详情
The Certification and Monitoring Roles of Underwriters in IPO Earnings Management
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the certification and monitoring roles
played by underwriters in IPO earnings management. Prior studies show that IPO issuers have
incentives to employ opportunistic earnings management to enhance initial firm values. However,
the certification role of underwriters has been largely overlooked. We argue that there is a
negative relation between underwriter reputation and IPO earnings management. Moreover, we
think that underwriters have strong incentives to continue providing monitoring to the firms they
take public due to the lucrative business relationships. We thus hypothesize that there is a
positive relation between underwriter reputation and post-IPO firm operating performance.
Using a sample of 367 IPOs, we obtain results consistent with our hypotheses. We find that IPOs
underwritten by lower-reputation underwriters have more initial discretionary accruals and
higher initial firm values, indicating there is a significantly negative relation between IPO
earnings management and underwriter reputation. We also find that the post-IPO operating
performance of IPOs is significantly and positively related to underwriter reputation. For the
robustness test, we consider the possibility that IPO earnings management and the choice of
underwriters are endogenously determined. An instrumental variable two-stage least squares
regression and a weighted least squares regression confirm the robustness of our results.