We introduce a real-time dispersion measure based on cross-sectional stock returns explicitly designed to capture retail-driven speculative episodes. Elevated return dispersion effectively identifies periods characterized by intensified retail investor trading behaviors, driven by salience, diagnostic expectations, and extrapolative beliefs. During these high-dispersion states, momentum strategies collapse, and short-term reversals become dominant. Conditioning momentum strategies on our dispersion measure resolves the longstanding puzzle of missing momentum in retail-intensive markets such as China, substantially enhancing profitability. A dynamic rotation strategy between momentum and short-term reversal portfolios guided by dispersion states achieves annualized Sharpe ratios nearly double those of static approaches. Extending our analysis internationally, we employ Google search trends as proxies for retail investor attention, confirming that dispersion robustly predicts momentum and reversal returns globally. Our findings underscore the behavioral channel through which retail-driven speculation conditions momentum dynamics, providing clear implications for dynamic portfolio management strategies.

This paper examines how China allocates its newly accumulated foreign assets by analyzing the long-run relationship between net national savings, foreign exchange reserves, and outward direct investment (ODI). Using quarterly data from 2005 to 2023, a cointegrated vector autoregression framework shows that ODI—particularly through state-owned enterprises— has emerged as an important channel for recycling national savings abroad. Although short-run reserve fluctuations persist, sustained reserve accumulation has become less central to China’s external asset management. This study contributes to the literature by highlighting the institutional role of state ownership in shaping cross-border investment patterns and by identifying ODI as a strategic mechanism for channeling national savings internationally. The findings shed new light on China’s evolving approach to external asset allocation and its broader economic and geopolitical implications.

This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy, introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers' leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance. Privately owned developers(POE) are hit harder than state-owned firms (SOE), with larger drops in sales and higher default risk. Using granular project-level data, we show that the policy reduces developer sales primarily by curtailing new-project supply: breached developers launch fewer projects. On the demand side, homebuyers reallocate purchases from privately owned developers to SOEs, further widening the POE-SOE gap. The policy also reduced local governments’ land-transfer revenues and increased reliance on local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) for land purchases. These LGFV-acquired parcels exhibit very low subsequent development rates, which may increase local governments’off-balance-sheet debt risks.

In the Chinese context, the term “overseas” refers to countries and regions outside the sovereignty and jurisdiction of China. Overseas listing is an important strategy for firms to integrate into global capital markets and enhance their corporate investment efficiency. Using data from 600 Chinese companies listed exclusively overseas and 860 domestically listed firms for the period 2009–2023, this study analyzes the impact of overseas listing on corporate investment efficiency using empirical research methods, underlying mediating mechanisms, and the moderating role of economic policy uncertainty. The findings show that overseas listing improves Chinese firms’ investment efficiency. Compared to listing on the United States securities market (Nshares), listing on the Hong Kong securities market, (H-shares) has a pronounced effect on enhancing investment efficiency. Enhanced information disclosure quality improves the investment efficiency of Chinese enterprises listed overseas. Economic policyuncertainty can strengthen the positive impact of overseas listing on corporate investment efficiency. This study shows that overseas listing improves investment efficiency of firms in developing countries and offers new insights into advancing micro-level opening-up in these countries.

This paper examines the role of institutional investors in shaping pricing dynamics within China’s nascent infrastructure Real Estate Investment Trust market. Introduced in 2021, China’s REITs have rapidly gained policy and market attention as a tool for financing large-scale infrastructure projects through equity-based securitisation. Unlike mature REIT markets, China’s infrastructure REITs are characterised by a high concentration of institutional ownership dominated by state-owned financial institutions. Using panel data on first 9 REITs from May 2021 to April 2024, we find that institutional ownership significantly boosts the premium to net asset value. This effect operates primarily through two channels: reduced market liquidity and increased idiosyncratic return volatility, likely reflecting institutions’ trading activity and informational advantages. The findings highlight how institutional capital serves as a confidence signal in China’s emerging REITs ecosystem. The study contributes to the global REITs literature by offering insights from an emerging market context and provides policy recommendations to guide China’s REITs market development toward greater transparency, diversity, and long-term resilience.

