This study examines how emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) respond to cross-national diversity in environmental regulation. Prior research suggests that internationalization exposes EMNEs to diverse environmental standards and may facilitate regulatory learning, yet offers a limited understanding of the mechanisms through which such exposure translates into green innovation. Drawing on institutional theory, we argue that green innovation is particularly fostered when EMNEs operate across host countries whose environmental regulatory regimes are more stringent than those in the home country, and when such exposure varies across multiple host locations. We theorize that this form of environmental regulatory diversity creates learning pressures and legitimacy incentives that motivate EMNEs to upgrade their environmental capabilities through green innovation. Using panel data comprising 9,362 firm-year observations from 1,088 Chinese MNEs over the period 2008–2021, we find support for our arguments. We further show that these effects are contingent on organizational and institutional conditions, specifically top management teams’ technological expertise and the strength of intellectual property enforcement in home-country locations. These findings advance research on EMNE learning and sustainable innovation under complex global environmental governance.

Taking China’s environmental “fee-to-tax” reform as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper employs a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to examine the impact of the green tax reform on firms’ cost of equity on a sample of A-share listed firms from 2012 to 2023. The results show that the implementation of the Environmental Protection Tax Law significantly reduced the cost of equity for heavily polluting firms. This finding remains robust after a series of robustness checks. Analyses of the underlying mechanisms reveal that the green tax reform lowered the cost of equity primarily through the channel of “Porter effect.” Moreover, the effect is more pronounced among firms located in the eastern China, those with stronger internal governance, and those operating in a stricter external monitoring environment.

This opinion paper analyzes China’s new mandatory climate disclosure standards, which were formally launched between December 2024 and December 2025. We argue that China has not simply adopted the investor-focused model of the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) or the European Union’s comprehensive double materiality approach. Instead, it has crafted a distinct “third way”—a new model of sustainability governance marked by a deliberate blending of global convergence and national priorities. Through a close, provision-level comparison, we identify eight specific provisions where China’s standard goes beyond both IFRS S2 (Climate-related Disclosures, issued by the International Sustainability Standards Board) and ESRS E1 (Climate Change, issued under the European Sustainability Reporting Standards), revealing a consistent rationale that treats corporate disclosure as an instrument of national governance, reaching institutional completeness by simultaneously issuing assurance standards, and maintaining developmental sensitivity through mechanisms like the proportionality principle. While considerable implementation challenges persist, this paper concludes that China’s approach presents a useful and reproducible model for other developing nations, positioning China as an active contributor to the evolving global standards architecture.

China’s green-finance expansion shifts attention from how much firms disclose to whether transition claims remain credible when verification tightens. Using a 2007–2022 panel of Chinese A-share listed firms (crash-risk measures available through 2021), we measure transition credibility by decomposing firms’ transition signals into verifiable actions, narrative disclosure, and realized environmental outcomes, and we propose a transparent narrative–action gap measure (WordsMinusActions = WordsIndex − ActionIndex) to capture ‘words without deeds.’ Exploiting the staggered rollout of China’s Central Environmental Protection Inspections (CEPI) as a plausibly exogenous increase in verification and enforcement intensity, we find that firms with high pre-CEPI narrative–action gaps experience a sharp increase in stock price crash risk around inspections: NCSKEW rises by about 0.09 in the inspection year and 0.20 in the following year (≈0.24 SD), and DUVOL rises by about 0.04 and 0.10 (≈0.27 SD) relative to low-gap firms. Consistent with enforcement discipline, these high-gap firms subsequently reduce disclosure intensity and increase verifiable green actions, narrowing the narrative–action gap after CEPI. The evidence supports governance that rewards verifiable action and consistency over disclosure volume in markets.

