This research examines the impact of short selling on the financing cost of corporate bonds using panel data from Chinese A-share listed companies spanning the period from 2007 to 2022. The study aims to investigate the potential cross-market information spillover effects within the short selling system. The findings indicate that short selling significantly reduces the financing cost of corporate bonds, with a more pronounced effect observed under greater short selling forces. The robustness of the results is confirmed by controlling for various potential influencing factors and addressing the endogeneity issue through Propensity Score Matched Difference in Differences (PSM-DID) methodology. Moreover, the research reveals that the alleviation of information asymmetry serves as the primary mechanism through which short selling exerts its impact, particularly in regions with well-developed financial markets and favorable legal environments. This study offersa novel perspective of short selling in China and it sheds light on its cross-market spillover effects. By effectively enhancing resource allocation efficiency in capital markets, short selling emerges as a potent tool for mitigating information disparities between bond investors and enterprises.

This paper investigates whether and how managers of highly polluting firms adjust their earnings forecast behaviors in response to the introduction of environmental legal institutions. Using the establishment of environmental courts in China as a quasi-natural experiment, our triple difference-in-differences (DID) estimation shows that environmental courts significantly increase the likelihood of management earnings forecasts for highly polluting firms compared to non-highly polluting firms. This association becomes more pronounced for firms with stronger monitoring power, higher environmental litigation risk, and greater earnings uncertainty. Additionally, we show that highly polluting firms improve the precision and accuracy of earnings forecasts following the establishment of environmental courts. Furthermore, we provide evidence that our results do not support the opportunistic perspective that managers strategically issue more positive earnings forecasts to inflate stakeholders‘ expectations subsequent to the implementation of environmental courts. Overall, our research indicates that environmental legal institutions make firms with greater environmental concerns to provide more forward-looking information, thereby alleviating stakeholders’ apprehensions regarding future profitability prospects.

When examining corporate governance in China, it is crucial to recognize the unique socio-economic structures and legal systems at play. The mechanisms of corporate governance theorized in the West might not necessarily have the same impact in China. In particular, given China’s distinct feature of the domestic economy and its socio-political structure, the results of introducing a hostile takeover system might not align with common anticipations that scholars and policymakers in China and elsewhere broadly share. In greater detail, this paper highlights the significant market imperfections in the Chinese economy, stemming from information asymmetry, imperfect product markets, and capital-market inefficiency. These market imperfections suggest that an active hostile takeover regime might not function effectively in China, as its disciplinary mechanism operates successfully in other advanced countries. Additionally, this paper underscores that due to China’s distinctive features—including its state-owned corporate landscape, the dominance of controlling shareholders in private corporations’ ownership structures, and its unique brand of socialism—the introduction of an active takeover regime could produce unintended consequences in the Chinese economy. Overall, challenging the prevailing perspective, I posit that within the Chinese hostile takeover framework, corporate governance is not as influential as one might assume.

Using data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2022, we employ a difference-in-differences model to empirically examine the impact of bankruptcy regimes, marked by the establishment of bankruptcy courts, on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). The results show a significant decline in TFP among firms in regions following the establishment of bankruptcy courts. This finding remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests reveal that establishing bankruptcy courts increases firms’ risk aversion incentives by endowing creditors with excessive rights. Consequently, firms tend to reduce liabilities, curtail R&D investment, and accumulate liquid assets as coping measures, ultimately contributing to a decline in TFP. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced for firms with high financial risk. However, the improvement of the market mechanism can alleviate the negative impact of bankruptcy courts excessively strengthening creditor protection. Specifically, when firms are located in regions with weak government intervention and strong financial development, as well as in market environments with low uncertainty and strong competition, this negative impact can be mitigated. These findings provide fresh insights into the dual nature of creditor protection and offer valuable references for governments to improve the bankruptcy legal system.