We compile a Chinese counterpart to the TRACE dataset and provide the first trade-level analysis of China’s wholesale corporate bond market—the second largest in the world. In contrast to the dealer-dominated, core–periphery networks typical of over-the-counter markets in developed economies, China’s corporate bond market shows limited dealer intermediation. Designated dealers are reluctant to intermediate trades,and non-dealers supply the majority of liquidity, leading to wide price dispersion and low trading activity. This weak dealer participation is not driven by information asymmetry but stems from balance sheet constraints among smaller dealers and large state-owned banks’ privileged access to profitable lending opportunities.

This study investigates the impact of RegTech adoption in the M&A regulatory review process on deal performance. Leveraging the staggered implementation of the SOEs Online Supervision System (SOSS) by China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) across its central and 31 provincial offices from 2018 to 2021, we find that SOSS directly enhances SASAC’s decision-making efficiency and improves its capacity to screen and approve higher-quality M&A deals. More importantly, SOE-led M&A transactions exhibit higher announcement returns as well as improved long-run stock and operating performance following the system’s implementation. The positive impact of SOSS is more pronounced for acquirers with stronger technological infrastructure, in transactions characterized by low transparency and weak governance, and in provinces with more stringent external scrutiny. Overall, by addressing regulator-firm information asymmetry and reinforcing managerial accountability, SOSS improves regulatory effectiveness in overseeing major investment activities among SOEs.

This paper examines how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects mergers and acquisitions (M&As) between companies with different levels of financing constraints. Existing literature overlooks the interactive effect of EPU and financing constraints on M&As, and empirical evidence regarding EPU's influence on financially constrained firms remains limited. China's unique ownership structure provides a valuable context for this analysis, as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) face fewer financing constraints than private firms. Using a 2007-2021 sample of Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies, we find that high EPU decreases the likelihood of private firms acquiring SOEs, while increases the likelihood of private firms being acquired by SOEs. These results suggest that under high EPU, financially constrained firms experience greater survival pressure, limiting their capacity to alleviate constraints by acquiring less-constrained targets. Conversely, less-constrained firms enhance their bargaining power and are more likely to acquire financially stressed counterparts. EPU facilitates control transfers from high-constraint to low-constraint firms, contributing to long-term market returns and improving financial market allocation efficiency. Our study contributes to the literature by shedding light on how EPU shapes divergent M&A behaviors based on firms’ financing constraints.

Innovation is crucial for long-term corporate value and competitive advantage; however, it can misalign the interests of managers and investors. Balancing managers’ short- and long-term goals is a pivotal challenge in promoting innovation incentives. Therefore, this study examines innovative incentives for managers of publicly traded firms to address the issue of agency problems. The study focuses on economic value-added (EVA) reform implemented by China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which encourages EVA-driven R&D investments as the primary management metric. The policy effectively motivates key corporate managers by reducing capital costs and stimulating increased innovation. Following this policy’s implementation, notable innovation disparities exist between state-owned enterprises and firms not subject to the reform. Furthermore, innovation incentives significantly affect overconfident company managers, yielding positive effects on innovation.

The Central Environmental Protection Inspector (CEPI) is a critical regulatory measure in China aimed at improving ecological quality. From a compliance cost perspective, we examine the impact of the CEPI on corporate environmental governance. The findings reveal an asymmetry in the CEPI's influence: it significantly promotes environmental governance efforts on the non-production side of enterprises, while having no substantial effect on the production side. Additionally, government environmental subsidies do not provide a resource incentive in the process of the CEPI influencing corporate environmental governance. However, local environmental governance pressure mitigates this asymmetry, leading the CEPI to significantly enhance environmental governance on both the production and non-production sides. Further analysis shows that under the synergistic effect of local environmental governance pressure, the CEPI encourages state-owned enterprises to focus on environmental governance on the production side, while non-state-owned enterprises tend to focus on the non-production side. Moreover, political connections reduce the positive impact of the CEPI on production costs under local environmental governance pressure. Finally, the CEPI also significantly encourages enterprises to expand their production scale. These findings offer valuable insights for refining the CEPI system to better promote corporate environmental governance.