Purpose – For Chinese companies that cross-list in Chinese A share and Hong Kong (H share) markets, the H share price has been consistently lower than the A share price by an average of 85% in recent years. This is puzzling because most institutional differences between the two markets have been eliminated since 2007. The purpose of this study is to explain the puzzle of the price difference of AþH companies. Design/methodology/approach – Using all A and H share Chinese firms in the period 2007–2013 and a simultaneous equations approach, this study identifies three new explanations for the recent price difference. Findings – First, utilizing a unique earning quality measure that is directly related to non-persistent components of fair value accounting under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), this study finds that the lower the earnings quality, the lower the H share price relative to the A share price, and hence the greaterthe price difference. Second, the higherthe myopic investor ownership in A share firms, the largerthe A share price relative to the H share price. Third, the short-selling mechanism introduced to the A share market since 2010 helps reduce the price difference. Originality/value – First, this study identifies three new explanations for the puzzle of the AH price difference which remains substantial even afterthe institutional and accounting standards differences between the two markets were eliminated. Second, we examine the impact of the implementation of fair value accounting under IFRS in an emerging market on the pricing difference of cross-listed shares and reveal that it can induce an unintended negative consequence on the pricing difference of cross-listed shares. Third, this study contributes to the literature on short sales by providing its mitigating role in pricing differences across two different markets. Finally, this study makes improvements in research design, which utilizes a unique measure of earnings quality that is directly related to the implementation of IFRS and a simultaneous equations approach that minimizes endogeneity concern.

We develop a model of a financial institution to study how shareholder—debt holder conflicts interact with prudential capital regulation and accounting measurement rules. Our analysis highlights the result that, for highly leveraged financial institutions—when prudential regulation play an important role—debt overhang and asset substitution inefficiencies work in opposing directions. We demonstrate that, relative to the “historical cost” regime in which assets and liabilities on an institution’s balance sheet are measured at their origination values, fair value could alleviate the inefficiencies arising from asset substitution, but exacerbate those arising from underinvestment due to debt overhang. The optimal choices of accounting regime and prudential solvency constraint balance the conflicts between shareholders and debt holders. Under fair value accounting, the optimal solvency constraint declines with the institution’s marginal cost of investment in project quality and the excess cost of equity capital relative to debt capital. Fair value accounting dominates historical cost accounting provided the solvency constraints in the respective regimes take their optimal values. If the solvency constraints are sub-optimally chosen, however, historical cost accounting could dominate fair value accounting.

Despite the considerable media attention given to the collapse of the market for complex structured assets that contain subprime mortgages, there has been too little discussion of why this crisis occurred. The Subprime Crisis: Cause, Effect and Consequences argues that three basic issues are at the root of the problem, the first of which is an odious public policy partnership, spawned in Washington and comprising hundreds of companies, associations and government agencies, to enhance the availability of affordable housing via the use of creative financing techniques. Second, federal regulators have actively encouraged the rapid growth of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and securities by all types of financial institutions. And third, also bearing blame for the subprime crisis is the related embrace by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board of fair value accounting. After reviewing the Bush administration's proposed solutions as flawed, this article recommends a strategy for subprime crisis resolution. Job one is to rebuild market confidence in structured assets by going back to first principles on issues such as market transparency, standardization of contracts, and accounting treatment. By reducing complexity on the trade of structured assets through simple deal structures and providing investors with the information they need to analyze collateral, for example by requiring SEC registration and public pricing of assets, much of the current liquidity problem is ameliorated.