This paper explores the impact of government intervention on local analysts’ earnings forecasts, based on a scenario of financial misconduct in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, under the influence of the government, local analysts’ earnings forecasts for SOEs with financial misconduct are less accurate and more optimistically biased. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that forecast bias by local analysts is greater when officials have stronger promotion incentives, when regions are less market-oriented and have a larger share of the state-owned economy, and when SOEs contribute more to taxation and employment. In further analysis, we find that local analysts have a more optimistic tone in reports targeting non-compliant SOEs. Local analysts who depend heavily on political information will also issue more biased and optimistic forecasts on SOEs with violations. Finally, as a reward for achieving government goals, the local brokerages affiliated with these analysts and providing these optimistic forecasts are more likely to become underwriters in seasoned equity offerings of SOEs. This paper reveals that government intervention significantly influences analyst forecasts, providing implications for understanding the sources of analyst forecast bias.

This paper provides evidence that some seasoned equity offerings are motivated by public information. We test this channel in the supply chain setting, where supplier managers are more attentive than outside investors to customer news. We find that supplier firms are more likely to issue seasoned equity when their customer firms have negative earnings surprises. The results are mitigated when there is common scrutiny on the customer-supplier firm pairs by outside investors and analysts. Furthermore, long-run stock market performance appears to be worse for firms that issue seasoned equity following the negative earnings surprise of their customer firms.

Using Chinese data, we investigate the impact of the China Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy that sets an explicit requirement that firms need to distribute at least 20% of their average annual net profits as cash/stock dividends accumulatively in three consecutive years before refinancing via seasoned equity offerings. Firms with the payout level below (above) the cutoff imposed by the Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy are regarded as Treated (Control) group. We find that Treated firms are more likely to cut investment, especially long-term innovation investment, and perform poorly compared to Control group due to lack of money. Treated firms also tend to use earnings management assisting in financing through the debt market as an alternative way to raise money. The negative impact of cutting investment caused by the Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy is more pronounced for firms suffering from severe financial constraints, firms having good corporate governance, and firms located in less financial development areas. We attribute findings to the difficulty of accessing capital that is implicitly increased the China Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy, which alters firms’ behavior leading to insufficient investments and destroys firms’ value.

Is the demand curve for stocks downward-sloping? The index-inclusion literature tries to answer this question by looking at price reactions to stocks added or deleted from major stock indices. We look for new evidence using another well-established event: the negative price reaction to the seasoned equity offerings. While this can be caused by asymmetric information, another plausible explanation might be a downward-sloping demand curve for stocks. We argue that we can disentangle the two factors using a natural experiment in China's stock market, where companies' equity offering plans need to be approved by the regulator. We find strong negative price reactions to the announcement of such approval. Since all information on the overvaluation of the firm is released when the firm announces its equity offering plan, the negative reaction to the approval of the plan cannot be explained by changes in the valuation of the firm. Furthermore, we find different price reactions in China's segmented stock market when the firm only issues new shares in one of the two domestic markets (A- and B-share markets). The evidence suggests that a significant part of the negative price reaction of equity offerings is related to a supply shock to a downward sloping demand curve.