This study examines how housing purchase restrictions (HPRs) affect firms' robotics adoption through labor cost increases. Exploiting policy-driven housing price shocks across Chinese cities, we find firms significantly accelerate robot adoption in response to higher labor costs. Effects are pronounced among financially unconstrained firms, state-owned enterprises, and firms with skilled or educated workforces. Automation investments subsequently improve firm productivity, profitability, and market positions. Our findings highlight unintended spillovers from housing regulations to firm-level technological decisions and suggest policymakers consider these indirect effects when designing local market interventions.

We use a sample of China’s listed firms and employ a naïve Bayesian machine learning algorithm to reveal that environmental information intangibility superficially promotes green innovation. We demonstrate that this effect is channelled through the acquisition of institutional resources, including bank loans and government subsidies. The impact of environmental information intangibility on green innovation is most pronounced within state-owned enterprises, large firms, and politically connected firms. Furthermore, we confirm that environmental information intangibility does not lead to improvements in innovation efficiency or quality. This implies that green innovation may serve as a symbolic environmental activity. Our findings contribute to the understanding of the consequences of environmental information intangibility, greenwashing behaviour, and their relationship to green innovation.

We empirically investigate the impact of state ownership on the private economic value and the scientific value of Chinese publicly listed firms’ innovation from 2003 to 2020, and explore its mechanism. We show that the stock-market-based methodology of estimating patent value proposed by Kogan et al. (2017) applies to the Chinese economy, and follow their approach to evaluate patents issued to Chinese listed firms. Using this new data and patent citation data, we find that state-owned enterprises have lower private value of innovation than non-state-owned enterprises, while their scientific values of innovation are not significantly different. We also provide evidence that the state-owned enterprises’ low profit-oriented R&D performance is due to their insufficient capabilities rather than ownership-specific corporate objectives.

The discussion on the innovative effects of intellectual property pledge financing is a mainstream trend. In this context, this study has improved the existing research from several aspects, such as broadening the dimensions of innovation, adding dynamic analysis, refining multidimensional mediation mechanisms, and employing unique samples. Ultimately, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Intellectual property pledge financing suppresses enterprise innovation, especially innovation quality, but this pattern will be broken by raising the threshold of innovation conditions. The reason is that strict innovation conditions can lead to a poor innovation foundation for enterprises, which are rarely affected by the fluctuation of funds obtained from intellectual property pledge financing. (2) Intellectual property pledge financing has a non-linear effect on firm innovation, characterized by an increase followed by a decrease, suggesting that intellectual property pledge financing in current China can only provide a temporary stimulus for firm innovation. (3) The relationship between intellectual property pledge financing and enterprise innovation is strongly moderated by the ownership, type, and size of the enterprise, with the inhibitory effect of intellectual property pledge financing on enterprise innovation occurring mainly in state-owned enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and small enterprises, while its positive effects are more pronounced in private enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, and medium-sized enterprises. (4) Financing constraints, internal incentives, external supervision, and signaling mechanisms are indeed key pathways through which intellectual property pledge financing affects firm innovation, especially when we analyse these mechanisms using dynamic models.

This paper explores the impact of government intervention on local analysts’ earnings forecasts, based on a scenario of financial misconduct in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, under the influence of the government, local analysts’ earnings forecasts for SOEs with financial misconduct are less accurate and more optimistically biased. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that forecast bias by local analysts is greater when officials have stronger promotion incentives, when regions are less market-oriented and have a larger share of the state-owned economy, and when SOEs contribute more to taxation and employment. In further analysis, we find that local analysts have a more optimistic tone in reports targeting non-compliant SOEs. Local analysts who depend heavily on political information will also issue more biased and optimistic forecasts on SOEs with violations. Finally, as a reward for achieving government goals, the local brokerages affiliated with these analysts and providing these optimistic forecasts are more likely to become underwriters in seasoned equity offerings of SOEs. This paper reveals that government intervention significantly influences analyst forecasts, providing implications for understanding the sources of analyst forecast bias.

