Software and accounting advances have led to a rapid expansion in and proliferation of loyalty tokens, typically bundled as part of product price. Some tokens, such as in the airline industry, already account for tens of billions of dollars and are a major contributor to revenues. An open question is whether, as technology evolves, firms will have a strong incentive to make loyalty tokens tradable, raising regulation issues, including with monetary and banking authorities. This paper argues that for the vast majority of tokens, issuing firms have a strong incentive to make them non-tradable. The core incentive for token issuance here is that an issuer can earn a higher rate of return on the ``float'' (tokens issued but not yet used) than its retail customers can, much like a bank. Our main finding is that an issuer earns higher revenue by making tokens non-tradable even though the consumer would be willing to pay a higher price for tradable tokens. We further show that an issuer with stronger market power tends to allow more frequent token redemption, and its revenue is more token-dependent. We test the model's predictions with data on airline mileage and hotel reward programs and document consistent empirical results that align with our theory.

This paper examines the Urban Construction Investment Bond (UCIB) as a tradable product in the financial market and a financial tool for local government in China. The development of this financial product is contextualised in infrastructure finance and local government debt. The creation of UCIB helps finance infrastructure investment and potentially reveal the relative risks through the secondary market. The spatial distribution of UCIB demonstrates different relative risks of this financial instrument in local conditions. The government uses this financial tool to bridge the emerging capital market and infrastructure finance, and the Chinese financial market now treats UCIB as an emerging asset class. The development of UCIB has sped up the pace of financialisation in China. Although relative risks help investors choose different UCIBs, the overall risk of UCIB cannot be ignored.

We study how service trade affects structural transformation and regional patterns of specialization. Using unique Canadian trade data, we document that i) interprovincial and international trade of services have increased between 1992-2017; ii) inter-provincial trade is larger in services compared to goods; iii) structural transformation occurs from goods to tradable services, especially in tradable service-intensive provinces; and iv) there is significant regional specialization in producing goods and services across provinces. Using a spatial model of structural transformation and trade, we quantify the effects of service trade, domestic and international, on the share of the tradable-service sector and regional specialization. Our results indicate that domestic service trade has significantly contributed to the regional specialization. On the other hand, we find that, international service trade is more responsible for the increase of the tradable service share than domestic service trade in the aggregate Canadian economy.

This paper investigates the impact of ownership and ownership concentration on the performance of China’s listed firms. By recognizing the differences between ownership and ownership concentration and between total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration, we conduct simplex, interactive and joint analyses. We find that ownership concentration is approximately associated with higher firm performance. Ownership concentration is more powerful than any category of ownership in determining firm performance. Firm performance is better when the state is the largest of the top shareholders and/or institutions dominate ownership among the top tradable shareholders. Our results support the theory that high ownership concentration mitigates the agency problem.

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest levels of only a single concentration.

Until recently, Chinese companies publicly listed in domestic stock exchanges had two classes of stock: tradable and non-tradable shares. These two classes of stock had the same voting, cash flow, and all other legal rights except that non-tradable shares cannot be transferred at the open markets. From 2005 to mid-2007, Chinese government completed the ownership reform, so-called the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), to convert all non-tradable shares into tradable shares. Under this reform process, the holders of non-tradable shares had to negotiate with those of tradable shares to determine how much liquidity premium, or the compensation ratio, non-tradable shareholders have to pay to tradable shareholders in order to obtain the liquidity right. This paper starts with a theoretical model to identify the fundamental factors, including price discount before and after the SSSR reform, the percentage of non-tradable shares in total shares, the volatility of tradable share price, and the lockup period, that should determine the compensation ratio. We show that those factors except price discount before the reform are statistically significant in determining the compensation ratio proposed by non-tradable shareholders. We further show that the agency problems also reveal themselves in the compensation ratios. Specifically, when a firm is controlled by a governmental agency, the compensation is higher. However, the compensation is lower when more concentrated in the top ten holders, especially when shares are held by mutual funds. Thus, the evidence is consistent with the notion that the agency problem exists in China’s fund managers. Finally, we show that the existence of agency problems also reduce the importance of fundamental factors in determining the compensation ratios.

A fundamental question in finance is whether and how removing market frictions is associated with efficiency gains. We study this question using share issue privatization in China that took place through the split share structure reform. Prior to the reform, domestic A-shares were divided into tradable and non-tradable shares with identical cash flow and voting rights. Under the reform, holders of the non-tradable shares negotiated a compensation plan with holders of the tradable shares in order to make their shares tradable. We hypothesize that efficiency gains in terms of better risk sharing play an important role in the determination of compensation. We show that the size of compensation is positively associated with both the gain in risk sharing and the price impact of more shares coming to the market after the reform, and is negatively associated with the bargaining power of holders of non-tradable shares and firm performance. Our study highlights the role of risk sharing in China’s share issue privatization.

In this paper, the relationship between firm performance’s combinations and differences as well as the timeliness of actual and scheduled third-quarter report disclosures is examined by regressing on data extracted from the semi-annual and the third-quarter reports of Chinese listed companies between 2003 and 2004. After controlling for the possible impact of semi-annual report disclosures, stock exchanges, firm size, ratios of tradable A-shares and B-shares, and so on, the results indicate that managers of listed companies may have the incentive to manipulate information in the actual and scheduled third-quarter report disclosures; the rule of “releasing good news earlier than bad news” is thus not strictly complied with. This paper further indicates that a firm’s performance, its combinations and differences, have a significant impact on the timeliness of disclosures of these two reports. I therefore suggest minimising the probability of information manipulation of listed companies, boosting investor relation management to safeguard the rights of small and medium shareholders, and enhancing the timeliness of information disclosures of Chinese listed companies.

This paper investigates the impact of ownership and ownership concentration on the performance of China’s listed firms. By recognizing the differences between ownership and ownership concentration and between total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration, we conduct simplex, interactive and joint analyses. We find that ownership concentration is approximately associated with higher firm performance. Ownership concentration is more powerful than any category of ownership in determining firm performance. Firm performance is better when the state is the largest of the top shareholders and/or institutions dominate ownership among the top tradable shareholders. Our results support the theory that high ownership concentration mitigates the agency problem.

Comprehensive data on corporate announcements of Chinese firms allows us to examine the preference for, and determinants of, cash and stock dividends. The results indicate that Chinese public investors prefer stock dividends over cash dividends, which are preferred by large state and legal person shareholders generally. Stock dividends, which do not require an explicit cash outflow from a firm, are found to be positively related to higher earnings, supporting the signalling hypothesis of dividend policy. In an imperfect market, these results have some implications for government regulation of financial markets.