What are the effects of policy reversals which were initiated by the US bureaucracy in response to the 2008 global financial crisis? Answering this question is challenging because US capital markets are relatively mature and policy reversals are far and in between in recent years. Specifically, the challenges include the one-time nature of these US policy reversals, the confounding effects of many programs targeting interrelated segments of the capital markets at the same time as well as possible endogeneity issues. China, on the other hand, offers a natural experiment to study the effects of policy reversals. In the last three decades, the Chinese government has initiated many policy changes to liberalize the capital markets and some of these have been reversed several times. Using hand-collected data of policy reversals targeting the Chinese stock markets from 1994 through 2009, we are able to address the first two challenges. To resolve any endogeneity issue, we focus on the impact of such policy reversals (targeted at the Chinese stock markets) on the Chinese repo markets, which trade market-driven interest rates. We find that the Chinese policy reversals are indeed effective in reducing the term spread, the volatility of the interest rate, and the volatility of the term spread. Our results suggest that the policy risk is systematically priced in financial securities, implying that policy makers can rely on financial market indicators to objectively evaluate their policy decisions.

What are the effects of policy reversals which were initiated by the US bureaucracy in response to the 2008 global financial crisis? Answering this question is challenging because US capital markets are relatively mature and policy reversals are far and in between in recent years. Specifically, the challenges include the one-time nature of these US policy reversals, the confounding effects of many programs targeting interrelated segments of the capital markets at the same time as well as possible endogeneity issues. China, on the other hand, offers a natural experiment to study the effects of policy reversals. In the last three decades, the Chinese government has initiated many policy changes to liberalize the capital markets and some of these have been reversed several times. Using hand-collected data of policy reversals targeting the Chinese stock markets from 1994 through 2009, we are able to address the first two challenges. To resolve any endogeneity issue, we focus on the impact of such policy reversals (targeted at the Chinese stock markets) on the Chinese repo markets, which trade market-driven interest rates. We find that the Chinese policy reversals are indeed effective in reducing the term spread, the volatility of the interest rate, and the volatility of the term spread. Our results suggest that the policy risk is systematically priced in financial securities, implying that policy makers can rely on financial market indicators to objectively evaluate their policy decisions.

What are the effects of policy reversals which were initiated by the US bureaucracy in response to the 2008 global financial crisis? Answering this question is challenging because US capital markets are relatively mature and policy reversals are far and in between in recent years. Specifically, the challenges include the one-time nature of these US policy reversals, the confounding effects of many programs targeting interrelated segments of the capital markets at the same time as well as possible endogeneity issues. China, on the other hand, offers a natural experiment to study the effects of policy reversals. In the last three decades, the Chinese government has initiated many policy changes to liberalize the capital markets and some of these have been reversed several times. Using hand-collected data of policy reversals targeting the Chinese stock markets from 1994 through 2009, we are able to address the first two challenges. To resolve any endogeneity issue, we focus on the impact of such policy reversals (targeted at the Chinese stock markets) on the Chinese repo markets, which trade market-driven interest rates. We find that the Chinese policy reversals are indeed effective in reducing the term spread, the volatility of the interest rate, and the volatility of the term spread. Our results suggest that the policy risk is systematically priced in financial securities, implying that policy makers can rely on financial market indicators to objectively evaluate their policy decisions.

ABSTRACT：As an important derivative instrument, CDO is playing a crucial role in the financial crisis. With complicated structure, we have developed many pricing models, which all relay on complicated mathematical model. The paper, firstly, introduces the mainstream pricing model----structural model and reduced form model. Then we introduced the Hybrid Models based on two formal models, by discussing the parameter of pricing i.e. default probability, default free risk and default correlation. In this paper, we give the hybrid model by Monte Carlo simulation based on copula function. Finally, we consider the pricing sensitivity on various parameters. According to the result of simulation, the relationship between the tranches price and pricing parameters is various. For the equity tranche and mezzanine tranche, the price and recovery rate have a positive correlation, while the case is inverse for the senior tranche. We also can conclude that, higher default correlation can lower the price of equity tranche, and have an opposite effect on the senior tranche. The influence on the mezzanine tranche isn’t certain. Furthermore, by comparing two different copula function model, we can get that marginal distribution has different effect on the tranches price.

Policy actions by the Federal Reserve during the recent financial crisis often involve recapitalization of banks. This paper offers a theory of the non-neutrality of money for policy actions taking the form of injecting capital into banks via nominal transfers, in an environment where banking frictions are present in the sense that there exists an agency cost problem between banks and their private-sector creditors. The analysis is conducted within a general equilibrium setting with two-sided financial contracting. We first show that even with perfect nominal flexibility, the recapitalization policy can have real effects on the economy. We then study the design of the optimal long-run recapitalization policy as well as the optimal short-run policy responses to banking riskiness shocks.

