Our investigation reveals that the top 10 shareholders are the only credible contenders for dominant control rights in China's listed corporations. To measure the ultimate control of these entities, we adopt the Shapley-Shubik power index and calculate the principal shareholder's control at the top of the control pyramid. Our results demonstrate that approximately 70% of firms exhibit an ultimate control value of 1. Additionally, our analysis reveals a non-linear relationship between the ultimate control, the tunneling behavior of the ultimate controller, and the executives’excess perk consumption .Specifically, our findings suggest that this relationship is characterized by a phase transition.

This paper examines the relationship between private benefits and the discount of private equity offerings. Measuring private benefits in terms of both control rights and cash flow, we find that private benefits are primarily attributed to control right rather than ownership. By using a measure, the Banzhaf power index, that could better reflects the largest shareholder’s relative influence over the firm. We find that the largest shareholder’s control power decreases, even though her ownership increases after private placement. It indicates that the largest shareholder is willing to give up some control power in private placement. In addition, we find that motivation and the type of investors in private placements significantly influences price discount.