The Full Guaranteed Purchase System began to replace the subsidy system as the core policy for promoting renewable energy integration, designating grid companies as the sole entity responsible for the physical integration of renewable energy. Meanwhile, the Tradable Green Certificates system provides environmental benefits for renewable power generators through market mechanisms. Therefore, exploring the strategic choices of various entities under the dual policy interventions, and uncovering the mechanisms for realizing electricity energy value and green value under different integration models, is of great significance for advancing China’s renewable energy integration. Based on China’s actual conditions, this study integrates the features of both policies and constructs a three-party evolutionary game model involving government, power generators, and grid enterprises to simulate their interactions and identify key factors influencing strategic choices. The results show that active government regulation effectively encourages positive strategies from both generators and grid companies, and that active power integration by grid companies further promotes green power generation. A “stepwise complementary” relationship exists among reputation gains, reputation losses, and regulatory costs: higher reputation gains can offset decision-making resistance arising from increased regulatory costs. Green power generation costs and innovation costs have significant negative effects on strategic choices, while the guaranteed purchase price has a significant positive effect on generators’ active strategies. The penalty parameter plays a key positive role in grid companies’ active strategies, and the guaranteed purchase price significantly influences their active integration behavior. This paper provides recommendations for motivating all entities actively participate in the consumption process.

Examining a cross section of seven regional Emission Trading System (ETS) and thenational ETS in China, we explore the interplay between firms and governments. We find heterogeneous adaptation among firms. Firms in regions anticipating stringentpolicies reduce emissions and invest in decarbonization technology, whereas expecta-tions of lenient policies lead to increased emissions. Meanwhile, governments set upmore stringent carbon policies when firms decarbonize more proactively. The resultsare robust to allowance allocation policies, such as cap-and-trade or tradable perfor-mance standards. Our findings underscore the importance of strategic interactionsbetween firms and governments in decarbonization.

We examine the risk-return trade-off in market anomalies within the A-share market, showing that even decaying anomalies may proxy for latent risk factors. To balance forecast bias and variance, we integrate the 1/N and mean-variance frameworks, minimizing out-of-sample forecast error. Treating anomalies as tradable assets, we construct optimized long-short portfolios with strong performance: an average annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.56 and a certainty-equivalent return of 29.4% for a meanvariance investor. These premiums persist post-publication and are largely driven by liquidity risk exposures. Our results remain robust to market frictions, including shortsale constraints and transaction costs. We conclude that even decaying market anomalies may reflect priced risk premia rather than mere mispricing. This research provides practical guidance for academics and investors in return predictability and asset allocation, especially in the unique context of the Chinese A-share market.

We examine the risk-return trade-off in market anomalies within the A-share market, showing that even decaying anomalies may proxy for latent risk factors. To balance forecast bias and variance, we integrate the 1/N and mean-variance frameworks, minimizing out-of-sample forecast error. Treating anomalies as tradable assets, we construct optimized long-short portfolios with strong performance: an average annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.56 and a certainty-equivalent return of 29.4% for a mean-variance investor. These premiums persist post-publication and are largely driven by liquidity risk exposures. Our results remain robust to market frictions, including short-sale constraints and transaction costs. We conclude that even decaying market anomalies may reflect priced risk premia rather than mere mispricing. This research provides practical guidance for academics and investors in return predictability and asset allocation, especially in the unique context of the Chinese A-share market.

Software and accounting advances have led to a rapid expansion in and proliferation of loyalty tokens, typically bundled as part of product price. Some tokens, such as in the airline industry, already account for tens of billions of dollars and are a major contributor to revenues. An open question is whether, as technology evolves, firms will have a strong incentive to make loyalty tokens tradable, raising regulation issues, including with monetary and banking authorities. This paper argues that for the vast majority of tokens, issuing firms have a strong incentive to make them non-tradable. The core incentive for token issuance here is that an issuer can earn a higher rate of return on the ``float'' (tokens issued but not yet used) than its retail customers can, much like a bank. Our main finding is that an issuer earns higher revenue by making tokens non-tradable even though the consumer would be willing to pay a higher price for tradable tokens. We further show that an issuer with stronger market power tends to allow more frequent token redemption, and its revenue is more token-dependent. We test the model's predictions with data on airline mileage and hotel reward programs and document consistent empirical results that align with our theory.

This paper examines the Urban Construction Investment Bond (UCIB) as a tradable product in the financial market and a financial tool for local government in China. The development of this financial product is contextualised in infrastructure finance and local government debt. The creation of UCIB helps finance infrastructure investment and potentially reveal the relative risks through the secondary market. The spatial distribution of UCIB demonstrates different relative risks of this financial instrument in local conditions. The government uses this financial tool to bridge the emerging capital market and infrastructure finance, and the Chinese financial market now treats UCIB as an emerging asset class. The development of UCIB has sped up the pace of financialisation in China. Although relative risks help investors choose different UCIBs, the overall risk of UCIB cannot be ignored.

We study how service trade affects structural transformation and regional patterns of specialization. Using unique Canadian trade data, we document that i) interprovincial and international trade of services have increased between 1992-2017; ii) inter-provincial trade is larger in services compared to goods; iii) structural transformation occurs from goods to tradable services, especially in tradable service-intensive provinces; and iv) there is significant regional specialization in producing goods and services across provinces. Using a spatial model of structural transformation and trade, we quantify the effects of service trade, domestic and international, on the share of the tradable-service sector and regional specialization. Our results indicate that domestic service trade has significantly contributed to the regional specialization. On the other hand, we find that, international service trade is more responsible for the increase of the tradable service share than domestic service trade in the aggregate Canadian economy.

This paper investigates the impact of ownership and ownership concentration on the performance of China’s listed firms. By recognizing the differences between ownership and ownership concentration and between total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration, we conduct simplex, interactive and joint analyses. We find that ownership concentration is approximately associated with higher firm performance. Ownership concentration is more powerful than any category of ownership in determining firm performance. Firm performance is better when the state is the largest of the top shareholders and/or institutions dominate ownership among the top tradable shareholders. Our results support the theory that high ownership concentration mitigates the agency problem.

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest levels of only a single concentration.

Until recently, Chinese companies publicly listed in domestic stock exchanges had two classes of stock: tradable and non-tradable shares. These two classes of stock had the same voting, cash flow, and all other legal rights except that non-tradable shares cannot be transferred at the open markets. From 2005 to mid-2007, Chinese government completed the ownership reform, so-called the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), to convert all non-tradable shares into tradable shares. Under this reform process, the holders of non-tradable shares had to negotiate with those of tradable shares to determine how much liquidity premium, or the compensation ratio, non-tradable shareholders have to pay to tradable shareholders in order to obtain the liquidity right. This paper starts with a theoretical model to identify the fundamental factors, including price discount before and after the SSSR reform, the percentage of non-tradable shares in total shares, the volatility of tradable share price, and the lockup period, that should determine the compensation ratio. We show that those factors except price discount before the reform are statistically significant in determining the compensation ratio proposed by non-tradable shareholders. We further show that the agency problems also reveal themselves in the compensation ratios. Specifically, when a firm is controlled by a governmental agency, the compensation is higher. However, the compensation is lower when more concentrated in the top ten holders, especially when shares are held by mutual funds. Thus, the evidence is consistent with the notion that the agency problem exists in China’s fund managers. Finally, we show that the existence of agency problems also reduce the importance of fundamental factors in determining the compensation ratios.