This study examines the relationship between industry litigation risk and corporate misconduct using China's A-share listed companies’ data from 2007 to 2022. The findings indicate a significant and negative association, where companies in industries with higher median litigation amounts relative to their assets exhibit reduced incidents of misconduct. This suggests that businesses in high-risk litigation sectors may adopt more cautious practices to mitigate legal challenges and protect their reputations. The robustness of these findings is confirmed through a variety of tests, including a quasi-experimental setting of the chief judges rotation implemented in 2008. Furthermore, the study finds that external monitors including financial analysts’ site visits and local law firms moderate the negative relationship between litigation risk and misconduct. We further show that legal enforcement and moral capital are the two channels through which industry litigation risk impacts corporate misconduct. Our findings underscore the role of litigation risk in shaping peer firms' behavior.

This paper investigates how transparency in lawsuit information affects capital allocation and aggregate industrial production. Greater transparency enhances the availability of information about firms' fundamentals, which can influence resource distribution. We exploit regional variations in courts' compliance with mandated judicial document disclosures in China, implemented since 2014, as a natural experiment. For firms with initially high marginal revenue products of capital (MRPK), a 10-percentage-point increase in legal transparency results in a 4.4% increase in physical capital and a 7.9% reduction in MRPK, relative to firms with lower MRPK. Additionally, regions with higher transparency experience a rise in aggregate output. Further analysis differentiating firms by ownership type, public listing status, and industry-level contract intensity enhances the robustness of our findings.

Using Chinese publicly listed firms from 2007 to 2020, this study empirically explores the impact of non-controlling shareholders’ network on the corporate excess goodwill. We find that the centrality of non-controlling shareholders’ network significantly decreases the excess goodwill from mergers and acquisitions, indicating that non-controlling shareholders’ network can restrain the goodwill bubbles. Moreover, the inhibitory effect of non-controlling shareholders’ network on excess goodwill stems from pressure-resistant institutional investors and individual investors. This effect is achieved through the information effect, resource effect, and governance effect. Furthermore, this inhibitory effect is more pronounced in firms located in less developed regions and legal environments, and firms with lower audit quality. In conclusion, non-controlling shareholders’ network plays a positive role in the restriction of excess goodwill in listed companies.

While the popularity of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) has brought signiffcant proffts, legal practitioners have been exposed to unanswered legal concerns behind the frenzy of NFT transactions. Generally, such concerns include those related to the applicability of copyright to NFTs, the legal relationship between an NFT and the tokenized work, and the copyrights associated with the NFT in transactions. TTe Hangzhou Internet Court released the ffrst NFT-related copyright case, setting a course for the subsequent judicial and business practice of IP-related NFTs nationally and internationally. With these general considerations in mind, the paper brieffy introduces what non-fungible tokens are and how they relate to copyright law. Speciffcally, by interpreting the ffrst NFT-related copyright decision in detail, the paper addresses the legal status of NFT and NFT transactions from the perspective of Chinese Copyright Law, with particular focus on the liability of online platforms and the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine.

We study when CEOs with legal expertise are valuable for firms. In general, lawyer CEOs are negatively associated with frequency and severity in employment civil rights, contract, labor, personal injury, and securities litigation. This effect is partly induced by the CEO’s man- agement of litigation risk and reduction in other risky policies. Lawyer CEOs are further associated with an increase in gatekeepers providing additional legal oversight and a decrease in innovative activities with high litigation risk. Lawyer CEOs are more valuable during periods of enhanced compliance requirements and regulatory pressure and in indus- tries with high litigation risk or better growth opportunities.

When examining corporate governance in China, it is crucial to recognize the unique socioeconomicstructures and legal systems at play. The mechanisms of corporate governance theorized in the West might not necessarily have the same impact in China. In particular, given China’s distinct feature of the domestic economy and its socio-political structure, the results of introducing a hostile takeover system might not align with common anticipations that scholars and policymakers in China and elsewhere broadly share. In greater detail, this paper highlights the significant market imperfections in the Chinese economy, stemming from information asymmetry, imperfect product markets, and capital-market inefficiency. These market imperfections suggest that an active hostile takeover regime might not function effectively in China, as its disciplinary mechanism operates successfully in other advanced countries. Additionally, this paper underscores that due to China’s distinctive features—including its state-owned corporate landscape, the dominance of controlling shareholders in private corporations’ ownership structures, and its unique brand of socialism—the introduction of an active takeover regime could produce unintended consequences in the Chinese economy. Overall, challenging the prevailing perspective, I posit that within the Chinese hostile takeover framework, corporate governance is not as influential as one might assume.

The debate on whether legalization or prohibition is more effective in conserving species and curbing illicit black-market trade remains controversial, with insufficient evidence available. Here we investigate the effects of China’s ivory ban on elephant poaching. We find that the enaction of the total ivory ban corresponds with a sharp 50% decrease in poaching and a significant reduction of the number of seizure cases. Further, although China has taken restrictive measures in 2015 and signaled a total ivory ban in 2016, no occurrence of “last minute rush” in smuggling activity was found preceding the implementation of the ivory ban.

Emissions data collection and management are crucial to operationalizing an emissions trading scheme (ETS). Regulators need high-quality data to allocate emissions allowances and monitor compliance. However, collecting such data can be costly, challenging various actors. Emitters may misreport data, weighing the cost against their interest, while governments may struggle with limited resources in managing compliance. Third-party verification is a solution but tends to be ineffectual and causes new problems unless with sufficient oversight and support. This quality-cost dilemma becomes even more complex in multi-level ETSs, as in China’s national ETS (NETS). Despite increased regulatory efforts to address data challenges, there remains a lack of in-depth legal analysis on the relationship between data quality and cost. This Article establishes a three-element analytical framework—data quality, cost concerns, and intergovernmental relations in data management—to shed light on the nuances of data regulation. Using China’s NETS as a case study, we gain a deeper understanding of the three elements in a specific jurisdiction and the legal institutions, practices, and challenges involved. Governments, emitters, and third-party verifiers each have unique roles and limitations in this process. We suggest legal and regulatory strategies for finding solutions. Our actor-centered analytical model and practical recommendations for the NETS can serve as a valuable guide for jurisdictions facing similar data challenges.

This paper explores the impact of political network on insider trading activities in China. We find that stronger political network discourages insider trading. Such effect is more pronounced among long-standing and high-level connections, and persists in the events of M&A and public policy announcement when insiders may make profitable informed trading. This finding points to new cost of being politically connected. In exploring the underlying mechanisms, we confirm that the muted insider trading is related to preferable financial and policy support, and are more pronounced for SOEs in provinces with stronger market force and legal enforcement.

Using data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2022, we employ a difference-indifferences model to empirically examine the impact of bankruptcy regimes, marked by the establishment of bankruptcy courts, on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). The results show a significant decline in TFP among firms in regions following the establishment of bankruptcy courts. This finding remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests reveal that establishing bankruptcy courts increases firms’ risk aversion incentives by endowing creditors with excessive rights. Consequently, firms tend to reduce liabilities, curtail R&D investment, and accumulate liquid assets as coping measures, ultimately contributing to a decline in TFP. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced for firms with high financial risk. However, the improvement of the market mechanism can alleviate the negative impact of bankruptcy courts excessively strengthening creditor protection. Specifically, when firms are located in regions with weak government intervention and strong financial development, as well as in market environments with low uncertainty and strong competition, this negative impact can be mitigated. These findings provide fresh insights into the dual nature of creditor protection and offer valuable references for governments to improve the bankruptcy legal system.