Under the guidance of the dual-carbon target, the development of the carbon financial system is of great significance to compensate for the gap between green and low-carbon investment. Considering the current state of the development of carbon financial system, China has initially formed a carbon financial system, including participants, carbon financial products and macro and micro operation structures, but the system is still in the initial development stage. Given the current restrictions on the development of carbon finance, it can be seen that there are still problems such as unreasonable economic structure, insufficient market construction, single product category, low utilization rate and urgent construction of relevant judicial guarantee system. Therefore, the system should be improved at the economic level and the legal level. The economic level includes adjusting the layout of economic development structure, strengthening the construction of market infrastructure, encouraging the diversification of carbon financial products and strengthening publicity and education promotion strategies. The legal level includes improving the top-level design, formulating judicial interpretation to promote carbon financial trading, promoting commercial law amendment, and promoting the linkage mechanism between specialized environmental justice and carbon finance and other safeguard measures. Finally, improving the carbon finance system is required to promote and protect the orderly development of carbon finance. To promote the reform of the pattern of economic development, the concept of ecological and environmental protection in the financial sector needs to be implemented to form an overall pattern of pollution reduction, carbon reduction and synergistic efficiency improvement.

This study examines the relationship between industry litigation risk and corporate misconduct using China's A-share listed companies’ data from 2007 to 2022. The findings indicate a significant and negative association, where companies in industries with higher median litigation amounts relative to their assets exhibit reduced incidents of misconduct. This suggests that businesses in high-risk litigation sectors may adopt more cautious practices to mitigate legal challenges and protect their reputations. The robustness of these findings is confirmed through a variety of tests, including a quasi-experimental setting of the chief judges rotation implemented in 2008. Furthermore, the study finds that external monitors including financial analysts’ site visits and local law firms moderate the negative relationship between litigation risk and misconduct. We further show that legal enforcement and moral capital are the two channels through which industry litigation risk impacts corporate misconduct. Our findings underscore the role of litigation risk in shaping peer firms' behavior.

This paper investigates how transparency in lawsuit information affects capital allocation and aggregate industrial production. Greater transparency enhances the availability of information about firms' fundamentals, which can influence resource distribution. We exploit regional variations in courts' compliance with mandated judicial document disclosures in China, implemented since 2014, as a natural experiment. For firms with initially high marginal revenue products of capital (MRPK), a 10-percentage-point increase in legal transparency results in a 4.4% increase in physical capital and a 7.9% reduction in MRPK, relative to firms with lower MRPK. Additionally, regions with higher transparency experience a rise in aggregate output. Further analysis differentiating firms by ownership type, public listing status, and industry-level contract intensity enhances the robustness of our findings.

Using Chinese publicly listed firms from 2007 to 2020, this study empirically explores the impact of non-controlling shareholders’ network on the corporate excess goodwill. We find that the centrality of non-controlling shareholders’ network significantly decreases the excess goodwill from mergers and acquisitions, indicating that non-controlling shareholders’ network can restrain the goodwill bubbles. Moreover, the inhibitory effect of non-controlling shareholders’ network on excess goodwill stems from pressure-resistant institutional investors and individual investors. This effect is achieved through the information effect, resource effect, and governance effect. Furthermore, this inhibitory effect is more pronounced in firms located in less developed regions and legal environments, and firms with lower audit quality. In conclusion, non-controlling shareholders’ network plays a positive role in the restriction of excess goodwill in listed companies.

While the popularity of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) has brought signiffcant proffts, legal practitioners have been exposed to unanswered legal concerns behind the frenzy of NFT transactions. Generally, such concerns include those related to the applicability of copyright to NFTs, the legal relationship between an NFT and the tokenized work, and the copyrights associated with the NFT in transactions. TTe Hangzhou Internet Court released the ffrst NFT-related copyright case, setting a course for the subsequent judicial and business practice of IP-related NFTs nationally and internationally. With these general considerations in mind, the paper brieffy introduces what non-fungible tokens are and how they relate to copyright law. Speciffcally, by interpreting the ffrst NFT-related copyright decision in detail, the paper addresses the legal status of NFT and NFT transactions from the perspective of Chinese Copyright Law, with particular focus on the liability of online platforms and the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine.

We study when CEOs with legal expertise are valuable for firms. In general, lawyer CEOs are negatively associated with frequency and severity in employment civil rights, contract, labor, personal injury, and securities litigation. This effect is partly induced by the CEO’s man- agement of litigation risk and reduction in other risky policies. Lawyer CEOs are further associated with an increase in gatekeepers providing additional legal oversight and a decrease in innovative activities with high litigation risk. Lawyer CEOs are more valuable during periods of enhanced compliance requirements and regulatory pressure and in indus- tries with high litigation risk or better growth opportunities.