Asymmetric response

  • 详情 "Accelerator" or "Brake Pads": Evidence from Chinese A-Share Listed Financial Firms
    The asymmetric dissemination of information among financial firms in the financial market reflects their asymmetric response to the dissemination of both positive and negative information. However, it is worth studying whether this asymmetry will intensify or alleviate under different financial market conditions. Based on high-frequency minute stock price data of Chinese A-share listed financial firms from July 2020 to July 2023, we decompose the good and bad information, as well as the positive and negative volatility information in the return series. We utilize the quantile cross-spectral correlation method to construct an information overflow network at monthly intervals. We use the MVMQ-CAViaR model to estimate the value at risk (VaR) for various quantiles and build a risk spillover network that incorporates both positive and negative tail risk information, using the quantile dynamic SIM-COVAR-TENET model. We calculated the network dissemination efficiency of both good and bad information, including average speed, speed deviation, densest speed, and depth, to explore the changes in the asymmetry of good and bad information dissemination under different financial market conditions. We get that when the financial market is booming, financial firms’ asymmetric response to good and bad information will increase, and the firms will pay more attention to bad information. When the financial market declines, the asymmetric response of financial firms to good and bad information is diminished, and their sensitivity to both positive and negative information is heightened. In addition, the dissemination of bad information by firms in the five sub-financial industries across various markets exacerbates the asymmetric response of other financial firms to good and bad information. More importantly, the release of positive return information, negative volatility information, and highly negative tail risk information by the real estate financial firms all impact the asymmetric response of financial firms to good and bad information in a prosperous financial market. In recessionary financial markets, financial regulators can strategically release positive information to mitigate the decline in the financial market. Conversely, in a booming financial market, financial regulators should be cautious of the negative impact that bad information can have on financial firms, particularly in relation to the excessive growth of the real estate sector and the potential chain reaction of significant adverse events.
  • 详情 "Accelerator" or "Brake Pads": Evidence from Chinese A-Share Listed Financial Firms
    The asymmetric dissemination of information among financial firms in the financial market reflects their asymmetric response to the dissemination of both positive and negative information. However, it is worth studying whether this asymmetry will intensify or alleviate under different financial market conditions. Based on high-frequency minute stock price data of Chinese A-share listed financial firms from July 2020 to July 2023, we decompose the good and bad information, as well as the positive and negative volatility information in the return series. We utilize the quantile cross-spectral correlation method to construct an information overflow network at monthly intervals. We use the MVMQ-CAViaR model to estimate the value at risk (VaR) for various quantiles and build a risk spillover network that incorporates both positive and negative tail risk information, using the quantile dynamic SIM-COVAR-TENET model. We calculated the network dissemination efficiency of both good and bad information, including average speed, speed deviation, densest speed, and depth, to explore the changes in the asymmetry of good and bad information dissemination under different financial market conditions. We get that when the financial market is booming, financial firms’ asymmetric response to good and bad information will increase, and the firms will pay more attention to bad information. When the financial market declines, the asymmetric response of financial firms to good and bad information is diminished, and their sensitivity to both positive and negative information is heightened. In addition, the dissemination of bad information by firms in the five sub-financial industries across various markets exacerbates the asymmetric response of other financial firms to good and bad information. More importantly, the release of positive return information, negative volatility information, and highly negative tail risk information by the real estate financial firms all impact the asymmetric response of financial firms to good and bad information in a prosperous financial market. In recessionary financial markets, financial regulators can strategically release positive information to mitigate the decline in the financial market. Conversely, in a booming financial market, financial regulators should be cautious of the negative impact that bad information can have on financial firms, particularly in relation to the excessive growth of the real estate sector and the potential chain reaction of significant adverse events.
  • 详情 Monetary Policy Transmission with Heterogeneous Banks and Firms: The Case of China
    We document that monetary policy has asymmetric effects on investments by large and small firms in China. Large firms’ investment are highly responsive to monetary expansions, but less affected by monetary contractions. In contrast, small firms’ investments are less responsive to monetary expansions, but significantly affected by monetary contractions. We argue that this asymmetric responses of large and small firms stem from their differential access to credits in a two-tiered banking system. Large firms borrow from the big state-owned banks, which have a strong depositor base, whereas small firms borrow mainly from small banks which does not have a large depositor base and therefore rely heavily on the inter-bank market for financing their loans to small firms. We build a DSGE model with heterogeneous banks, heterogeneous firms, and an inter-bank market that is calibrated to the Chinese data. We show that the model’s quantitative predictions about the effects of monetary policy on large and small firms are consistent with the facts we documented.
  • 详情 Monetary Policy Transmission with Heterogeneous Banks and Firms: The Case of China
    We document that monetary policy has asymmetric effects on investments by large and small firms in China. Large firms’ investment are highly responsive to monetary expansions, but less affected by monetary contractions. In contrast, small firms’ investments are less responsive to monetary expansions, but significantly affected by monetary contractions. We argue that this asymmetric responses of large and small firms stem from their differential access to credits in a two-tiered banking system. Large firms borrow from the big state-owned banks, which have a strong depositor base, whereas small firms borrow mainly from small banks which does not have a large depositor base and therefore rely heavily on the inter-bank market for financing their loans to small firms. We build a DSGE model with heterogeneous banks, heterogeneous firms, and an inter-bank market that is calibrated to the Chinese data. We show that the model’s quantitative predictions about the effects of monetary policy on large and small firms are consistent with the facts we documented.