We identify choke points in global production networks as industries bridging flows across global value chains. These industries exhibit low substitutability: US firms exposed to Chinese choke points during the 2022 Covid-19 lockdowns experienced large and persistent sales declines. The Red Sea crisis demonstrates how negative shocks to water transport, a single choke point, propagate throughout the global network. This structural fragility is priced in global stock markets: firms in choke point industries earn annualized benchmark-adjusted returns exceeding 6%. The premium compensates for aggregate consumption risk, as downturns in choke point industries predict lower future US and global consumption growth.

This paper investigates the sales seasonality premium (Gustavo et al., 2020) in the Chinese stock market. We document a significant sales seasonality premium in the cross section of stocks listed on Chinese market. A long-short strategy of buying low-sales stocks and shorting high-sales season stocks generate a monthly return of 0.84% with a Newey-West t statistic of 2.94. The return spreads between low-sales season stocks and high-sales season stocks are robust to well-known anomalies and are larger in magnitude among large-cap companies. We also find that the return spreads are more pronounced within industries with relatively fixed patterns in product demand. The sales seasonality premium in the Chinese stock market is found to be a combined result of investor rationality and irrationality.

This paper examines whether subjective macroeconomic expectations predict equity risk premia in China. Using professional macro forecasts from the Wind database over 2011- 2023, we construct a composite macroeconomic expectation index via PLS. We find that the index significantly and positively predicts future equity premia both in-sample and out-ofsample, implying a countercyclical equity premium. The predictive power is robust to a wide range of macro-financial controls and delivers economically meaningful gains in portfolio allocation. Further analysis shows that controlling for forecast errors does not attenuate predictability, and the subjective index largely subsumes the information in realized macro variables, suggesting that it captures forward-looking macroeconomic conditions rather than belief bias. Cross-sectional and long-horizon results reinforce this interpretation.

On October 10, 2025, Bitcoin fell 9.1% in thirty minutes on Binance following a geopolitical shock, contributing to a 16.0% peak-to-trough drawdown over 33 hours. Using minute-level Binance and Bybit data across spot, perpetual futures, and mark price feeds for BTC, ETH, and SOL, this paper situates the event within an empirical distribution of 62 BTC drawdowns exceeding 3% over 30 minutes during 2024–2026. October 10 ranks first of 62 on every microstructure metric simultaneously: a SOL futures-spot drawdown gap of 11.0 percentage points (z = +7.65), a BTC basis swing of $1,367 (z = +6.18), and a mark to-spot undershoot of $2,507 (z = −4.21). It also ranks first on multivariate anomaly measures (Mahalanobis distance 7.70; sum of absolute z-scores 45.9, 2.4 times the runner-up). A parsimonious conceptual cascade model identifies the mark price oracle as the crypto-specific amplifier.

Firms frequently overstate digital transformation in public disclosures while committing less in observable investment, a phenomenon known as digital catering. We examine whether digital public financial infrastructure can discipline such symbolic behavior. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design on Chinese A-share listed firms over 2014--2024, we find that exposure to China's e-CNY pilot reduces digital catering by roughly 14% relative to the sample mean. The decline is driven almost entirely by reduced rhetorical digital transformation, while balance-sheet-based digital commitment rises only marginally: the e-CNY pilot is associated with substantially less digital talk, but not with a commensurate increase in digital walk in the short run. The effect operates through lower agency costs and reduced information asymmetry, and follows an amplification--substitution pattern---stronger among digital-sector and accounting-opaque firms, weaker where internal controls and institutional ownership are already strong. The evidence identifies financial-transaction verifiability as a novel source of discipline over corporate cheap talk: CBDC-related infrastructure constrains unsupported symbolic claims without immediately accelerating substantive digital investment.

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Against the backdrop of systemic financial risk prevention and the pursuit of a virtuous cycle in the real economy, whether Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) shareholding alleviates maturity mismatch of corporate investment and financing activities is a question of critical importance, not only for the development of individual firms but also for high-quality macroeconomic growth. Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2021, this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the impact of LGFVs shareholding on corporate maturity mismatch. The empirical results indicate that LGFVs shareholding can significantly alleviate corporate maturity mismatch and the finding is still robust across a series of empirical checks. Mechanism analyses show that LGFVs shareholding improves firms’ long-term financing capacity through a resource provision channel and restrains overinvestment through a governance optimization channel, thereby collectively mitigating corporate maturity mismatch. Further analysis indicates that the mitigating effect of LGFVs shareholding is more pronounced in firms with concentrated LGFVs shareholding, firms controlled by non-state-owned capital and firms under higher economic policy uncertainty. Our findings provide valuable theoretical insights for policy design aimed at optimizing corporate financial behavior and curbing corporate financial risks.

The robustness of the securities market is a necessary condition for ensuring the stable operation of the financial market, and stock price fluctuations have always been a major concern for academia and investors. One of the main influencing factors of stock price fluctuations is macroeconomic monetary policy. As one of the important control tools of macroeconomic monetary policy, the impact of benchmark interest rates on stock price fluctuations cannot be ignored. This paper takes Chinese A-shares as the research object, analyzes the impact of benchmark interest rate changes on stock price fluctuations, and further introduces investor sentiment as a mediating variable to analyze its role in the transmission process of monetary policy. This paper selects monthly data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2024 and conducts empirical tests by constructing direct effect models and mediating effect models. The research results show that: First, benchmark interest rates have a significant negative impact on stock price fluctuations; second, benchmark interest rates can indirectly affect stock price fluctuations by influencing investor sentiment, with investor sentiment playing a partial mediating role. The research conclusions of this paper help to deepen the understanding of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy's impact on securities prices, and provide micro-evidence for monetary policymakers to assess the impact of policy adjustments on capital market stability, while also providing a reference for investors to understand the risk characteristics of the securities market under changes in the interest rate environment.

We construct a text-based measure of war-related diplomatic sentiment from 154,185 foreignministry communications across the 15 largest world economies. The daily index tracks military escalations and ceasefires, varies across countries, and predicts newspaper-based geopolitical risk more than the reverse. Adverse Chinese rhetoric foreshadows stronger southbound reallocation into Hong Kong equities and weaker Stock Connect flows; a one-unit decline shifts daily flows by $42.4 million towards outflows, operating through a relative-price channel widening the AH premium rather than onshore declines. In monthly cross-country analyses, only the U.S. shows safe-haven behavior; adverse rhetoric raises Chinese and U.S. trading volume and U.S. volatility.

This paper develops a delegation-based framework to explain how institutional design shapes pricing incentives under risk. Using China’s 2016 IPO reform—which abolished prefunding requirements and transferred payment obligations from investors to underwriters—as a natural experiment, we show that introducing subscription-payment risk (SPR) renders underwriter’s partial residual claimants with respect to unpaid allocations. Building on Baron’s (1982) delegation model, we argue that the reform amplifies information asymmetry and induces underwriters to adopt more conservative pricing strategies to manage perceived payment risk. Empirically, IPOs exposed to SPR exhibit greater underpricing and lower offer prices, particularly when investor bids reflect stronger valuation pessimism. The effect tends to be less pronounced for reputable underwriters and when foreign institutional investors participate. Overall, the evidence demonstrates how risk redistribution and institutional frictions jointly shape underwriter behavior and pricing efficiency in primary equity markets.