Efficient portfolio is a portfolio that yields maximum expected return given a level of risk or has minimum level of risk given a level of expected return.However,the optimal portfolios seem not being as efficient as intended.Especially during financial crisis period.optimal portfolio is not an optimal investment as it does not yield maximum return given a specific level of risk,vice and versa.One possible explanion for an unimpressive performance of the seemingly efficient portfolio is incorrectness in parameter estimates called"estimation risk in parameter estimates".Five different estimating strategies are employed to explore ex post portfolio performance when estimation risk is incorporated.These strategies are traditional mean-variance(EV),Adjusted Beta(AB) approach,Capital Asset Pricing Model(CAPM),Single Index Model(SIM), and Single Index Model incorporating shrikage Bayesian factor namely Bayesian Single Index Model(BSIM).Among the five alternative strategies,shrinkage estimators incorporating the single index model outperforms other traditional portfolio selection strategies.Allowing for asset mispricing and applying Bayesian shrinkage adjusted factor to each asset's alpha,a single factor namely excess market return is adequate in alleviating estimation uncertainty. JEL：G320

This paper focuses on evidence from stock markets as it investigates the spillovers from the United States to mainland China and Hong Kong SAR during the subprime crisis. Using both univariate and multivariate GARCH models, this paper finds that China's stock market is not immune to the financial crisis, as evidenced by the price and volatility spillovers from the United States. In addition, HK's equity returns have exhibited more significant price and volatility spillovers from the United States than China's returns, and past volatility shocks in the United States have a more persistent effect on future volatility in HK than in China, reflecting HK's role as an international financial center. Moreover, the impact of the volatility from the United States on China's stock markets has been more persistent than that from HK, due mainly to the United States as the origin of the subprime crisis. Finally, as expected, the conditional correlation between China and HK has outweighed their conditional correlations with the United States, echoing increasing financial integration between China and HK.

The global financial crisis is hitting China hard with great adversity. In response, China start to formulated the plan for dealing with the financial crisis and its possible fallout in June 2008 when China was in the critical stage of putting up the Olympic Games. The Chinese leadership judges the crisis is going to be a serious disaster but not as bad as the great depression of the 1930s. An America-type crisis is unlikely to happen in the country and the main threat would be the Chinese real sector being dragged down under, which in turn sparks a crisis in the financial sector. China’s strategy for combating the crisis therefore is to deal with the immediate crisis effects in the real economy in the first place, and looks for opportunities in the meantime. The overwhelming emphasis is placed on expanding domestic demand to fuel growth. Following this strategy, China has rolled out a comprehensive package of combating measures. The fiscal expansion hit the headlines with extensive government financial support for infrastructure and public service projects. Yet the Chinese monetary stimulus is actually more powerful. The stance of Chinese monetary policy has changed from being precautionary against inflation with flexibility to appropriate easing to promote growth. After several rounds of rate cuts, the Chinese version of quantitative easing takes the central stage. In China’s battle with the financial crisis, the monetary stimulus is playing a leading role at the moment. The international dimensions of China’s monetary policy typify how China turns a crisis into a world of opportunity. China has taken a conservative approach to managing her reserves in which the huge international reserves are taken as self insurance rather than an avenue for international leverage. Within this framework and if safety of these foreign assets can be assured, China can provide finance to countries in crisis through international financial organisations. In addition to the Panda Bonds, the chief way for China to make funding contribution is through IMF. For this matter, China supports the motion to increase the IMF’s lending capacity and would buy the bonds it issues. China is actively calling for reform of international financial architecture. Chinese advisers have publically argued that the increase in China’s funding contribution has to be paralleled by an increase in China’s profile in the power structure in the IMF. In many occasions, China has also acted as spokesman of the emerging and developing economies by making cases for increasing their say in world financial affairs. But on the whole, China has been cautious not to committing herself too much as she knows probably she has little to gain from international policy coordination. Against this backdrop, China has chosen to focus on regional financial cooperation proactively and considerable progress has been made in this area. China’s dealing with the current financial crisis is unassuming. What she has done is down-to-earth common sense. However, the Chinese approach is shown signs of working. Despite the early success of crisis handling, there remain fundamental problems in China’s structure of economic growth. How to redress structural imbalances in the economy, to boost domestic demand, to calm down the property market and, above all, to create millions of jobs, are still the major huge challenges China is facing.

There is growing evidence that economic crises are transmitted across economies and equity markets. This motivates two questions. First, can the direction and magnitude of a country's stock market reaction during an extreme case ("contagion") be explained by economic fundamentals? Second, are there benefits of international diversification during times of widespread contagion among equity markets? We examine the reaction of major world equity markets to the 1997 Asian Crisis. In particular, we investigate the interrelationships among world equity markets, the factors explaining the different directions and magnitudes of countries' reactions to this crisis and the effectiveness of the global diversification of investment portfolios during financial crises. Our analyses provide evidence that is consistent with the correlations among world equity markets increasing dramatically during the period of the Asian Crisis. However, this effect is concentrated on a short period around the crisis. The benefits of international diversification may be obtainable, even when the period contains a worldwide financial crisis. We show that the productivity and interest rate macroeconomic variables, worldwide beta and the existence of derivatives trading are important in explaining the stock market returns during the Asian Crisis. The effect of the worldwide beta variable is particularly strong. Finally, the trade variables are insignificant, their influences being subsumed by interest rate and inflation macroeconomic variables. On balance, we interpret our results as supporting a rational view of the spread of an economic crisis to other markets.

This paper develops a model of private debt financing under inefficient financial intermediation. It suggests a mechanism that can generate the following sequence of events observed in the recent Asian crisis: A period of relatively low capital flow despite a steady improvement in economic fundamentals (capital inflow inertia), followed by a fast buildup of capital inflow, and ended with a large capital outflow and domestic credit crunch. Unlike other models requiring large movements in fundamentals or asset prices to explain a financial crisis, this model can exhibit large credit/capital flow swings with moderate changes in the economic and market environment.