This paper develops an SOE (small open economy) dynamic general equilibrium model to study the impact of climate change on the current account. By calibrating the model to Chinese economy, we find the following results. First, the current account-output ratio improves in the first decade following an increase in global temperature caused by climate change. It then deteriorates in the following next three decades. Second, the overall current account-output ratio dynamics in response to climate change is neither affected by the types and stringency of climate policies, nor by the levels and growth rates of temperature increases. Third, the impact of an increase in temperature from 1.28 ℃ to 1.5 ℃ relative to the pre-industrial periods (1850-1900) on the current account-output ratio is equivalent to that of an approximate 0.14% permanent decline in TFP. Finally, although the current account-output ratio is likely to deteriorate in the first year when temperature increases instantly, it might not be true if the coefficient of relative risk aversion, or interest rate premium is larger, or debt sensitivity to interest rate is smaller.

Different from the well established markets such as the dollar-Euro market, recent CIP deviations observed in the onshore dollar-RMB forward market were primarily caused by conversion restrictions in the spot market rather than changes in credit risk and/or liquidity constraint. This paper proposes a theoretical framework under which the Chinese authorities impose conversion restrictions in the spot market in an attempt to achieve capital flow balance, but face the tradeoff between achieving such balance and disturbing current account transactions. Consequently, the level of conversion restriction should increase with the amount of capital account transactions and decrease with the amount of current account transactions. Such conversion restriction in turn places a binding constraint on forward traders’ ability to cover their forward positions, resulting in the observed CIP deviation. More particularly, the model predicts that onshore forward rate is equal to a weighted average of CIP-implied forward rate and the market’s expectation of future spot rate, with the weight determined by the level of conversion restriction. As a secondary result, the model also implies that offshore non-deliverable forwards reflect the market’s expectation of future spot rate. Empirical results are consistent with these predictions.

This paper sheds new light on the external and domestic dimension of China's exchange rate policy. It presents an open economy model to analyze both dimensions of macroeconomic adjustment in China under both flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes. The model-based results indicate that persistent current account surpluses in China cannot be rationalized, under general circumstances, by the occurrence of permanent technology or labor supply shocks. As a result, the understanding of the macroeconomic adjustment process in China requires to mimic the effects of potential inefficiencies, which induce the subdued response of domestic absorption to permanent income shocks causing thereby the observed positive unconditional correlation of trade balance and output. The paper argues that these inefficiencies can be potentially seen as a by-product of the fixed exchange rate regime, and can be approximated by a stochastic tax on domestic consumption or time varying transaction cost technology related to money holdings. Our results indicate that a fixed exchange regime with financial market distortions, as defined above, might induce negative effects on GDP growth in the medium-term compared to a more flexible exchange rate regime.

We examine whether the Chinese exchange rate is misaligned and how Chinese trade flows respond to the exchange rate and to economic activity. We find, first, that the Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB), is substantially below the value predicted by estimates based upon a cross-country sample, when using the 2006 vintage of the World Development Indicators. The economic magnitude of the mis-alignment is substantial -- on the order of 50 percent in log terms. However, the misalignment is typically not statistically significant, in the sense of being more than two standard errors away from the conditional mean. Moreover, this finding disappears completely when using the most recent 2008 vintage of data; then the estimated undervaluation is on the order of 10 percent. Second, we find that Chinese multilateral trade flows respond to relative prices -- as represented by a trade weighted exchange rate -- but the relationship is not always precisely estimated. In addition, the direction of the effects is sometimes different from what is expected a priori. For instance, Chinese ordinary imports actually rise in response to a RMB depreciation; however, Chinese exports appear to respond to RMB depreciation in the expected manner, as long as a supply variable is included. In that sense, Chinese trade is not exceptional. Furthermore, Chinese trade with the United States appears to behave in a standard manner -- especially after the expansion in the Chinese manufacturing capital stock is accounted for. Thus, the China-US trade balance should respond to real exchange rate and relative income movements in the anticipated manner. However, in neither the case of multilateral nor bilateral trade flows should one expect quantitatively large effects arising from exchange rate changes. And, of course, these results are not informative with regard to the question of how a change in the RMB/USD exchange rate would affect the overall US trade deficit.

The US dollar has been volatile and falling again and again in recent decades as well as recent years, and for many observers, it is going to be broken sooner or later. The central importance of the dollar is due to the fact that it is not just a currency for the US. Over half of all dollar bills in circulation are held outside of the US borders, and almost half of the US Treasury bonds are held as reserves by foreign central banks. The US dollar is supposed to be the anchor that stabilizes the global currency market. Instead, today it is a major source of instability. In the back ground, the US fiscal deficits have been running high again under Bush administration, once up to almost 3% of US GDP. And current account deficit is set to about 7% in 2005 and more volatility is widely expected. The situation is very challenging for the central banks of Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore which collectively hold about US$2.8 trillion worth of US Treasury bonds as part of their reserves. The moment that they reduce their purchases, the value of the dollar slips. Yet, the more they buy, the more they are exposed to a potential free fall of the US dollar. China has been blamed, not only by US congressmen who are understandably not very familiar with either the complicated currency issues or the domestic politics in any other country, but also many economists or business strategists. It was said that it was all because RMB did not reevaluate, as the source of this "global imbalance" and currency instability. How much revaluation of RMB would remove the US deficits of $700 billions, or at least the US-China trade deficits $200 billions (including Hong Kong)? 500% or 1000%? Of cause no body asked for that kind of magnitude now. Normally smart people say 30-50%, with the unsaid intention to blame-then-suggest again another 30-50% after some initial moves, then the third, the fourth. This seems not really new phenomena at all. It has been all so familiar before and since the Nixon shock in early 70s', and in 80s' when there was the Plaza Accord. The convenient targets to blame were the gold standard, the Dutch Mark, the Japanese Yen. Now it is turn for Chinese reminbi. So the question is what are the real causes of the global imbalance and currency instability? In this short paper, we first take a look at what is really going on with the Chinese economy and trade balance, and then try to identify sources of the current imbalance , and then, as a concluding remark, think again the possibilities to reform the global currency system.

摘要：一国经常项目赤字只有获得足够资金支持才能维持，基于此本文将美国经常项目赤字可持续性问题转化为能否稳定地获得外源性融资的问题。文章从供给和需求角度探讨了美国与东亚之间特殊融资安排的形成与稳定性问题，并用两种方法估计了美国经常项目赤字可持续的必要条件及调整的时间。本文认为国际金融体系下美元霸权和东亚国家内需不足导致了东亚国家的资金供给，美国消费主导型经济导致经常项目赤字进而引致资金的需求，供求之间能达到短期均衡。但是由于制度安排的缺陷，这种特殊的融资安排长期必然走向崩溃。届时美国赤字调整不可避免，中国应采取措施方法赤字调整带来的风险。 Abstract: The current account deficits are sustainable only if it was adequately financed. On this basis, this paper has translated the problem concerning the sustainability of current account deficits into the question of stability of outside financing. Then, our paper discuss the special financing arrangement between East Asia and US, hence after, we further discuss the necessary conditions for the “sustainability” and time to adjust deficits. This paper justified that: East Asia becomes the supplier of financing because of the dollar hegemony under the absent of international financing system and lack of inner demand, US become the demander of financing for sake of the demand-led growth. The demand and supply will reach an equilibrium in short run, but the special financing arrangement dooms to be collapsed for short institutional arrangements, the US has to adjust its currents account deficits passively.