explain the relative trading volumes in debt and equity markets.