The role of Market-incentive environmental regulation (MIER) within the framework of environmental governance is patently evident. While extant literature lauds the advantageous outcomes attributed to the environmental protection tax (EPT) which as a representative of MIER, our empirical inquiry presents a contrasting narrative. By employing the sophisticated Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) methodology and utilizing data from A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015-2022, our investigation reveals a significant decrease in firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) following the implementation of EPT. Our core assertion is fortified through the discernment of two plausible mechanisms, namely, the production downsizing effect and the production capital crowding-out effect. Building upon this revelation, we delve into the nuanced pathways through which firms can strategically mitigate the impacts of EPT, encompassing the enhancement of human capital, amplification of research and development (R&D) investments, and fortification of overall firm resilience. Heterogeneity analysis discloses a notably heightened impact of EPT on TFP of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), larger enterprises and enterprises located in eastern regions. Ultimately, an approximately cost-benefit analysis conclusively demonstrates that the benefits derived from EPT far surpass the costs incurred by the concomitant industrial output reduction, which further illustrates the rationale for the implementation of EPT.

We study how financial markets integrate news about pollution abatement costs into firm values. Using China’s automation of pollution monitoring, we find that firms with factories in bad-news cities---cities that used to report much lower pollution than the automated reading---see significant declines in stock prices. This is consistent with the view that investors expect firms in high-pollution cities to pay significant adjustment and abatement costs to become “greener.” However, the efficiency with which such information is incorporated into prices varies widely---while the market reaction is quick in the Hong Kong stock market, it is considerably delayed in the mainland ones, resulting in a drift. The equity markets expect most of these abatement costs to be paid by private firms and not by state-owned enterprises, and by brown firms and not by green firms.

A unique natural experiment in China – the city-level staggered introduction of admin-istrative approval centers (AAC) – reduces bank loan processing times by substantially speeding up the process of registering collateral without affecting credit decisions. Fol-lowing the establishment of an AAC, firms significantly reduce their cash holdings. State-owned enterprises are less affected. Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings de-creases, as does the cash flow sensitivity of investment. The share of short-term debt increases, while inventory holdings and reliance on trade credit decrease. Defaults also decrease. These results suggest that timely access to credit has important implications on firms’ financial management.

Does large-scale privatization increase income inequality? To answer this question, we analyze the impact of China’s reform of state-owned enterprises on labor market outcomes in urban areas from 1992 to 2004, exploiting cross-prefecture variation in reform exposure stemming from initial differences in the employment shares of urban collective enterprises and state-owned enterprises. Our analysis reveals that workers in prefectures with higher exposure to the reform experienced a more rapid decline in employment and a slower increase in income, compared to those in less exposed areas. Further analysis shows that individuals with lower income and those with lower educational attainment experienced greater losses. A back-of-the-envelope analysis indicates that the reform contributed to more than 40% of the study period’s increase in income inequality.

The scale expansion of low-carbon industries and the green transformation of carbon-intensive industries are two sides of the same coin in achieving the “dual carbon” goals. However, research on transition finance supporting the upgrading of traditional existing carbon-intensive industries remains insufficient. The key to examining the effectiveness of transition finance lies in distinguishing whether the supported enterprises are engaging in greenwashing or green evolution. Based on data of Chinese A-share listed companies in the carbon-intensive industries, an empirical study is conducted and offers the following findings: (1) Transition finance not only does not increase greenwashing but also promotes comprehensive green innovation in carbon-intensive enterprises. (2) In terms of the influencing mechanism, transition finance exerts “resource effects” and “signaling effects,” promoting green innovation by improving debt maturity mismatch and attracting green institutional investors. (3) Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive impact of transition finance on green innovation is particularly pronounced among enterprises in the eastern region, state-owned enterprises, and those with lower levels of managerial myopia. (4) Further industry spillover effects analysis reveals that transition finance empowers green innovation within industries though peer effects and competitive effects. The findings are essential for understanding the effectiveness of transition finance and offer valuable insights for policymakers.