Against the backdrop of systemic financial risk prevention and the pursuit of a virtuous cycle in the real economy, whether Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) shareholding alleviates maturity mismatch of corporate investment and financing activities is a question of critical importance, not only for the development of individual firms but also for high-quality macroeconomic growth. Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2021, this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the impact of LGFVs shareholding on corporate maturity mismatch. The empirical results indicate that LGFVs shareholding can significantly alleviate corporate maturity mismatch and the finding is still robust across a series of empirical checks. Mechanism analyses show that LGFVs shareholding improves firms’ long-term financing capacity through a resource provision channel and restrains overinvestment through a governance optimization channel, thereby collectively mitigating corporate maturity mismatch. Further analysis indicates that the mitigating effect of LGFVs shareholding is more pronounced in firms with concentrated LGFVs shareholding, firms controlled by non-state-owned capital and firms under higher economic policy uncertainty. Our findings provide valuable theoretical insights for policy design aimed at optimizing corporate financial behavior and curbing corporate financial risks.

We examine the relationship between government data opening and corporate leverage manipulation. Leveraging the staggered establishment of province-level open government data platforms in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that government data opening significantly reduces corporate leverage manipulation. This policy effect is more pronounced among firms with low capital intensity, firms with limited analyst coverage, and those located in regions with low banking competition. Mechanism analysis suggests that government data opening affects the cost-benefit tradeoff of corporate leverage manipulation by alleviating financing constraints and enhancing corporate governance, thereby mitigating leverage manipulation practices. Our research contributes to the literature on government data opening, highlighting its role in reducing leverage manipulation and offering valuable implications for mitigating significant financial risks.

Supply chain standardization significantly promotes cross-regional investment by increasing subsidiaries outside headquarters cities, mainly by reducing transaction and information costs and alleviating “outsider disadvantage.” This effect is stronger for non-state-owned firms, firms with lower financing constraints, and those in highly marketized regions. Our findings show that standardization helps overcomeinstitutional and information barriers, optimizing resource allocation. This study expands supply chain governance literature and offers insights for building a unified national market.

We examine the unintended consequences of bankruptcy court establishment on corporate behavior. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2019 and a staggered difference-in-differences model, we find that the establishment of bankruptcy courts increases accrual earnings management by about 17% among high bankruptcy risk firms relative to low-risk firms. While bankruptcy courts improve bankruptcy efficiency and justice, reduce local government intervention, and accelerate the exit of zombie firms, they also induce greater earnings management. This effect is driven mainly by survival pressure and managerial reputation concerns, rather than by efforts to correct external evaluations. Consistent with this interpretation, we do not observe improvements in long-term operations, governance, performance, or real earnings management. Overall, this paper enriches the literature on earnings management from the perspective of judicial governance and on the economic consequences of creditor-friendly bankruptcy institutions.

This study examines the impact of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) on the stock price crash risk of Chinese commercial banks. In addition, it explores how Governance and Digital Transparency curtail the effect of EPU on stock price crash risk. Using a sample of 50 Chinese A-share-listed banks from 2012 to 2024, the study reveals that EPU significantly increased the banks’ stock price crash risk. The findings are robust to alternative measures of EPU and stock price crash risk. Further, governance and FinTech adoption mitigate the positive effect. The mitigating effect persists across high- and low-risk bank subsamples. In addition, we perform a battery of analyses to support our main findings. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications.

The China Securities Regulatory Commission is allowing firms to use externally financed funds for share repurchases, a recent measure to enable listed companies address valuation pressures and protect investors; however, its implications for corporate marketing decisions remain unclear. Using an event sample of Chinese listed firms that conducted open-market repurchases between 2009 and 2024, this study empirically examines how this market activity financed by different sources influence marketing decisions and explores the underlying mechanisms. The findings show that compared with firms using internal cash for repurchases, those relying on debt financing are inclined to resist myopic marketing decisions, and this negative relationship is pronounced under high analyst coverage and when privately owned listed firms are controlled by family entrepreneurs. These results remain robust after replacing the dependent variables and applying propensity score matching. Overall, this study shows that debt financing to support share repurchases has a long-term beneficial governance impact as it improves earnings quality and protects investor interests, and offers a new perspective on the relationship between financing-based repurchases and marketing myopia, and provides useful policy insights for evaluating the effectiveness of China’s refinancing regulations related to share repurchases, while guiding further refinement.