We construct a new geospatial measure using high-resolution river vector data from National Geomatics Center of China (NGCC) to study how urban riparian exposure shapes local government debt financing costs. Our base-line results show that cities with higher riparian exposures have significantly lower credit spreads, with a one-standard-deviation increase in riparian exposure reducing credit spreads by approximately 12 basis points. By comparing cities crossed by natural rivers with those intersected by artificial canals, we disentangle the dual role of riparian zones as sources of natural capital benefits (e.g., enhanced transportation capacity) versus climate risks (e.g., flood vulnerability). We find that climate change has amplified the impact of natural disasters, such as floods and droughts, particularly in riparian zones, thus weakening the cost-reducing effect of riparian exposure on bond financing. In contrast, improved water infrastructure and flood-control facilities strengthen the cost-reduction effect. Our findings contribute to the literature on natural capital and government financing, offering valuable implications for public finance and risk management.

This study finds that reducing political influence over local courts weakens local government debt capacity. We establish this result by exploiting the staggered roll-out of a judicial centralization reform aimed at alleviating local court capture in China and find reduced judicial favoritism towards local governments post-reform. The majority of local government lawsuits are with contractors over government payment delays. The reform not only increases government lawsuit losses but also exposes their credit risk, as payment delays without court support signal government liquidity constraint. Investors respond by tightening lending and increasing interest rates, which curbs government spending.

China’s land market features a substantial industrial discount: industrial-zoned land is an order of magnitude cheaper than residential land. In contrast to explanations centered on subsidies to industry, we find that a primary determinant of this price gap is local public finance. Under the "land finance" system, land sales are an important source of revenues for Chinese local governments. We show that local governments, who serve as monopolistic land sellers in China, face a trade-off between supplying residential or industrial land that is determined by the different time profiles of revenues from industrial and residential land sales, local governments’ financial constraints, and the extent of local governments’ tax revenue sharing with other levels of government.